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Not ‘man’ but ‘men’ inhabit the earth and form a world between them.1 
 
Particularly strong public misgivings in various parts of Europe about wider 
application of genetic modification in agriculture and food, as well as intense 
disagreements and contestations about its necessity and desirability necessitate an 
exploration of how law treats serious disagreements about the development and use of 
radically new technologies. Intense difficulties apparent in the EU regulation of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) from these public contestations prod focus on a 
particular set of problems that are central to contemporary law’s claim to democratic 
normativity. Widespread skepticism about underlying policy-making and policy results 
among citizenry, accompanied by violent and non-violent protest (elaborated later in the 
Chapter) pose a serious strain to classical modes of representation in liberal democracies.2 
Aspirations for appropriate representation of citizen concerns about controversial 
technologies necessitate improvisations that further democratize the regulation of 
technology in a way that deliberations about its desirability, safety and appropriateness 
move beyond the existing arenas of state structures and techno-scientific communities.  
This thesis seeks to identify the existing room for public participation in EU 
regulation of GMOs, for reasons elaborated in this Chapter. This elaboration identifies 
normative and consequentialist reasons for emphasizing legal engagements with public 
contestations about technology. It focuses on public participation in decision-making as an 
important and necessary part of legal engagements in addressing the aforementioned 
representational question. Elaborated later, though public participation is recognized in 
EU policy documents as necessary and normatively superior, studies show that such 
policy commitments are seldom translated into justiciable legal principles. This thesis 
examines the current regime of EU GMO regulation to understand if and how public 
participation is furthered. Enlargement of arenas of deliberation in regulation of 
controversial technologies to public participation is particularly important in situations 
                                                
1 Hanna Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin 1963) 175. Emphasis added.  
2 WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy, Uncertain Safety: Allocating Responsibilities for Safety 
(Amsterdam University Press 2008) 88. The representational aspect is raised ‘also because of the 
formulation of alternative plans to regulate controversial technologies by concerned citizens’. 
 2  
where radical incertitudes about the effects of such technologies in ecology and society 
are visible. Such citizen participation becomes important also when public values 
regarding the regulation of research, development and use of such technologies are starkly 
divided. If techno-scientific communities and relevant regulatory structures are unable to 
acceptably mediate public concerns about safety and other values, it requires bringing 
rationalities from other sections of society to the regulatory table through public 
participation.3 In this context, how law is employed towards implementation of the 
existing policy commitments to public participation in decision-making needs further 
examination, which is attempted in this thesis. 
This Chapter starts with an emphasis on political choices regarding technological 
trajectories that need to be deliberated, since path dependencies accompany the promotion 
and pursuit of any technological trajectory; for instance, genetic modification in 
agriculture can bring about a set of dependencies significantly different from the pursuit of 
organic or conventional agriculture. After introducing the technology of genetic 
modification, and its applications in agriculture and food, the Chapter underlines the 
epistemic and political difficulties of finding the appropriate mix of benefits and threats 
inherent to the development of this technology. Subsequently, the Chapter discusses the 
nature of public contestations about GMOs in the EU, which is perceptible, considerable 
and persistent. This is followed by an elaboration of the normative necessity for law to 
engage with such wide-spread public contestations. Though engagement can generally 
mean a number of things, what is most relevant for the thesis are the rationalities through 
which public concerns can be mediated, and the legal principles that effectuate this. Legal 
instruments and principles implementing the regulatory tool of risk to mediate public 
concerns about finding an appropriate level of safety for the use of GMOs is such an 
instance of engagement.  
This Chapter then proceeds to identify utilitarian benefits for an appropriate 
development of technology through a legal insistence on engagement with public 
contestations and concerns about regulation of technology. In addition, the continuing 
concern of democratic deficit in postnational frameworks like the EU is identified as a 
supplementary reason for the need to further democratize the regulation of controversial 
technologies. The Chapter also elaborates characterizations of contemporary science as 
                                                
3 See for instance, Dahl’s definition of democracy in terms of granting public contestation, where 
rationalities emanating from groups other than dominant governing groups can inform these contestations. 
Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press 1971) 4. 
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post-normal or post-academic in an effort to appropriately place scientific advice in 
regulation. This is predicated by the central role of expert scientific advice in the release 
of GMOs in EU, noted later in the thesis. Finally, this Chapter identifies policy 
commitments in the EU for public participation in decision-making, and specifies the 
assumptions behind the term in this thesis. It carries forward explicit policy commitments 
to public participation in the EU to investigate and analyze the room provided by law for 
public participation in EU regulation of GMOs.  
 
1.1 Why focus on law’s engagement with public contestations about 
technology? 
A focus on contestations about technology, and regulatory choices between technology’s 
various trajectories, is closely connected to the recognition that technological change is 
path-dependent.4 This recognition refuses to buy into the myths of techno-scientific 
change as an unravelling of a pre-ordained track of optimal progress and universal 
scientific reason. Such an approach brings focus on the spectres of technological slippery 
slopes that might not be appropriate for an ecologically sustainable economy, or might 
even be a debilitating tax on the possibilities of further democratisation of our polities. 
Conceptually, notions of co-shaping of technology and society, i.e. how social shaping of 
technology and technological shaping of society are inter-penetrative, underline the need 
to focus on treating contestations about technological trajectories as central to concerns of 
democratising polities, for multiple reasons elaborated below.5 The centrality of 
attempting social shaping of technology in a democratic manner, and for democratic ends, 
becomes an important starting point for enquiries about the normative role of law in the 
regulation of technology. Further, the technological trajectories society chooses can shape 
society in significant manners. By way of substantiation, first, Jacques Ellul famously 
emphasized the need to seek ways of resisting and transcending technological 
determinism for preserving the very possibilities of freedom in the human condition. In 
his technological age, ‘of autonomous, dominant totalizing systems of technology... 
                                                
4 Pathdependency assumes that technological development occurs along research tracks that are contingent 
to social and political choices, and are not naturally formed. See text to n 69 for an elaboration. 
5 See Wiebe Bijker and John Law (eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical 
change (MIT Press 1992), in particular ‘General Introduction’, ‘Part I: Does Technologies have 
Trajectories?’ and Thomas J. Misa, ‘Controversy and Closure in Technological Change: Constructing 
“Steel”’, 111. See further, Langdon Winner, ‘Do artifacts have politics?’ in Langdon Winner (ed), The 
Whale and the Reactor: A search for limits in an age of high technology (University of Chicago Press 1986) 
19. 
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defined and dominated by it... working as a principal law of our age’,6 he underlined the 
need to transcend the rationalities of techno-logical systems to protect human freedom. In 
other words, while one might want to avoid Luddite panic of rejecting all new 
technologies, how do we avoid human enslavement to technological rationality? Literary 
worlds from Shelley7 to Atwood8 focus on the dystopian possibilities of new and radical 
technologies like biotechnology leading to both authoritarian control and catastrophe, 
even when developed with good intentions, or even with hopes or assertions of great 
progress.  
Second, the important political nature of public contestations about technological 
trajectories is apparent in ascriptions of a fast approaching condition of convergence of 
information, computing, robotics, nano– and bio– technologies. Notwithstanding 
differences about the credibility of fears regarding the resultant stage of singularity,9 the 
flagging of this concern itself has taken us to a stage where speculations of the post-
human cannot anymore be dismissed at the outset during an examination of law’s 
interaction with development of technology.10 Poised at this cusp ‘of one of the most 
momentous periods of technological advance in history,’ with the promise of a good life 
through revolutionary advances in technology, it is asserted that it will be the political 
decisions that we make shortly ‘concerning our relationship to techno-science that 
determine whether or not we enter into a post-human future and the potential moral chasm 
that such a future opens before us’.11 This apparent move beyond biology, as we know 
it,12 is accompanied with resultant grave anxieties about the human condition, including 
                                                
6 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (John Wilkinson tr, Knopf 1964); The Technological Bluff 
(Geoffrey W. Bromiley tr, Eerdmans 1990). His was not a call for rejection of technique, but transcending it, 
by emphasizing our freedom through recognising our non-freedom. See in particular, Ellul, 1964 xxxii. 
7 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (Harding, Mavor & Jones 1818).  
8 Margaret Atwood Oryx and Crake (Bloomsbury 2003); Margaret Atwood, Year of the Flood (Bloomsbury 
2009). 
9 Where supra human intelligence is achieved through an exponential expansion of technological means, 
possibly resulting in great disruption and marginalization of substantial sections of human populations. 
10 See for instance: Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is near (Viking 2005). See further: International 
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Interim report from the Presidential Panel 
Chairs on Long-Term AI Futures (IAAAI 2009) 
<http://research.microsoft.com/enus/um/people/horvitz/note_from_AAAI_panel_ chairs.pdf> accessed 19 
July 2011; articles regarding imaginations about law’s treatment of singularity in 
<http://www.asimovlaws.com/articles> accessed 19 July 2011.  
11 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (Picador 2002) 10. For a useful survey and critical account of 
the post human scholarship, see Upendra Baxi, Human rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays (OUP 
2007). See for a useful survey of the literature and its implications for global human rights discourses: see 
ch 6, ‘The Posthuman and Human Rights’ 197. 
12 See for instance, Katherine Hayles, How we became Post human: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago University Press 1999) 7: ‘if one-cell bacterium of E.Coli contains 
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the loss of the human self, fears about tinkering with nature (well evocated by Shelley’s 
Frankenstein) as well as threats of totalitarian control from a marriage of techno-science 
and big business.  
An attention to post-biology anxieties can bring forth focus on law’s engagement 
with techno-scientific advancements in particular ways, and the regulatory treatment of 
genetic modification of crops and food is an early precursor to these developments. 
Agricultural biotechnology, perhaps far simpler and less evocative of post-biology 
anxieties than more recent technologies like synthetic biology or human biotechnology, 
involves the technique of splicing. Splicing entails the deletion or insertion of identified 
genes for acquiring specific traits in crops like maize, potatoes, canola, cotton and soya. 
The technique is intended for applications like increase in yield, additive nutritive values 
like vitamins, or production of pesticide like properties within plants themselves. Two 
decades of highly visible and controversial experience in EU regulation of GM food and 
agriculture have provided important insights about conceptions of appropriate regulation 
of new technologies in general. GM crops have brought out fundamentally divided 
opinions about the appropriate development, use and regulation of the technology, 
throwing open profound philosophical and regulatory issues about modernity, rationality 
and progress. These include worldviews about danger and safety, understandings of 
ethical and environmental appropriateness in technological development, evaluation of 
social necessities in appraisals of technology, as well as importance of political values in 
engaging with science and technology.  
The need for regulating such techno-scientific developments is often responded 
with an obvious prescription¸ as for instance by Fukuyama, for the State to find the 
potential mix of benefits and threats inherent to contemporary biotech development.13 
However, finding this middle ground is not a straightforward exercise, either at the level 
of the nation-state, the EU or the global level. This is complicated with epistemic issues of 
knowability of both benefits and threats, regulatory capture by powerful interest groups or 
vocal agenda setters, and the chasmic differences in cultural subjectivities and political 
normativities of groups who seek to shape regulation. Examining how regulators seek to 
navigate governance of the desirability of techno-scientific advancements, is related to the 
nature of the role law plays, and ought to play, in mediating and leading us through these 
                                                                                                                                                   
information equivalent of 100 million pages of the Encyclopedia Britannica, it follows inescapably that 
humans are no more than information-processing machines essentially similar to intelligent machines’.   
13 Fukuyama (n 11) 10. 
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anxieties.14 Here then, the focus on law’s engagement with contestations about 
technologies become a site for not merely finding the right policy solution through 
technical fixes for effectiveness and management, but also for alternate democratic 
imaginations to describe and understand law’s normativities in dealing with development 
and use of new technologies. What is the conversational space law provides to articulate 
anxieties about our collective transition through technological pathways, and the 
accompanying contestation and disagreements about the regulation of these technological 
choices is an important question within this exploration.15 This book seeks to engage with 
this question by examining the room for public participation provided by EU law in the 
regulation of GMOs. 
Elaborated in the next section, the experience of the EU regulation of GMOs has 
been one of intense disagreements, which is inordinate for a regime that is used to finding 
tolerable consensus. GMOs also have brought out rare disagreements in the trans-Atlantic 
consensus in global trade regimes, bringing into focus high profile trade conflicts about 
the way GM agriculture and food are being regulated.16 A plethora of literature in the past 
decade has focused on a variety of issues regarding the introduction and use of GMOs. 
These include the politics of production of seeds,17 simultaneous increase in control and 
rent seeking behavior by large transnational corporations,18 the domination of domestic 
regulatory structures by them, particularly in the Global South,19 and seed sovereignty of 
                                                
14 Most commentators rightly rule out, at the outset, libertarian or laissez faire attitude to technology 
development as misguided and unrealistic. That society should put constraints on the development of new 
technology to guide it for socially desirable ways are generally considered uncontroversial; see for a detailed 
exploration of this aspect: Janet A Kourany, Philosophy of Science after Feminism (Oxford University Press 
2010) chs 2 and 4. 
15 Here, I follow Brownsword’s differentiation of law and regulation as intersecting but not coextensive. 
Law can be seen as a subset of regulation, as regulators rely on a number of instruments including law to 
influence behavior of the regulated. At the same time regulation, which ‘signifies something like: “the 
sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to standards or goals with the 
intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of 
standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification,”…does not encompass such tasks as 
constitution making and dispute resolution’. Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological 
Revolution (Oxford University Press 2008) 6-7. It is within this understanding that I assume law can set 
standards for appropriate regulation of technology, like say through setting legal requirements for public 
participation in such regulation. 
16 See Joseph Murphy and Les Levidow, Governing the Transatlantic Conflict over Agricultural 
Biotechnology: Contending Coalitions, Trade Liberalisation and Standard Setting (Routledge 2006) ch 1, 
for the origins of the EU–US conflict regarding the transatlantic trade in biotechnology products. 
17 Ralph Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1491-2000 (University 
of Wisconsin Press 2004).  
18 Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century (Putnum 1998). 
19 Mae-Wan Ho, Genetic Engineering or Nightmare? The Brave New World of Bad Science and Big 
business (Gateway Books 1998). 
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marginal farmers in impoverished countries.20 There are other concerns raised during the 
regulation of GMOs, which are often considered technical though with very significant 
political implications. They include concerns regarding the appropriate contours of 
employing the precautionary principle in controversial technologies,21 the appropriate 
ambit of science in regulation of harm to health and environment,22 troubling doubts 
regarding toxicity, allergenicity, horizontal gene transfer as well as grave and irreversible 
effects on biodiversity from GMOs,23 the increasing dominance of risk regimes in the 
governance of techno-scientific innovation,24 the need for recognizing consumer voices in 
appropriate development of new technologies,25 the issue of appropriate ambit of science 
and precaution in WTO mechanisms,26 and issues of culture and public opinion in 
regulatory regimes.27  
Notwithstanding the breadth of the focus in this literature, a brief survey would 
show that issue of risk regulation has patently dominated attention.28 This emphasis on 
risk has brought two prominent questions to the fore viz., first, the appropriate manner in 
which risks of GMOs to the environment and human health can be measured and managed 
in situations of scientific incertitude. Second is the manner in which the quality and nature 
of scientific evidence in regulation, including its coalescence with social rationalities, is 
                                                
20 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Biotechnology and Empire: The Global power of seeds and science’ (2006) 21 Osiris 
273. 
21 Helena Valve and Jussi Kauppila, ‘Enacting closure in the environmental control of GMOs’ (2008) 20 
Journal of Environmental Law 339. See further, Jim Dratwa, ‘Taking risks with the Precautionary Principle: 
Food (and the environment) for thought at the European Commission’ (2002) 4 Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning 197. 
22 Bruno Latour, The Politics of Nature: How to bring the Sciences into Democracy (Harvard University 
Press 2004). 
23 Artemis Dona and Ioannis S. Arvanitoyannis, ‘Health risks of Genetically Modified Foods’ (2009) 49 
Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition 164; Christoph Then and Christof Potthof, ‘Risk reloaded: 
Risk analysis of genetically engineered plants within the EU- A report by Testbiotech e.V. Institute for 
Independent Impact Assessment in Biotechnology’ <http://www.testbiotech.org> last accessed on 7th 
September 2011. See further, Jane Rissler and Margaret Mellon, The Ecological Risks of Engineered Crops 
(MIT Press 1996); Marc Lappe and Britt Bailey, Against the Grain: The Genetic Transformation of Global 
Agriculture (Earthscan 1999). 
24 Donatella Alessandrini, ‘GMOs and the crisis of Objectivity: Nature, Science and the Challenge of 
Uncertainty’ (2010) 19 Social and Legal Studies 3. 
25 Michel Callon, ‘The increasing involvement of concerned groups in R&D policies: What lessons for 
Public Powers’ in Aldo Geuna, Ammon Salter and Edward Steinmueller (eds), Science and Innovation 
(Edward Elgar 2003). 
26 Jacqueline Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
27 Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne, ‘Science and Decision-making’ in Steve Rayner and Elizabeth L. 
Malone (eds), Human Choice and Climate Change (Battelle Press 1998). 
28 See, Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology (Edward 
Elgar 2008) 39-48. See for a general overview of the risk imperium, Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, 
‘Introduction’ in Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (eds), Thinking Beyond Risk Society (Open University 
Press 2006) 3; Jane Franklin, ‘Politics and Risk’, in Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (eds), Thinking 
Beyond Risk Society (Open University Press 2006) 149. 
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brought to focus in the context of contradictory risk evaluations. This is especially the 
case in postnational frameworks like the WTO, which is beset with conflicting evaluations 
about environmental and health risks of trade in GMOs. Much of the earlier identified 
literature seeks to arrive at different policy prescriptions to ameliorate the policy 
conundrum about these two issues in particular, though issues more fundamental to law 
and justice are often touched upon.29 This understandable focus on policy prescriptions 
has been stark, particularly in the search for an effective and legitimate regulation of 
GMOs in the EU. It has thrown open difficulties in the coexistence of the multiple 
objectives of the regulatory regime, viz., investment in and of innovations, pursuit of the 
internal market, protection of health and environment, respect of public opinion and 
regard for consumer confidence, as well as the non-discrimination principle in 
international trade law.  
Competing political, economic and ethical constructions of these objectives, over 
and above the differences in perceptions of the hazards involved, have played an 
important part in the kind of disagreements encountered in the EU regulation on GMOs. 
For instance, even for many scientists, the impasse in green biotechnology is a site to learn 
lessons about the appropriate development of technology, by taking into account societal 
concerns and ethical, legal and social aspects on board.30 Thus an interest in how law 
takes into account public contestations of technology impacts the democratic regulation of 
technology, and the appropriate development of technology. Before we continue our focus 
on these two factors, it is appropriate at this stage to elaborate on the palpable nature of 
public concerns and unease about GMOs in Europe.  
 
1.2 Disquiet about GMOs: Perceptible, considerable and persistent 
The introduction of GMOs in the European Union (EU) as a product in the internal market 
has encountered high levels of public unease, disagreement and resistance, which is 
recognized by the multilevel regime in inordinate ways. By 1997, when the Commission 
authorized a variety of GM maize (on the back of a single positive vote from a Member 
                                                
29 There are important recent exceptions to this pure focus on policy prescriptions in GMO regulation: Luc 
Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell (eds), The Regulation of GMOs: Comparative Approaches (Oxford 
University Press 2010); Lee (ibid). The latter provides a detailed analysis of EU regulation of GMOs, and 
this thesis has substantially benefited from it. Instead of duplicating this important work on EU regulation of 
GMOs, I seek to extend it with a specific investigation on public participation. 
30 Rip cites a number of statements from nanotechnology researchers to this effect. Arie Rip, ‘The Tension 
between Fiction and Precaution in Nanotechnology’ in Elizabeth Fisher, Judith S Jones and Rene von 
Schomberg (eds), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar 
2006) 270, 272.  
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State), there were angry reactions from a number of Member States;31 and even a 
resolution by the European Parliament against it.32 This resistance is continuing in a 
contingent manner visible in various ways that are elaborated here. A number of surveys 
and opinion polls, conducted by non-partisan and EU bodies, point towards substantial 
public resistance in accepting expert recommendations about the necessity, utility and 
safety of the technology. For instance, the GM Nation process initiated by the UK 
Government reported that only eight percent of the respondents were happy with eating 
GM foods.33 Importantly, public unease does not appear to be decreasing with the passage 
of time, contrary to a popular imagery of an ignorant public who can be enlightened with 
effective public education on relevant scientific and technological matters (what is 
derisively called PR techniques by some civil society groups).34 An increase in 
information and education on the designed advantages from the development of GM 
technology does not seem to generate an increase in its popularity.35 By 2010, around 169 
regions and 4713 local governments in the EU declared themselves GM-free.36  
Public protest against the introduction of various GM crops has repeatedly taken 
forms of destruction of crops by protestors, notably in France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. What is of interest here is not just the fact of destruction itself as 
an expression of public contestation, and accompanying issues of civil and political 
disobedience that pose a central problem to law’s authority over citizens. Further, what is 
                                                
31 See Tamara Harvey, ‘Regulation of GM products in a Multi-level system of Governance: Science or 
Citizens’ (2001) 10 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 321.  
32 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on genetically modified maize’ final edition 08/04/1997. 
33 Department of Trade and Industry, GM Nation? The Findings of the Public Debate (UK Department of 
Trade and Industry 2003) para 121, for more indicative details of the GM nation process. 
34 European Commission, Attitudes of European Citizens Towards Environment (Special Barometer 295 
2008) 64: 58% of the respondents were found to be opposed to the use of GMOs.  Earlier in a 2005 survey, 
it was noted that ‘while support may have increased between 1999 and 2002, it then decreased between 
2002 and 2005’, in George Gaskell, Nick Allum, Sally Stares and Agnes Allansdottir, Europeans and 
Biotechnology in 2005: Patterns and Trends- Final Report on Eurobarometer 64.3 (European Commission 
2006) 21. See further: Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms and the 
Public: Participation, Preferences and Protest’ in Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 29) 11, 22; European 
Commission, European Science and Technology (Eurobarometer 55.2 2001); European Science and 
Technology (2nd edn, Eurobarometer 58.0 2003). Further, ‘GMOs have been rejected as undesirable by the 
majority of European publics in successive polls in the last decade’, Gregory Shaffer and Mark Pollack, 
‘Regulating between National fears and Global Disciplines: Agricultural Biotechnology in the EU’ (Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 10 2004) <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/04/041001.pdf> 
accessed 11 Nov. 2011. 
35 This is clear in the report based on a series of polls commissioned by the Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology, a charitable trust established in 2001, with the aim of serving the society as an honest broker 
in the debate on agricultural biotechnology, <http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/ 
Reports/ Food_and_Biotechnology/PIFB_StakeholderForum_Process.pdf> last accessed on 29th Oct. 2011.  
36 GMO-free Europe, GMO-free regions and Areas in Europe (2009) <http://www.gmofreeregions.org/ 
fileadmin/files/gmofreeregions/full_list/List_GMOfree_regions_Europe_update_September_2010.pdf> last 
accessed 1 Dec. 2011. 
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of equal importance is the response of public juries in the UK to legal action against these 
destructions of property. These public juries have time and again acquitted such 
protestors. An example is the case of the prosecution of twenty eight Greenpeace 
volunteers accused of crop destruction in GM fields, where the jury acquitted them of 
theft, and failed to reach a verdict on criminal damage (19 April 2000), and were later 
even acquitted for the latter charge (20 September 2000).37 Commentators have analyzed 
this trend as an important indication of the public discomfort about criminalizing 
contestations, which most juries have generally considered as being in the public 
interest.38 
Public concern is explicitly recognized in the recitals of the Aarhus Convention,39 
and recognition of public unease is crisply articulated by various legislatures in Europe, 
including the European Parliament.40 The de-facto moratorium of the late nineties that led 
to the breakdown of the previous EU regulatory regime was itself a product of the 
recognition by some national governments that public opinion in their territories expected 
them to oppose the inevitability of EU authorization of GMOs.41 Under the current 
regime, Germany became the sixth country in mid-2009 to ban a particular strain of GM 
maize, despite prior clearance by EU institutions for crop cultivation all over Europe. 
Before this, Austria, Hungary, Poland, France and Greece had put in place safeguard bans 
                                                
37 See also R. v Colchester [2001] Criminal Law Review 564, where it was the accused that were arguing for 
the possibility of greater damage, so as to secure the right to elect for jury trial, cited from Bodiguel and 
Cardwell (n 34) fn 102.  
38 ‘With juries being the representative of the public, this marks a perhaps unexpected engagement of wider 
society in the governance of GMOs’, Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 34) 26. See for a detailed comparison with 
the relevant French process, 26- 35. 
39 UNECE Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters, 1998 <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/ 
documents/cep43e.pdf> last accessed 1 Dec. 2011: ‘Recognizing the concern of the public about the 
deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment’, Preamble of Aarhus Convention. 
40 European Parliament (n 32). 
41 Two declarations were made in this regard in 2194 Council Meeting- 24/25 Jun. 1999. Declaration by the 
Danish, Greek, French, Italian and Luxembourg delegations concerning the suspension of new GMO 
authorisation; Declaration by the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, German, Netherlands, Spanish and Swedish 
delegations. There are various triggers identified for the moratorium, most important ones include the strong 
and systematic picketing of supermarket outlets that sought to sell a new GM chocolate-bar brand in Sep. 
1998 that elicited no GM policies from  most European retail chains (that  they will sell products only if 
there was a clear message from consumers that they really wanted these foods) and similar policies from 
large food manufacturers; the publication of a research report in Nature in May 1999, suggesting threat to 
biodiversity in data that pointed to adverse toxic effects of GM pollen to the larvae of Monarch butterfly; as 
well as the media coverage and public reaction related to the immediate suspension and sacking of Arpad 
Pusztai,  scientist  in the Rowett research Institute in Aberdeen in the UK, for issuing a press release 
regarding a laboratory feed studies with rats that purportedly demonstrated the increased toxicity in GM 
potatoes. 
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on specific GMOs that were earlier cleared by the requisite EU procedure.42 These 
Member State actions hint at the possibility that the public concerns articulated in the de-
facto moratorium continue in the current framework.43 The Council had rejected 
Commission proposals to repeal some of these bans by a qualified majority on four 
different occasions.44 
Even the most trenchant critics of these bans within the EU, who characterize them 
as ill advised for a variety of reasons (including playing to populism, public ignorance and 
irrationality), have not ascribed mercantilism as a possible intent of these moves.45 
Significantly, there has been no such accusation of protectionism by Member States 
including those who had originally voted for the release of the specific GMO. Some of the 
Member States who had originally voted for the release of individual GMOs have strongly 
resisted Commission proposals to revoke subsequent bans of other Member States. This is 
well-illustrated by the EU voting on the Austrian withdrawal of a particular strand of GM-
maize,46 where the EU President stated that most Member States had a second reasoning 
against the Commission's proposal, viz., ‘the feeling that a Member State’s will should be 
respected’.47 Thus, though the reasons cited for safeguards included new scientific 
evidence of risk, or invoking inadequacies of risk appraisal to public concerns, the factum 
of public opinion and political pressure to resist releases in specific Member States is 
intertwined with these invocations.48  
                                                
42 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the economic and social committee and the Committee of the regions on the freedom for Member States to 
decide on the cultivation of genetically modified crops’ COM (2010) 375 final, fn 4. 
43 ‘it might be highlighted that lack of confidence in the regulatory framework extends well beyond the anti-
GM movement, even to governments’, Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 34) 36. 
44 Commission Communication (n 42) fn 6. 
45 Indeed, allegations of trade protectionism from the other side of the Atlantic are common place, which is 
signified in the facts of EC-Biotech dispute in the WTO. Text near n 587 in chapter 5 for a discussion. 
46 Commission proposal for withdrawal of Austrian safeguard derogations were rejected twice by qualified 
majorities in the Environment Council, 2773rd Environmental Council Meeting, 18 December 2006, 
rejecting ‘European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the provisional prohibition of 
the use and sale in Austria of generically modified maize’, COM (2006) 510 final.  In the vote on the second 
proposal the majority pointed out the failure to reassess the concerned GMOs under the Directive, and 
argued that ‘the different agricultural structures and regional ecological characteristics in the EU need to be 
taken into account in a more systematic manner in the environmental risk assessment of GMOs’. In the 
Commission’s third proposal on the specific derogation, which incidentally targeted only part of the 
safeguard action (food and feed aspects), was unable to reach either a support/rejection through qualified 
majority. This has left the Commission with the discretion to adopt its proposal - 2826 Environmental 
Council meeting, 14 Nov. 2007. 
47 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/biotech/eu-considers-pause-thought-gmos/article-168053> last accessed 13 
Jun. 2011. 
48 Commission Communication (n 42) 6. Here the Commission remarked, in a matter of fact manner, that 
the Member State safeguard bans though invoked as new scientific risks, involves diverse and varied types 
of reasons in reality, including political or economic motivations such as meeting the demand for GM-free 
markets.  
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Further, there appears to be a transition from the days of the biotech halcyon, when 
GMOs were hailed as a triumph of modern science, to a distinct recognition among 
decision makers that public opinion and consumer voice is perhaps the most important 
aspect in the success of a technology like GM foods. Connected to consumer skepticism is 
the issue of a perceived lack of benefits for the general public; surveys show substantial 
sections of the public perceive the use of technology as mainly benefiting producers as 
opposed to ordinary people.49 Literature surveys point out various points of convergence 
in the institutional pursuit of conversations with consumer voices. These include the 
finding that attitudes towards GM foods appear to be resistant to persuasion, ‘including 
different arguments as absence of risks, improved risk assessment methods, introduction 
of traceability systems, public participation in risk management, and a whole range of 
producer and consumer related benefit; all to no avail’.50  
The attempt to educate the public to allay their skepticism about specific 
technologies is based on a deficit model, which seeks to inform the ignorant lay person 
about the technical aspects and evaluation of risk. This is founded on an assumption that 
lay people lack the cognitive ability to understand and appreciate issues of safety, and the 
basis of the public’s irrational perception of risk, i.e. a difference in a lay perception and 
an expert finding, is this knowledge deficit. Within the deficit model, then, the problem of 
lay ignorance can be solved through effective communication of risk findings.51 Deferring 
a discussion on the deficit model of risk to the third Chapter, here I only point to a major 
criticism regarding the assumption that responses and judgments about dangers are purely 
a mechanical processing of information. Instead, a cognitive view of a human being is 
criticized as a simplification. It has been asserted that people forge questions and find 
answers about issues that concern them, rather than purely perceive and process the 
                                                
49 GM nation (n 33) para 121. Earlier, the UK Food Safety Authority survey in 2000 found that the presence 
of GM ingredients was a key criterion for consumers in their decision to avoid purchase from takeaways: 
House of Lords Select Committee, 2000, fns 4-5, cited from Michael Cardwell, ‘The release of Genetically 
Modified Organism into the environment: Public concerns and Regulatory responses’ (2002) 4 
Environmental Law Review 156. 
50 Joachim Scholderer, ‘The GM foods debate in Europe: History, regulatory solutions, and consumer 
response research’ (2005) 5 Journal of Public Affairs 263, 270. 
51 Susan Owens, ‘Engaging the Public: Information and Deliberation in environmental policy’ (2000) 32 
Environment and Planning 1141, 1142. 
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information that are provided to them.52 Various scholars have underlined the importance 
of ‘affect heuristics’ when people make judgments.53 Slovic noted: 
 
Although risk perception was originally viewed as a form of deliberative, analytic information 
processing, over time we have come to recognise how highly dependent it is upon intuitive and 
experiential thinking, guided by emotional and affective processes.54 
 
It appears that there is a gradual recognition that public beliefs and consumer evaluations 
are highly complex, and cannot be merely encapsulated by ascriptions of safety and risk, 
though safety heuristics are often used to ascribe rationality to visible public unease. 
Issues of general socio-political attitudes, including those towards environment and 
nature, increase of corporate control over science, technocratic regulation and the resultant 
lack of social trust were all found to be connected to public articulations of safety and risk 
in agricultural biotechnology.55 This state of public opinion is understood to arise partly 
from the large scale appearance of issues related to food safety and bio-ethics in public 
agendas, including through considerable efforts of green and consumer groups. The BSE 
crisis and media coverage of how regulators handled it, as also the anxieties from the 
sudden appearance of Dolly the cloned sheep could only have reinforced public opinion. 
For reasons mentioned in this section, it is clear that public unease about GMOs is 
clear and considerable, and the contestations about this technological trajectory 
perceptible. Further, opposition was found to be persistent despite regulatory attempts at 
science communication and education, based on a flawed understanding that disagreement 
solely reflects the ignorance of the public. The processes that lead to formations of these 
disagreements and framing of public agendas (including how consensus may be 
engineered) are generally important areas to focus on. However, persistent and 
considerable public contestations necessitate legal systems to process resistance as a 
rationale on its own right. This is since democratic law ought to frame principles to 
reliably ensure that policies are responsive to citizen’s preferences, albeit within the 
legitimate ambit of constitutional values. The normative and consequentialist reasons for 
                                                
52 Serge Moscovici, ‘The Phenomenon of Social Representations’ in Robert Farr and Serge Moscovici (eds), 
Social representations (Cambridge University Press 1984) 3. 
53 See for an elaboration: Helene Joffe, ‘Risk: From Perception to Social Representation’ (2003) 42 British 
Journal of Social Psychology 55, 58. 
54 Paul Slovic (ed), Risk Perception (Earthscan 2000) xxxi. 
55 Michael Siegrist, ‘The influence of trust and perceptions of risk and benefits on the acceptance of gene 
technology’ (2000) 20 Risk Analysis 195. 
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being responsive to citizen’s preferences, including through public participation, is 
elaborated in the next two sections.  
 
1.3 Normative aspirations for democratic law 
An important question in law’s aspiration to be democratic is the nature of its treatment of 
contestations and disagreements, especially in cases of persistent disagreements and 
highly visible contestations about important and fundamental issues. Engaging with public 
unease could possibly be seen within a calculus to merely engineer legitimacy so that the 
expression of public unease becomes only a practical hurdle that needs to be overcome. 
However, beyond proceduralities of decision-making, it is asserted that a genuine 
employment of democratic normativity requires recognizing rationalities that are alternate 
to existing dominant ones as starting points; rationalities that may be behind such 
disagreements and contestations, so as to open arenas of conversation that respect and 
recognize these alternate rationalities.  
Such a normative assertion finds some support also among strands of analytical 
legal positivists in the past decade. Notably, debates in analytical legal philosophy have 
focused on related issues of disagreement and law. The object of focus is the ‘usual liberal 
disregard’ about the inescapability of disagreement about even fundamental matters of 
law, even while acknowledging disagreement in views about religion, ethics and 
philosophy.56 Waldron points to this disregard when he argues that ‘our common basis for 
action in matters of justice has to be forged in the heat of our disagreements, not 
predicated on the assumption of a cool consensus that exists only as an ideal’.57 He 
distinguishes this from a general assumption about law in analytical positivism, that a well 
ordered society always has a common view upon which society acts together, by using 
premises found in the Rawlsian idea for justice as such an important instance in liberal 
conceptualizations of law. He argued that the basis of a common view is not necessarily 
true, cannot obliterate the fact of disagreement, and that political communities need to 
forge positions on ethics and justice in the heat of disagreements, and not assumptions of 
                                                
56 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press 1999) 154- 155.  
57 During a sympathetic account of political process in Western liberal democracies, Waldron recounted that 
‘every single step that has been taken by legislatures towards making society safer, more civilized, and more 
just has been taken against a background of disagreement, but taken nevertheless in a way that managed to 
somehow retain the loyalty and compliance (albeit often grudging..) of those who in good faith opposed the 
measures in question…including prohibition of child labor, limitation of working hours, dismantling of 
segregation, health and safety regulation in factories, liberation of women,’ as opposed to a well ordered 
Rawlsian justice consensus. He emphasized that these political achievements had authority and respect as 
law, despite disagreements even as to whether it is a step in the right direction, ibid 156. 
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cool consensus.58 Disagreements about law and justice, thus, can be seen as a central issue 
in law’s claim of authority over citizens, and any accompanying claim for legitimacy.  
It is important to recognize another important relevant factor here regarding 
concerns over legitimacy that are usually approached as not ‘just any disagreement’ but 
‘reasonable disagreement’.59 Here the gate-keeping to even consider the tenability of 
particular positions of disagreements is conducted through an a priori evaluation of the 
substance or truth claim that informs the disagreements. For instance, such claims could 
be evaluated in terms of being scientific or unscientific, furthering or weakening public 
interest or, infringing or strengthening existing rights. In the case of GMOs, such a priori 
evaluations could be made in terms of how public unease is based on prejudice, ignorance, 
and adverse propaganda based on falsities by media or civil society organizations. 
Alternatively, it could also be judged as how the biotech industry makes tall claims of 
benefits, influences academic research, funds partisan research and camouflages it as peer 
reviewed work, inappropriately influences regulators, or even makes appeals to unrealistic 
techno-fantasies of the public through public relations campaigns. Thus, the gate-keeping 
question of reasonability of the disagreements takes us back to a cyclical a priori 
evaluation of the truths and falsities behind the positions of unease, or enthusiasms. Such 
a cycle of ascribing rationality is deemed inappropriate in the case of contestation for two 
reasons mentioned below.  
The EU expert group on science and governance points out the possibilities of 
existence of alternate rationalities of public unease hidden from dominant scientific 
paradigms in their report:  
 
[P]erhaps the most widely recognized indicator of public unease concerns reactions to issues at the 
intersection of “science” (including science-based technologies) and “risk”. The public is thought to 
fear science because scientific innovations entail risk. Both science and risk, however, are ambiguous 
objects. It is frequently assumed in policy circles that the meanings of both for citizens must be the 
same as for experts, but that assumption is, in our view, itself a key element in generating “public 
unease”. The widespread sense of unease – sometimes expressed as “mistrust of” or “alienation from” 
science – must be seen in broader perspective. We conclude indeed that there is no general, 
indiscriminate public disaffection with or fear of “science”. Instead, there is selective disaffection in 
particular fields of science, amidst wider areas of acceptance – even enthusiasm.60  
                                                
58 ibid. 
59 David Estlund, ‘Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement’ (2000) 99 Philosophical Studies 111. 
60 Expert Group on Science and Governance, Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously: Report of the 
Expert Group on Science and Governance to the European Commission (EUR 22700 2007) 9 
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Further, it could be that: 
 
[A]lthough the European public has often been characterized as technophobic, emotional or susceptible 
to NGO and media propaganda over GMOs, there is nothing irrational about disagreeing with a 
scientific estimate of risk. People may not know the technical details, but they have developed 
awareness of the broad issues involved and ways of forming their own judgments. Their previous 
experience, such as the BSE crisis, found concerns regarding the (un)reliability of scientific 
reassurances of safety and the authorities tendency to conceal information when powerful economic 
interests are at stake.61 
 
Intricately related to law’s general claim to democratic normativity is a particular focus by 
scholarship on scientific citizenship and governance of new technologies, which 
conceptually connects general concerns about disagreements regarding law and justice to 
contestations about technological trajectories. In this stream of scholarship science, 
politics and law are seen to be closely entangled, and regulation of science has been 
identified as a major challenge for democratic governance, ‘since political decisions about 
science and technology inevitably entail questions of democracy’.62 Whereby, the general 
demand for democratic participation of citizens based on a critique of elite expertise,63 and 
an acknowledgement of the social context in which expert knowledge is produced or 
applied,64 become direct tools to seek democratisation of law. Further, this claim can 
extend to a description of contemporary regulation as one where increased and 
institutionalised co-operation between techno-science and law, ‘produces a specific form 
                                                                                                                                                   
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/sciencesociety/document_library/pdf_06/european knowledge-society_en.pdf> 
last accessed 21 Dec. 2011. 
61 Elsa Tsioumani, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms in the EU: Public Attitudes and Regulatory 
Developments’ (2004) 3 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 279, 281. 
62 See for instance: Alfons Bora, ‘Techno-scientific normativity and the “Iron cage” of Law’ (2010) 35 
Science, Technology & Human Values 3. He examines a plethora of literature to make this observation 
including Yaron Ezrahi, Descent of Icarus: Science and the transformation of Contemporary Society 
(Harvard University Press 1990); Steve Fuller, The Governance of Science: Ideology and the future of the 
Open Society (Open University Press 2000);  Daniel Lee Kleinman (ed), Science, Technology and 
Democracy (SUNY Press 2000); Philip Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy (Oxford University Press 
2001); Sheila Jasanoff, Science at Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Harvard University Press 
1995).  
63 ‘It is seen as uncertain, risky and incomplete’: Sabine Maasen and Peter Weingart, ‘What’s new in 
scientific advice to Politics’ in Peter Weingart and Sabine Maasen (eds), Democratization of Expertise? 
Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making (Springer 2005) 1, 3. 
64 Steven Shapin and Simone Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental 
Life (Princeton University Press 1985, 2011 reissue); Susan Silbey and Patricia Ewick, ‘The Architecture of 
Authority: The Place of Law in the Space of Science’ in Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha 
Umphrey (eds), The Place of Law (University of Michigan Press 2003) 75. 
 17  
of techno-scientific normativity that excludes (all other) political considerations, and thus 
constitutes an iron cage of law’ (sic).65  
Whether disagreements are unfair or justified are weighty issues that require 
further consideration. However, it would be difficult to deny the reasonableness of a 
normative expectation on law to take disagreements a priori seriously, especially in 
situations where substantial sections of citizens (perhaps even a majority) consistently 
appear to disagree with the release of GMOs. Hence it would be reasonable to start from a 
position that, once there is an assumption of considerable and persistent disagreement, law 
has to engage with this unease by ensuring effective participation in regulatory 
deliberation by publics which are wider than expert communities. It could be missing a 
trick by ignoring public unease with a hope that the public will turn around, or by 
explaining unease away as ascriptions of irrationality of publics, or even as mere products 
of agenda setting by civil society organizations.  
Though for some, a functional question regarding how considerable and persistent 
such contestations have to be before law ought to engage with them, may remain. This 
position, however, is complicated by a fundamental concern regarding the difficult 
question of conscientious and moral objections to specific laws. Questions of civil and 
political disobedience, discernible in a distinguished lineage of thinkers from Henry David 
Thoreau, Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, underline the fault-lines of liberal 
laws’ claim to democratic legitimacy.66 The question of conscientious objections here 
takes public contestations about the use and regulation of GMOs to the heart of a general 
problem of law’s quest for legitimacy, which is unresolved for at least some.67 This aspect 
makes the immanent dealing of disagreements and resistance even more important for a 
normative superiority intrinsic to law’s claim for democratic legitimacy. 
  
1.4 Consequential benefits from public participation  
Apart from the aforementioned concerns regarding normative aspirations for law to be 
democratic and the need in some quarters for building at least an ambience of legitimacy, 
                                                
65 Bora (n 62) 4, emphasized words are added.  
66 See for a useful introduction: Kimberley Brownlee, ‘Civil Disobedience’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 ed) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-
disobedience/> last accessed on 21st November 2011. ‘Some people may think that there is no point in 
analyzing the link between the destruction of GMOs and civil disobedience, simply because civil 
disobedience is a violation of law and must be condemned. However, the debate on civil disobedience is still 
current and of major importance in understanding the law and its sources’: Luc Bodiguel, ‘Conclusion’, in 
Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 29) 375, 377.  
67 See a recent acknowledgement of this facet in Bodiguel (n 66) 376. 
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a focus on legal engagements with disagreements includes consequentialist implications 
for the appropriate development of a technology. Resistance is identified to have an 
important signaling function in the development of technology, notwithstanding pejorative 
ascriptions of technophobia:  
 
Rather than asking what causes people’s reactions to new technology, we ask how their reactions 
influence the development of new technology. Resistance is an independent variable of the design 
rather than a dependent one...resistance is not about changing or not changing, but about the direction 
and the rate of change...resistance is more a problem of the designer than of the user. But in avoiding 
the trap of shifting the attribution from user to designer, one needs to see the systemic process between 
designers and users over time...where designers are not the only actors, there is capital 
involved...shareholders, buyers and sales-people, all following a different logic. Highlighting the 
contributions of resistance to that ‘game’ empirically in different contexts serves to enhance the user 
perspective.68  
 
User perspectives and the way technology is developed can have various ramifications 
beyond the perspectives of an individual consumer, as larger questions of governance and 
citizenship are intricately connected to signaling technology development. At a 
fundamental level, identifying and moving towards moral and political utopias (in which 
promotion or dissuasion of technological trajectories are integral parts) are denoted in and 
through such perspectives.  
The assumption here is to move away from an understanding of technological 
change as a race along a single pre-ordained track following a single self-evidently 
optimal line of progress, but that technological development is more like biological 
evolution. Development of technologies is better understood as an ‘open branching 
process more akin to organic growth’, and interacting with ‘wider social structures and 
contextual contingencies to become channelled in highly path-dependent ways’.69 
                                                
68 Martin Bauer, ‘Technophobia: A misleading conception of resistance to new technology’ in Martin Bauer 
(ed), Resistance to Technology (Cambridge University Press 1995) 97.  
69 See for a succinct introduction of this position: Andy Stirling, ‘Science, Precaution and the Politics of 
Technological Risk: Converging implications in Evolutionary and Social Scientific Perspectives’ (2008) 
1128 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 95, 97. He continues: ‘In a complex, dynamic, 
interconnected, and finite world, only a small subset of the totality of potentially viable developmental 
pathways will actually be followed. This can be as true at the level of the design of an individual consumer 
product, like the video or DVD, as at the global scale taken in the configuration of major infrastructures, like 
those underlying energy, transport, communication, and industrial production systems.’ Questions of path 
dependency are often dealt away for various reasons, and I suspect, mainly due to the dilemma of regulatory 
connection, where we know very little about the technology at the initial stages of its development, and a 
later stage when we get to know about, it is too late to stop it- see Paul Sollie, ‘Ethics, Technology 
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Recognition of path dependency, and a refusal to buy into the myths of technological 
change as an unraveling of a pre-ordained track of optimal progress, makes a focus on 
law’s engagement with disagreement an important way to identify and deal with specters 
of technological lock-in. Or, as Charles Taylor would suggest, ‘we are not indeed locked 
in. But there is a slope, an incline in things that is all too easy to slide down’.70 Once we 
recognize that the development of technologies and their trajectories are not linear and 
natural, but are contingent to social factors, the influence of user resistance in social 
shaping of technology is evident.71 Such social shaping includes mediation of the nature 
and effects of slippery slopes that have to be identified early enough to avoid situations of 
a fait accompli. For instance, fear of inevitability is visible in the claims of some public 
groups that large scale cultivation of GM crops lead to lock-in of agriculture to GM crops 
due to what they see as unmanageable mixing of genetic material between GM and other 
kinds of agriculture. They quote the experience of widespread cultivation of soya in 
Argentina or canola in Canada for the slim possibilities of returning to an organic or GM-
free form of cultivation, once widespread transgenic cultivation is allowed.72 These 
pictures of irreversibility and lock-ins are differently mediated by different regulatory 
communities, where the experience and participation of farming and other public groups 
are important. Whether law specifies scope for participation of these groups, which are 
traditionally outside the pale of regulatory deliberation, impacts the evaluation and 
management of ecological slippery slopes.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Development and Uncertainty: An Outline for any Future Ethics of Technology’ (2007) 5 Journal of 
Information, Communication & Ethics in Society 293, 297.  
Falsities and inadequacies of the assumption behind a single and self-evident optimal line of 
progress unraveling technological developments are often ignored through various heuristic mechanisms 
including: avoidance- for instance, Calestous Juma, ‘The New Culture of Innovation: Africa in the Age of 
Technological Opportunities’, Keynote Address (8th Summit of the African Union, Addis Ababa, 29 January 
2007); wishing it away- for instance, Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘A Vision of Ambient Law’ in Roger 
Brownsword and Karen Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, 2008) 175, 176; as also general assertions that it is indeed such 
unraveling of the universal scientific rationale that unfolds through technological development- for instance 
Paul Ceruzzi, ‘Moore’s Law and Technological Determinism: Reflections on the History of Technology’ 
(2005) 46 Technology and Culture 584, 593. 
70 Quoted in Richard Spinello, Cyberethics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace (3rd edn, Jones and Bartlett 
2006) 9. 
71 Compelling evidences of how social change and technological change shape each other (co-construction 
of technology and society) are considered by many philosophers of technology. See Wiebe Bijker, Of 
Bicycles, Bakelite and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (MIT Press 1995); Wiebe Bijker 
and John Law, ‘Do Technologies have Trajectories’ in Bijker and Law (n 5) 15; Thomas J Misa, 
‘Controversy and Closure in Technological Change: Constructing “Steel”’, in Bijker and Law (n 5) 109. 
72 Gundula Meziani and Hugh Warwick, Seeds of Doubt (Soil Association 2002). See further, Kahon Chan, 
‘War of the papayas’, China Daily (Hongkong, 8 Sep. 2011) 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/201109/08/content_13645581.htm> accessed on 21 Sep. 2011. 
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For these aforementioned reasons, both consequentialist and normative, law’s 
acknowledgement of disagreements and controversies about technology is an important 
starting point towards securing a common future in a socially just, ecologically 
sustainable, ethically informed and politically responsible manner. It is further suggested 
that attempts at public participation in the regulatory deliberation is one of the most 
important engagements that can emanate from this acknowledgement. The assertion is 
merely that legal requirements of public participation in the regulation of technologies like 
GMOs is an essential but not sufficient condition here.  
 
1.5 Democratic deficit in postnational frameworks 
The general issues that make the legal engagement with public contestations about GMOs 
important appear to get accentuated in situations of postnational frameworks like the 
EU.73 Concerns of democratic deficits in the EU institutional architecture are persistently 
raised without resolution, notwithstanding robust defenses of the EU regulatory regimes 
by renowned political scientists like Majone and Moravcsik.74 These concerns include 
issues such as how direct are EU citizen’s policy preferences an influence on EU policy 
outcomes, or in other words how technocratic or political is the policy process.75 Such 
articulations include questions as to whether there are opportunities in the institutional 
design similar to an essential feature in liberal democracies, which allow for an opposition 
to the current leadership elites and policy status quos.76 Though there have been various 
institutional attempts to address the important question of the democratic deficit, including 
recent attempts at reform of delegation and implementation powers of the Commission,77 
                                                
73 The term ‘postnational’ is used interchangeably with supra-national here, and means legal spaces that 
have emerged as a result of the decline of the dichotomy between national and international law, triggered 
by increasing inter-linkages in structures of national/regional and global governance. See further: Nico 
Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-national Law (OUP 2010). 
74 Francesca Bignami, ‘The Democratic Deficit in the European Community Rulemaking: A call for notice 
and comment in Comitology’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 451. See for Majone’s 
regulatory state thesis: Giandomenico Majone (ed), Regulating Europe (Routledge 1996) and Giandomenico 
Majone, ‘Europe’s Democratic Deficit’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 5. See for Moravcsik’s inter-
governmentality thesis: Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union’ 
[2001] Foreign Affairs 114. 
75 See Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why there is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A response to 
Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 Journal for Common Market Studies 533, 534.  
76 ibid 548. 
77 See the co-decision procedure by Council and the European Parliament for legislative acts under Article 
289 TFEU, procedures for delegated acts (Article 290 TFEU) and procedures for implementing acts (Article 
291 TFEU). Further see, Regulation 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s 
exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ L55/13. 
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whether these attempts can resolve such concerns is yet to be seen.78 However, an 
architecture that allows the release of GM seeds despite a majority of Member States 
repeatedly voting against it in the committee procedure,79 as well as substantial 
contestation and unease among the general population,80 make concerns of democratic 
deficit a supplementary reason for focusing on legal engagement of public contestations in 
general, and public participation in particular, important.  
 
1.6 Character of scientific advice in the regulation of technology  
The issue of public participation and democratisation in the regulation of technologies like 
GMOs is intricately connected to how law engages with scientific advice, especially in 
risk regulation. This requires us to bracket an appropriate understanding of the 
contemporary scientific enterprise, since scientific advice plays an important part in the 
regulation of technology. The broad sociological literature that has characterized 
contemporary scientific enterprise as Mode-2, post-normal or post-academic as opposed 
to normal or traditional science is of importance here.81 These enumerated approaches 
understand science as beyond its traditional understanding, of say, Kuhn.82  
Kuhn famously characterized scientific enterprise (normal science) as a process 
regarding the debates about the rules of science, ‘research firmly based upon one or more 
past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice’.83 He saw 
scientific revolutions as ‘tradition shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity 
of normal science’, which predicates that even scientific change is bound by the internal 
heuristics of a discipline.84 As opposed to this normal condition, contemporary scientific 
research and expertise are marked by a number of factors mentioned below, which have 
implications for the use of scientific expert advice in the regulation of technology. Where 
‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’ the conventional 
                                                
78 Vihar Georgiev, ‘Commission on the Loose? Delegated Lawmaking and Comitology after Lisbon’ 
(EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference, Boston, March 2011); Andreas Follesdal, ‘The 
legitimacy challenges for new modes of Governance: Trustworthy Responsiveness’ (2011) 46 Government 
and Opposition 81; Christopher Lord, ‘Still in democratic deficit’ (2008) 43 Intereconomics: Review of 
European Economic Policy 316.  
79 Text near n 170 in chapter 2. 
80 Text near nn 31-50. 
81 Though there are internal differences among these approaches that characterise science, all of them have 
similar effects for the limited purpose of this thesis, which is related to employment of scientific expertise in 
regulation, enumerated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
82 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press 1962). 
83 ibid 10.  
84 ibid 6. 
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model of the linear communication of the findings of scientific enquiry to policy makers 
may be insufficient.85  
 
[N]ormal science aims at establishing the ultimate truth or the final resolution of a scientific puzzle, 
post-normal science recognizes that as long as both scientific uncertainties and decision-stakes are high, 
such aim is in principle unachievable. Indeed it can be misleading and create false expectations to act as 
if the role of science in such issues is just to get the facts right. Instead post-normal science aims at 
common commitments to reflective approaches for dealing with complex policy issues.86  
 
Various sociologists of science have asserted the differences between the nature of the 
contemporary scientific endeavour from the earlier ideal-type of science. The first type 
uses experimental systems that consist of one epistemic object (or unknown element) 
only, while the latter research is faced with a multi-sited heuristic endeavour, with 
multiple epistemic objects, and a necessary blurring of epistemic and technical objects. 
The multi- or interdisciplinary confrontation makes the epistemic differences between the 
scientific fields involved obvious, and partly results in deconstructing the claims for 
absolute standards and objective truths. Another difference identified by these scholars is 
that while in the first case (normal science) the disciplines are primarily scientifically 
framed, in the second case the individual scientific fields also fulfil a societal function and 
follow explicit trans-scientific objectives, leading these multiple objectives to conflict 
situations.87  
Parallel is the characterization of contemporary science as Mode-2, which notes 
the replacement of traditional university oriented forms of mono- or interdisciplinarity by 
trans-disciplinary science that ‘is embedded in non-hierarchical, heterogeneous, transient 
settings’.88 The blurring of scientific disciplines is seen to be accompanied by a 
commonplace mixing of what is traditionally understood as scientific, technological and 
                                                
85 Jerome Ravetz, ‘Usable Knowledge, Usable Ignorance: Incomplete Science with Policy implications’ in 
William C Clark and Robert Munn (eds), Sustainable development of the biosphere (Cambridge University 
Press 1986) 415, 422. See further Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz, ‘Science for the post-normal age’ 
(1993) 25 Futures 735. 
86 Arthur Petersen, Albert Cath, Maria Hage, Eva Kunseler and Jeroen van der Sluijs, ‘Post-normal Science 
in practice at the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency’ (2011) 36 Science, Technology and 
Human Values 362, 367. 
87 Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz, ‘Post-normal Science: An insight now maturing’ (1999) 31 
Futures 641. 
88 Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons, Rethinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an 
Age of Uncertainty (Polity Press 2001); Michael Gibbons, The New Production of Knowledge: The 
dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies (Sage 1994). 
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industrial research, both outside and inside universities.89 In this scenario, which is also 
termed ‘post-academic’, the characteristics of disinterestedness and objectivity of the 
scientific enterprise cannot be taken for granted any more.90 The large scale 
industrialization of science for industrial, economic and social application, and the 
accompanying involvement of concerns of profit in corporate investment are seen to affect 
research agendas of the scientific enterprise. The Dutch scientific council for government 
policy (WRR) refers to the fading distinctions between doing science and doing business 
as implicating the position of expert advice in regulation.91 These characterizations of the 
employment of contemporary scientific expertise in regulation are generally recognized 
by sociologists of science, and even among scientists, as an important marker.92 
Therefore, an apposite understanding of scientific advice in regulation may need the 
consideration of additional values; an aspect that is elaborated in Chapter 3. Here public 
participation is seen as an important avenue for such ascertainment of appropriate values 
in regulation.  
 
1.7 Invocation of public participation 
Arguments in favour of public participation include the cognitive improvement of 
decisions due to inputs from a plurality of perspectives, including widening its technical 
and scientific base.93 Further, they also include an implied emphasis on participation for 
justice and equity,94 ambitions to make participative or deliberative measures as 
supplements or alternatives to representative democracy,95 enhancement of legitimacy of 
controversial environmental decisions that are frequently delegated to unelected experts,96 
as well as normative advantages for representative democracies through improvements in 
                                                
89 Robert Hagendijk, ‘The Public Understanding of Science and Public Participation in Regulated Worlds’ 
(2004) 42 Minerva 41. 
90 John Ziman, ‘Is Science losing its Objectivity?’ (1996) 382 Nature 751; John Ziman, Real Science: What 
it is, and what it means (Cambridge University Press 2000).  
91 WRR (n 2) 85-87.  
92 See a broad review of literature regarding post normal science as focus of critique in John Turnpenny, 
Mavis Jones and Irene Lorenzoni, ‘Where now for Post-normal Science?: A critical review of its 
development, definitions, and uses’ (2011) 36 Science, Technology and Human Values 287, 295. See 
further, Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Breaking the waves in Science Studies: Comment on H.M. Collins and Robert 
Evans, The Third Wave of Science Studies’ (2003) 33 Social Studies of Science 389. 
93 Jenny Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving 
approach’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415. 
94 See for instance, World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP 
1987). 
95 Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, ‘The usual suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus Convention’ 
(2003) 66 Modern Law Review 80, 83; Simon Chambers, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’ (2003) 6 
Annual Review of Political Science 307, 308. 
96 Lee and Abbot (95) 84. 
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transparency, accountability and implementation resulting in a wider range of democratic 
deliberation.97 While acknowledging possible contradictions between these multiplicities 
of aspirations, the reason for employing public participation as a marker is discussed in 
this section.  
The acceptance of public participation as normatively superior in important EU 
policy documents lends impetus for an investigation about how law provides for public 
participation in EU GMO regulation. In 2001, the Commission’s White Paper on 
European Governance signified the need to make policy-making more inclusive through 
stronger interaction with civil society.98 It recommended ‘wide participation throughout 
the policy chain - from conception to implementation’ to ensure the ‘quality, relevance 
and effectiveness of EU policies’.99 A similarly strong invocation of people-centered 
policies is found in the Lifesciences strategy of 2002, where the Commission sets out its 
vision of developing ‘sustainable and responsible policies’ in healthcare, agriculture and 
food production, including in agricultural biotechnologies.100 However both documents 
deny the necessity for translating this expression of interest for public participation into 
justiciable principles.101 Notwithstanding this, the acceptance of the normative superiority 
of public participation in EU governance in these documents is important for our 
purpose.102 
A number of international legal instruments underline the importance of public 
participation, the need to institutionalise a regulatory framework that allows effective 
participation in public issues, and even recognize its special relevance in the case of 
GMOs. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration calls for the provision of appropriate access to 
information, the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes, and effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings for environmental issues towards 
                                                
97 Jon Elster (ed), Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University Press 1998); John Dryzek, Deliberative 
Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford University Press 2002); John Dryzek and 
Simon Niemeyer, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance (Oxford University Press 2010). 
98 COM (2001) 428 final 25 July 2001. 
99 ibid 10.  
100 European Commission, ‘Life Sciences: A Strategy for Europe’ COM (2002) 27 final  23 Jan 2002, 28. 
101 Despite its strong endorsement for wide participation, the White Paper on European Governance 
precluded the employment of legal rule, due to ‘excessive rigidity and risk slowing the adoption of 
particular policies’, (n 98) 17. Galligan  found this reasoning unconvincing since the claim that such an 
approach would lead to rigidity is bluntly asserted without the slightest concern for any supporting evidence, 
while the wisdom of a legal approach that may complement other approaches to participation are not even 
considered. ‘The White Paper plainly lost an opportunity to formulate a rigorous, properly researched 
approach to public participation in governance’, Denis Galligan, ‘Citizen’s rights and Biotechnology 
regulation’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (Hart Publishing 
2007) 335, 350. 
102  Galligan (101) 351. 
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realization of sustainable development through better connection between the governed 
and those who govern.103 The Aarhus Convention (of which the EU is a signatory)104 
stipulates parties to make provision for public participation in decisions on specific 
environmental activities; in plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment; 
as well as in preparation of executive regulation and generally applicable legally binding 
normative instruments.105 The Almaty amendment to the Aarhus Convention specifically 
requires Members to introduce an additional regime for public participation in decisions 
on the deliberate release into the environment and placing on the market of GMOs.106 This 
amendment stipulates an early and effective public participatory measure that is prior to 
making specific decisions on the release of GMOs, and underlined that ‘due account is 
taken of the outcome of the public participation procedure’.107  
An argument for participation, i.e. mechanisms that allow the public to 
meaningfully influence regulatory decisions, at a broad policy level or in respect of 
individual releases of GMOs, could be criticised for the institutional cost that are to be 
incurred, and the (im)practicalities involved. Prescriptions of how to create such 
organizational structures within public bodies are not envisaged as part of this thesis; such 
institutional and organizational questions are not germane to the central question of this 
thesis. Within its mandate of examining the extent of legal effectuation of public 
participation in GMO regulation, it seeks to carefully analyse the relevant provisions to 
see whether they effectuate participation, and further, whether the regulatory tools have 
conceptual possibilities for law to incorporate such participatory requirements. 
                                                
103 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, (1992) 31 International 
Legal Materials 874. 
104 Council Decision of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the 
Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters (2005/370/EC) OJ L 124/1. Public Participation in decision-making is identified as 
one of the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention, the others being public access to information and public 
access to justice. See further, Maria Lee, ‘Public Participation, Procedure, and Democratic Deficit in EC 
Environmental Law’ (2004) 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 193. 
105 See Article 6, 7 and 8 of Aarhus Convention. Article 6 (8) requires Members to take due account of the 
outcome of the public participation in decisions on specific activities. Article 7 mandates parties to provide 
opportunities for public participation in the preparation of policies relating to the environment, to the extent 
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and other generally applicable legally binding rules that may have a significant effect on the environment. It 
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106 Decision II/1 on genetically modified organisms, Amendment to the UNECE Convention on access to 
information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters 
adopted at the second meeting of the Parties held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on 25-27 May 2005, UN 
ECOSOC ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.2 20 June 2005, <http://www.unece.org/index.php?eID=tx_ 
nawsecuredl&u=0&filefileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2005/pp/ece/ece.mp.pp.2005.2.add.2.e.pdf&t=1322
648754&hash=06f4d8cfd8f65640718ab1c2f47a43a204d92566> last accessed 20 Nov. 2011. 
107 Annex I bis (7) ibid. 
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How participation can be structured is intricately related to who is recognized as 
capable of participation, and how that public is conceptualised. Lee and Abbot focus on a 
serious limitation of the Aarhus Convention regarding the real nature of participation.108 
They observe the relative privileging of NGOs in Aarhus Convention: 
 
[E]ven if environmental interest groups represent one particular view of the public interest, arguably 
creating a public interest in their involvement, they cannot claim to represent the public…What we can 
say is that since industry or developers are undoubtedly involved in any decision making process, 
environmental interest groups provide an invaluable alternative input, particularly since negotiation 
with the regulated industry is the starting point for much regulatory reform.109 
 
Public sphere can be imagined as a public zone of mediation between the state and 
individuals or groups, where various publics can participate in state processes of decision-
making through negotiations, contestations and deliberations. Habermas’ work on public 
sphere is widely recognized as the primary reference point in understanding 
conceptualizations of public sphere today, even by its critics who see it as inadequate and 
erroneous.110 Gardiner succinctly summarizes the central thesis of Habermas’ work:  
 
[I]n eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a distinct forum for rational public debate emerged in most 
Western European countries. It constituted an area of social life, separate from the state apparatus, in 
which citizens gathered to converse about the issues of the day in a free and unrestricted fashion, either 
literally, as in the town square, or in the pages of diverse journals and periodicals. Debate proceeded 
according to universal standards of critical reason and argumentative structure that all could recognize 
and assent to; appeals to traditional dogmas, or to arbitrary subjective prejudices, were ruled 
                                                
108 Lee and Abbot (n 95)107. 
109 ibid 87. 
110 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Polity 1989). Significant work on 
the public sphere already existed by the time Habermas had originally written his book in German in 1962, 
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conceptualization, more or less, comprised of well-educated bourgeois males: Habermas (n 110) 48. See 
also John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Holt 1927). See further, Andreas Koller, ‘The Public sphere 
and Comparative Historical Research: An Introduction’ (2010) 34 Social Science History 261. 
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inadmissible. Thus it was in the public sphere that ‘discursive will formation’ was actualized in a 
manner that represented general social interest, as opposed to a class or sectional one. 111 
 
Habermasian public sphere also sought to be a historical account of 18th-19th century 
Germany, Britain and France, where ‘the critical reasoning of the public constitutes an 
effective steering force in both society and polity’.112 An approximation of the male 
domain as the bourgeoisie public sphere was central in such an account, ‘founded upon 
free and equal access and upon willing consent between participants’.113 The neglect of 
public spheres other than the male bourgeois public sphere in his approximation has been 
criticised for overlooking the ‘coercive and power-driven attributes of sectionalism, 
exclusiveness and repression’, ‘having profound consequences, not only for historical and 
social investigation but also for theoretical speculation’.114 Habermas subsequently 
conceded the existence of a plurality of publics:  
 
[T]he modern public sphere now comprises several arenas in which… a conflict of opinions is fought 
out more or less discursively. This conflict does not merely involve a competition among various 
parties of loosely associated private people; from the beginning a dominant bourgeois public collides 
with a plebeian one.115  
 
This concept of multiple publics is developed by feminists like Nancy Frazer, and others 
like Craig Calhoun, to argue for recognition of the legitimate discursive claims of those 
residing in ‘alternative public spheres’, or counterpublics that are ‘parallel discursive 
arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter 
discourses’.116 Frazer points to the fallacy in the idea that inequalities between participants 
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112 John Michael Roberts and Nick Crossley, ‘Introduction’ in Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts 
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Politics of Private Woman and Public Man’ in Janet Siltanen and Michelle Stanworth (eds), Women and the 
Public Sphere: A Critique of Sociology and Politics (Hutchinson 1984). 
115 Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Polity 1992) 430. Emphasis added. 
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ambivalent, expressive and effectual practices of the Other- Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday 
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116 Nancy Fraser, ‘Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere: Toward a Postmodern conception’ in Linda J. 
Nicholson and Steven Seidman (eds), Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics (Cambridge 
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can be bracketed during discursive deliberation, when in fact it only ‘conceals real 
inequalities’ including access to resources, which can have ‘drastic consequences for the 
outcome of debate and discussion’.117 She points out that fixed boundaries on topics of 
public discussion that are structured around a common interest do not exist a priori, but 
are products of discourse and dialogue. Formation of counterpublics permit ‘subordinated 
groups to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’.118 
She therefore argued that a participatory parity in the public sphere requires not merely 
the bracketing, but rather the elimination of systematic social inequalities’, and in 
situations where such inequality persists it is preferable to construe a ‘multiplicity of 
mutually contestatory publics’ as opposed to a ‘single modern public sphere oriented 
solely to deliberation’.119 
Following this, the thesis seeks to investigate if and how existing policy 
commitments to public participation have been transposed to legal justiciability. The 
choice of public participation as a referral point in this investigation is notwithstanding the 
acknowledgement of the problems posed by heuristics of public participation, viz., the real 
possibility that public participation may ‘simply hold a mirror up to the pattern of power 
in the community; if the rich and well-organized are heard, while the poor and minorities 
are weakly represented’.120 Nevertheless, it seeks to investigate the possible 
(in)consistencies between the claim to participation in EU policy documents and its 
transposition in EU GMO regulation through legal and justiciable principles. This is with 
an ambition that such a comparison can spark a genuine shift as a result of which patterns 
of power and productions of rationality will also be questioned. A legal engagement with 
public concerns about EU GMO regulation is required for factors identified earlier in this 
Chapter: a) normative aspirations for further democratization of law to be proximate to 
public preferences, b) in policy areas involving perceptible, considerable and persistent 
public disquiet, c) especially in a polity where concerns about the democratic deficit are 
repeatedly raised and d) consequentialist advantages of public participation for socially 
appropriate development of technology. Recognition of the legitimate issues of power 
imbalances and regulatory capture (that can beset both classical regulatory mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                   
University Press 1995) 291, 295. See further, Michael Warner, ‘Publics and Counterpublics’ (2002) 88 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 413; Roberts and Crossely (n 111) 14; Craig Calhoun, ‘The Public Sphere in 
the Field of Power’ (2010) 34 Social Science History 30. 
117 Fraser (116) 291. 
118 ibid 116. 
119 ibid 295. 
120 Lee and Abbot (n 95) 107. 
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and public participatory mechanisms) need not be normatively debilitating for the 
investigation in this thesis, but can be taken as an important factor that needs cognizance 
and additional attention. 
 The investigation in this thesis regarding existing and possible room in the EU 
regulation of GMOs for participation of publics outside of techno-scientific communities 
moves beyond a review of relevant legislation. As Glowka noted: ‘General references to 
public participation may not translate into actual public participation if additional criteria 
are not provided on the form that public participation can take’.121 After providing a broad 
description of legislation that frame the EU regulation of GMOs in Chapter 2, including 
labeling, coexistence and liability, it identifies safety as the central element in the 
regulatory framework for release of GMOs. The concept of risk and the principle of 
precaution are seen as two important motifs in the regulatory pursuit of safety. Later 
Chapters undertake a conceptual exploration of these two motifs to examine if and how 
notions of participation of publics, which are wider than expert scientific communities, are 
conceptually central in them.  
The third Chapter examines the concept of risk as a regulatory tool to pursue 
safety, and is followed by an exploration of the nature and implementation of the 
precautionary principle in Chapter 4. They examine the conceptual possibilities of 
bringing wider public concerns within risk and precaution. The fifth Chapter describes the 
global rules related to the regulation of GMOs in the GATT/ WTO framework and the 
Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity. Through this, the Chapter 
examines whether these global rules provide room for possible improvements of EU 
safety regulation that include public participation. This Chapter also includes a short 
section that describes the manner in which the WTO framework recognizes Member’s 
regulatory action to protect public values. The sixth Chapter investigates different 
regulatory strategies employed for protecting public values related to GMOs in the EU. 
Continuing from the description on labelling and coexistence from Chapter 2, the sixth 
Chapter elaborates on the purpose and limitations of furthering the regulatory recognition 
of ethical plurality as a strategy to pursue public values about GMOs. The Chapter 
analyzes the nature and quality of participation that is possible through consumer 
decisions in the regulation of research, development and use of GMOs. It further examines 
                                                
121 Lyle Glowka, Law and Modern Biotechnology: Selected issues of relevance to Food and Agriculture 
(FAO legislative study 78, FAO 2003) 51 <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/y4839E/y4839E00.pdf> last 
accessed 12 Jan. 2011. 
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the use of public bioethics committee reports as a marker of public values regarding the 
regulation of GMOs. This examination is towards analyzing the room made available for 
public participation in EU regulation of GMOs through such reports. In conclusion, the 
ambition of the thesis is restated for the sake of clarity. It describes relevant EU laws to 
identify and analyze the room available or possible for public participation in the EU 
regulation of GMOs. The first step for such a project is a cursory description of the EU 
legal framework for GMO regulation, attempted in the next Chapter.  
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Chapter 2 
EU Legal Framework for GMO Regulation 
 
How we think about disagreements will determine how we think about politics. And since law is the 
offspring of politics, how we think about disagreement will determine in some measure how we think about 
positive law. 122 
 
EU law regulates the development and use of GMOs through allocating 
responsibilities to different authorities, public and private, accompanied by limited 
recognition of rights of public information, consultation and participation. As elaborated 
later in the Chapter, a case by case examination of the risks of new GMOs, which are 
sought to be released for cultivation or other market purposes, is slotted between 
restrictions on contained use for research, and post-release specifications like labelling, 
traceability, coexistence and liability. This places GMO regulation within the interstices of 
EU environmental law, consumer law, agricultural law, food safety law and of course 
general internal market law.123 The Chapter attempts a cursory description of EU 
legislation that provides the framework for EU regulation of GMOs, and to identify the 
room provided for public participation, consultation and information in such regulation. 
The EU accession to the ECHR makes EU regulation of science and technology, 
including GMOs, subject to the general rights and protection offered by the 
Convention.124 The European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which emphasizes that the 
Union is founded on the indivisible and universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity, and on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, is 
                                                
122 Waldron (n 56) 36. 
123 Article 4 (2) TFEU lists the competence regarding internal market, agriculture, environment, consumer 
protection and ‘common safety concerns in public health matters’ as shared between the Union and the 
Member States. Article 11 TFEU stipulates requirements of environmental protection to be integrated into 
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124 Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 
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recognized as part of the broad ethical framework in the EU regulation of research, 
development and use of science and technology.125 Specific insistence on public 
participation in EU decision-making is mostly absent in the TEU, the TFEU and the 
ECHR.126 Representative democracy is signified in the TEU as the foundation of the EU, 
where the European Parliament, the Member States through their governments, and 
political parties at the European level are expected to represent and express the will of the 
citizens.127 However, the TFEU insists on citizen’s right of access to EU documents, and 
prescribes that EU institutions conduct their work as openly as possible ‘in order to 
promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society’.128 An ingenious 
platform is provided by the TEU where ‘not less than one million citizens who are 
nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the 
European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate 
proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaties’.129 Apart from these provisions, there are little 
legislative suggestions for a move towards public participation in EU regulation of science 
and technology.  
By examining the three stages of EU regulation of GMOs,130 the picture that 
emerges in this Chapter is that this regulatory labyrinth is dominated by the motif of 
safety, articulated through the concept of risk and the principle of precaution. The Chapter 
discusses the procedures related to contained use and field trials of GMOs during its 
development before a research organization can apply for authorization for release. 
Further, the Chapter discusses the steps involved in arriving at a regulatory decision to 
authorize the release of GMOs, either as an agricultural crop, human food or animal feed 
(feed). It includes an identification of provisions that facilitate public participation, 
consultation and information during such regulation. In the post release procedures, it 
further discusses EU instruments of environmental guarantees, the relevant product 
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Synthetic Biology (EGE 2009) 35-36. See, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, 
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safeguard measures, labelling and traceability requirements, coexistence measures and 
liability provisions. The Chapter does not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the 
relevant legal rules in an exhaustive fashion, but merely introduces the broad contours of 
the framework to an unfamiliar reader. After such an introduction, further discussions 
regarding EU procedures related to safety, labelling, segregation of different streams of 
agriculture (GM, conventional and organic), and consideration of public values apart from 
safety are continued in later Chapters.131 
The EU Regulation, which applied the provisions for public access to information 
and justice, and public participation in decision-making in environmental matters in the 
Aarhus Convention to EU law, stipulates that effective opportunities for public 
participation during the preparation, modification or review of plans or programmes 
relating to the environment are to be provided by EU institutions through appropriate 
provisions at an early stage, when all options are still open.132 EU institutions are required 
to identify the public that are likely to be affected or have an interest in relevant 
programmes. Further, this Regulation also stipulates that these groups are provided with 
public access to requisite information, receive any comments from them, and that the 
regulators take due account of these comments.133  
The current attempt at high levels of harmonization in EU GMO regulation 
through a complicated regulatory maze, as discussed later in this section, include 
provisions for the general public to access relevant documents, and to be consulted. The 
enactment of the Deliberate Release Directive, 2001134 and the subsequent introduction of 
the two regulations (Food & Feed Regulation and Labelling Regulation)135 in July 2003 
completed an important stage that ended the de-facto moratorium; where various states 
had refused to allow the circulation of GMOs that were authorized by the EU regime.136 
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The legal compatibility of the moratorium with the WTO framework was suspect and 
necessitated the formal end of the moratorium. The attempt during the inception of the 
current regime was to tackle the social and environmental issues emanating from the 
release of GMOs in a manner acceptable to international and internal audiences.137 Twin 
tropes of risk and consumer protection were employed in the regulatory regime for 
authorizing GMOs to achieve a single market, which maintains a high level of 
environmental protection and human health in a precautionary manner.138 This is because, 
once a GMO is authorized by the Commission as safe for its intended use after the 
stipulated risk ascertainment process,139 and appropriately labelled,140 the same can be 
grown, sold or consumed in any individual Member State.141 The precautionary principle 
is often asserted as the fundamental principle upon which this regulatory framework is 
built. The objectives of the Deliberate Release Directive affirm that ‘in accordance with 
the precautionary principle, the objective of this Directive is to approximate laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States and to protect human 





                                                
137 See the statements of the Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström and the Health and Consumer 
Protection Commissioner David Byrne, on the occasion of the adoption of the new regulations: “it will 
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Labeling Regulation (Recital 3). Further, the stipulation in the Food and Feed Regulation (Recital 6) for a 
case by case evaluation of the socio-economic, environmental and health risks for every application of 
release of GMOs, as opposed to the doctrine of substantial equivalence, demonstrates the precautionary 
inclinations in the regulatory system. See for more on the process versus product debate: Robert Howse and 
Donald Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction: An illusory Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” in 
Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249.   
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Salient features of the regulatory framework include:  
• a detailed set of principles, which is required to be considered in environmental and health 
risk assessments,143 
• a requirement that applicants perform their own risk assessment prior to submitting an 
application for approval of the GMO,144 
• broadening of the relevant matters to be considered in assessing applications to include 
ethical concerns,145 and the cumulative long-term effects of GMOs on human health and 
the environment,146  
• an emphasis on public consultation and access to information regarding applications for 
release,147  
• provisions to ensure adequate labelling, traceability and post-market surveillance 
requirements,148  
• segregation measures to ensure coexistence of GM, conventional and organic 
agriculture,149 and 
• continuing attempts to create EU environmental liability regimes that are specifically 
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requires the Member States to ensure that all appropriate measures, in accordance with the precautionary 
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148 See Article 21 Deliberate Release Dir., Articles 12, 13, 24 and 25 of the Food and Feed Reg., and Article 
4 (6) of the Labelling Reg. 
149 Article 26a Deliberate Release Dir. 
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2.1 Authorization procedures under the Directive and Regulation 
The decision to release a GMO for agriculture or other purposes like animal feed, food, 
floriculture and food processing (the most visible stage of the regulation) is envisaged 
through an intricate mixture of the Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed 
Regulation. There are partial overlaps and variations in the respective scopes of these two 
legal instruments. The method underlying both the procedures are similar viz., a 
characterization of the risks involved to the environment, health or both, accompanied by 
an attempt to gain political acceptability for this characterization.150 However, there are 
significant differences between the formal procedures under the Directive and the 
Regulation, including the role of the Member State Competent Authorities.151 This 
subsection describes the respective procedures under the Directive and the Regulation. 
The Food and Feed Regulation is applicable in authorization of GMOs intended for a) 
use as food or feed, b) food or feed containing or consisting of GMOs, and c) food or feed 
produced from or containing ingredients produced from GMOs.152 The Court has held that 
products such as honey and food supplements containing genetically modified DNA ought 
to fall within the latter category of ‘food produced from or containing ingredients 
produced from GMOs’, even though such genetically modified DNA is incapable of 
reproduction or transfer of genetic material.153 The Deliberate Release Directive is 
applicable to releases of GMOs into the environment for a) any other purpose than for 
placing in the market, and b) placing in the common market GMOs ‘as or in products’.154 
There are significant overlaps between this latter category in the Directive and the scope 
of the Regulation viz., GMOs for food or feed, and food or feed containing GMOs. In 
such cases of overlap, the application is processed under the Regulation for food safety, 
coupled with an environmental risk analysis under the Directive.155 In situations like 
transgenic floriculture (having no applications of food) the procedure under the Directive 
is singularly applied. In other cases of release that do not include living material, say of 
                                                
150 Preamble 9 of the Food and Feed Reg. specifies that the authorisation procedures for food safety should 
include the principles introduced in the Deliberate Release Dir. 
151 See Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-making (Hart Publishing 
2005) ch 9, for a detailed discussion on the difference between the requirements prior to a decision to 
release under the two instruments. Only a cursory description of the authorisation is attempted here partly, 
since there is so much literature already available on this. 
152 Articles 3 and 15 Food and Feed Reg. In the interest of readability, food is used in the following text to 
include animal feed, unless specified otherwise. 
153 Karl Heinz Bablok v Freistaat Bayern Case C-442/09, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 6 
September 2011, not yet reported. 
154 Article 1 Deliberate Release Dir. 
155 Articles 6 (4) and 18 (4) Food and Feed Reg. requires that environmental safety procedures for food 
containing/ consisting of GMOs applies as in the Deliberate Release Dir.  
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processed transgenic food, the application comes under the exclusive ambit of the 
Regulation since it involves no apparent environmental hazards. 
Under both instruments, the applicant who is developing the GMO is expected to 
initiate the process of risk regulation for an authorization of release by forwarding a food 
safety assessment, an environmental risk assessment, or both (in applicable cases). Any 
application to authorize release of a GMO is to include this assessment in the dossier, and 
is to be submitted to the relevant Member State Competent Authority.156 At this initial 
stage, apart from undertaking a preliminary evaluation of the hazards, the applicant is also 
responsible to share all available peer reviewed and independent studies regarding the 
safety of the GMO. If the application for release is made exclusively within the context of 
the Directive, the national Authority to which the application was originally addressed 
examines the relevant environmental risks, including through an appraisal of the dossier 
submitted by the applicant. The environmental risk assessment by the specific Authority is 
circulated to all other Member States Competent Authorities and the Commission within a 
stipulated time. In case a recommendation to authorize release is made in this report, other 
Member States and the Commission are granted an opportunity to provide comments or 
reasoned objections to the recommended release.157 The Commission is expected to make 
the summary of the dossier of the original application and the national Competent 
Authority’s assessment report available to the public. It must also forward any consequent 
comments by the public to the relevant competent authorities within the stipulated time.158  
If there are no objections from scientific authorities of other Member States, or if the 
objections raised are resolved through exchange of positions within the stipulated time, 
the relevant GMO is authorized to be released under the Directive.159 Although the 
regulatory structure provides this early opportunity to arrive at an agreement on 
outstanding issues between the national authorities, such a resolution is yet to occur under 
this regime. In these instances of disagreement between national scientific authorities, the 
Commission is required to forward the dossier to the Scientific Committee for 
consultations (the GMO panel of European Food Safety Authority is the designated 
                                                
156 Article 4 (2) Deliberate Release Dir., Article 5 (3) (e) and Article 17 (3) (e) Food and Feed Reg. 
157 Article 15 (1) Deliberate Release Dir. 
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committee for this purpose).160 Based on the report of European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) as the Scientific Committee, the Commission is expected to forward a draft 
decision on the possible release for a general EU procedure called Comitology.161 In this 
committee procedure, expert representatives of various Member States deliberate and vote 
on the proposal.162  
The initial stages in the regulatory procedure for authorization are substantially 
different under the Regulation. Here Member State Competent Authorities have minimal 
roles, though individual applications are formally submitted to them. Applications under 
the Regulation are forwarded from these authorities to EFSA within a stipulated time, 
which circulates the same to other national authorities and the Commission. There is also 
an important provision to make the summary of the dossier available to the public.163 
Subsequent to this, EFSA carries out a safety assessment, which may include a number of 
opportunities for national authorities to be consulted.164 This risk assessment of EFSA is 
submitted to the Commission, and is required to be made public so that citizens can make 
comments regarding the contents of the report to the Commission.165  
The Commission is supposed to prepare a draft proposal based on the opinion of 
EFSA, any relevant provisions of EU law and ‘other legitimate factors relevant to the 
matter’.166 Though there is no explicit reference to the consideration by the Commission 
of public comments about EFSA opinion during the preparation of its proposal, this can 
be implied as part of ‘other legitimate factors’ here. Here, the Commission is required to 
provide an explanation for any difference between the opinion of EFSA and its draft 
proposal regarding the application.167 The Commission’s draft proposal regarding the 
                                                
160 Article 28 ibid. 
161 Ellen Vos, ‘The role of Comitology in European Governance’ in Deirdre Curtin and Ramses Wessel 
(eds), Good Governance and the European Union: Concept, Implications and Applications (Intersentia 
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163 Article 29 (1) of the Food and Feed Reg. Also, Article 28 of the Food and Feed Reg. requires the 
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the European Union: Ambiguity and Hierarchy’ in Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 29) 101, 105. 
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release of the specific GMO is required to be forwarded to the Standing Committee on the 
Food Chain and Animal Health for Committee procedure.168  
The Committee procedures provided under the Directive and the Regulation are 
similar, and have invariably resulted in deadlocks, where neither the opposition nor the 
supporters of the proposal to release could garner the requisite qualified majority of two 
thirds of the members of the Committee.169 In these situations of deadlock in the 
Committee, the dossier is forwarded to the Council, with the assumption that in view of 
the contentious nature of the dossier, political responsibility needs to be explicitly 
exercised by the members of the Council. This is an expression of the bifurcation of EU 
risk regulation into technical risk assessment and political management, examined in 
detail in the next Chapter. The voting pattern and the deadlock during voting in 
Regulatory Committee is mirrored in the Council votes, demonstrating the deep divisions 
and concerns that have continued to underpin decisions on most releases of GMOs in the 
EU.170 Every application for release of GM crops has undergone the regulatory rigmarole 
of first, an assessment either by EFSA, a Member State Competent Authority, or both, and 
second risk management considerations including the Committee procedure. Such a long 
chain of decision-making has not resulted in a qualified majority either to accept or reject 
the proposal. All these applications have been authorized by the Commission on the 
legimating factor of EFSA opinion, either as a risk assessor under the Regulation or as 
Scientific Committee that is consulted during committee procedure under the Directive.171 
The implications of this scenario to governance of controversial technologies in general, 
and to risk regulation in particular, are discussed in the next Chapter. However, the 
legitimacy of the Commission’s decisions to authorize specific GMOs when misgivings 
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on risk are unresolved, and where a simple majority in the scientific committee opposes 
the decision during bifurcated risk regulation, needs further reflection. 
The recent change in rules regarding the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers is relevant for both the Committee procedure and voting in the Council. The new 
requirement to arrive at a decision on the Commission’s proposal of implementation is a 
double majority, i.e. ‘a qualified majority of 55% of the members, comprising at least 
fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population 
of the Union’.172 Further, in situations where no opinion on the draft implementing acts 
related to protection of health or safety of humans, animals or plants are delivered, the 
Commission is expected to either resubmit an amended version of the proposal to the 
same committee, or forward the proposal to an appeal committee, within the stipulated 
time.173 In case a deadlock (no opinion) continues at this stage of appeal, the Commission 
is again given the discretion to adopt its own proposal to release.174  
 
2.2 Regulation earlier to authorizations for placing on the market 
The consideration of risks of GMOs does not, of course, begin with the aforementioned 
stage of authorization, but is preceded by a number of regulatory measures that are 
mentioned in this section.175 The Contained Use Directive provides for guidelines of safe 
use during relevant research and development within the confines of laboratories and 
green houses.176 Though the scope of the Directive is limited to micro-organisms, some 
Members States have extended national implementation to contained use of all GMOs.177 
A prior assessment of the risk to health and environment from the concerned research 
must be carried out by the user of modified organism, which is required to be made 
available to the national Competent Authority in appropriate forms.178 Different categories 
provided under the Contained Use Directive give rise to different levels of containment of 
                                                
172 Qua a joint reading of Article 16 (4) TEU, and Article 5 (1) of Regulation (EU) No. 182/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles 
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173 Article 5 (4) ibid (Regulation). 
174 Article 6 (3) ibid.  
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Genetically Modified micro-organisms [2009] L 125/ 75 (Contained Use Dir.).  
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the specific activity, as well differential obligations of notifications to the concerned 
public Authority. The user is responsible to classify the GMO sought to be used within 
containment into one of the four statutorily enumerated categories viz., activities of no or 
negligible risk, activities of low risk, activities of moderate risk and activities of high risk, 
based on their own risk assessment.179 The higher levels have more stringent containment 
and isolation conditions, accompanied by requirements of further periodic notifications to 
the competent authorities.180 The competent authorities shall examine the conformity of 
the notifications with the requirements of this Directive, including the accuracy and 
completeness of the information given, the correctness of the risk assessment, the 
selection of the class of contained use, and where appropriate, the suitability of the 
containment and other protective measures, the waste management, and emergency 
response measures.181 In appropriate situations the Member States are allowed to provide 
for public consultations on aspects of the proposed contained use that it considers 
appropriate.182 
The Deliberate Release Directive provides for guidelines of field trials of plants in 
ecosystems that could be affected by their use; such field trials are mandatory before 
placing such GMOs on the market.183 The key document in a decision to authorize field 
trials is the technical dossier prepared by the applicant, and is similar in nature to the 
dossier during the authorization procedures for both market release and contained use 
(mentioned earlier). The dossier is expected to supply information relating to GMOs, 
conditions of release and the ‘potential receiving environment’, interactions between the 
GMOs and the environment, control, remediation methods, waste treatment and 
emergency response plans as well as monitoring plan for identifying effects on human 
health or environment.184 Based on the information provided in the dossier, the national 
Authority is required to take a decision on the authorization for field trials. The Directive 
facilitates circulation of this information between various national authorities through the 
Commission,185 and information on all field trial releases is made accessible to the public 
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183 Preamble 25 Deliberate Release Dir. 
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185 Article 11 ibid. 
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within a reasonable period, including exchanges between the national authorities.186 
Further, the public must be consulted with regard to these experimental releases.187  
It was noted in the previous section that concerns about safety dominate the process 
to authorize deliberate release of GMOs, where political, ethical and other social concerns 
articulated outside scientific rationality appear to be underrepresented in law’s 
engagement with contestations about GMOs as an agri-technological trajectory (argued in 
Chapter 4). There are, however, statutory provisions to institutionally acknowledge 
general concerns about ethics of the development and use of GMOs, through consultation 
with expert committees (examined in Chapter 6). On the other hand, concerns about safety 
continue beyond the stage of authorization, despite being raised before the inception of 
this stage, and are described in the next section.  
 
2.3 Persistence of safety concerns beyond the decision to release 
Concerns about safety that persist after authorization for commercial release of specific 
GMOs are addressed in two subsequent legal spaces. At a stage of regulation that is 
subsequent to the authorization for release, EU law provides certain powers to Member 
States to control movement and use of GMOs within their territories for responding to 
safety concerns about health and environment. This section finds that though these two 
legal spaces have the potential to give expression to social disagreements about the risk 
assessed during authorization, scientific rationality strictly controls the application of 
these provisions.  
 
2.3.1 Product safeguard measures 
First among these areas is the combination of internal market law and the safeguard 
clause, seen in all EU product-based harmonising measures. A number of Member States 
have invoked these clauses to ban specific GMOs in their territories including Austria, 
Hungary, France, Germany and Poland.188 The Deliberate Release Directive empowers 
Member States to take derogatory action, subsequent to harmonization, with detailed 
‘scientific’ grounds to demonstrate risk to human health or environment, ‘in the event of 
new or additional information’ or ‘re-assessment of existing information on the basis of 
                                                
186 Article 9 (2) ibid. 
187 Article 9 (1) ibid. 
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new or additional scientific knowledge’.189 The absolute insistence on scientific evidence 
is different from safeguard provisions in the previous Deliberate Release Directive of 
1990,190 which had an additional ground. This ground allowed measures by Member 
States to provisionally derogate from the free movement of authorized GMOs, if there 
were ‘justifiable reasons’ to consider the constitution of risk to human health or the 
environment.191 However, in the Greenpeace decision, where signatures of one-fifth of the 
population of Austria were submitted (along with certain scientific documents) in support 
of the safeguard measure as constitutive of possible risk to their health, these were not 
regarded as ‘justifiable reason’.192  
The Common Seed Catalogue Directive,193 an instrument which provides for a 
register of all seed varieties that are intended for cultivation in EU (including GM seeds 
that are already approved by authorization process under the Deliberate Release Directive) 
also provides for particular safeguard measures.194 This Directive has safeguard provisions 
similar to the current Deliberate Release Directive and seeks to respond to urgent threats 
to the environment and health.195 In addition, the Catalogue also permits safeguard 
measures when ‘it is well-known that the variety is not suitable for cultivation in any part 
of its territory because of its type of maturity class’.196  
The safeguard clause under the Food and Feed Regulation provides for emergency 
measures of suspension or termination of commercial releases in the event of a severe 
risk;197 for example, in light of an EFSA opinion underlining an urgent need to suspend or 
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modify an existing authorization.198 The Court has recently emphasized that in light of the 
overall scheme of the Regulation, the assessment and management of a serious and 
evident risk ultimately is the sole responsibility of the Commission and the Council, 
subject to review by the EU Courts.199 Notwithstanding the temporary and preventive 
nature of these emergency measures, the judgment reiterated these measures may be 
adopted only based on a risk assessment, which is as complete as possible in the particular 
circumstances of the case.200 
It is important that safeguard measures are generally expected to be provisional in 
nature, and require the concerned Member State to inform the Commission and other 
Members States about the action taken including its reasons and a review of risk 
assessment.201 Further, a subsequent centralized review process through the committee 
procedure of these emergency measures (in most cases, tightly controlled by claims of 
scientific basis) ensues within the stipulated time.202 Thus safeguard clauses under both 
Deliberate Release Directive and Food and Feed Regulation not only harmonize and 
centralize short term responses to even exceptional situations, but also tie its application to 
an unrealistically high bar of narrow scientific proof. This is well-illustrated by the 
attempts of the Commission to repeal the Austrian safeguard measures that were in the 
form of a temporary ban of the use and sale of two strains of GM-maize in its territory. 
The first two proposals by the Commission to withdraw the Austrian safeguard measures 
were rejected by the Council by a qualified majority. In the vote on the second proposal, 
the qualified majority pointed to the statutory requirement under the Deliberate Release 
Directive to reassess the concerned GMOs, and argued that ‘the different agricultural 
structures and regional ecological characteristics in the EU need to be taken into account 
in a more systematic manner in the environmental risk assessment of GMOs’.203 The 
Commission’s third proposal on the specific derogation, which incidentally targeted only 
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the food and feed aspects of the safeguard action, ended in a deadlock. Here there was an 
inability to secure a qualified majority either in favour of or against the proposal, leaving 
the Commission with the obligation to adopt its own proposal to repeal the Austrian 
measures.204 This situation elicited a response from the EU Presidency that most Member 
States had a second reasoning against the Commission’s proposal to withdraw the 
safeguards, viz., ‘the feeling that a member state’s will should be respected (sic)’.205 This 
reveals a problematic situation, where the Commission in the name of implementing EU 
legislation has much leeway to act on its proposal (opposing specific Member State 
safeguard measures), notwithstanding significant majority support for these safeguards 
that falls short of a qualified majority.  
Significantly, the Commission has proposed an opt-out clause from allowing 
cultivation of GM seeds that were already authorized by EU regulation, in the form of an 
additional safeguard clause to the Deliberate Release Directive.206 The Commission points 
out the lack of freedom for Member States to decide whether they wish to cultivate GMOs 
in their territory on the ‘basis of specific conditions’, due to the absence of a provision to 
take into account legitimate factors other than science during authorization of deliberate 
release under the Directive.207 This proposal is subsequent to declarations from the 
Kingdom of Netherlands to the Agriculture and Environmental Councils, asking the 
Commission to suggest a solution on cultivation while taking into account the socio-
economic dimensions of GMO cultivation.208 Further, Austria supported by twelve 
Member States, presented a paper in the Environment Council suggesting an introduction 
of legislation that provides an opt-out clause for cultivation of specific GMOs.209 Since 
cultivation has a strong local and regional dimension, the draft opt-out clause has sought 
to provide for a safeguard clause for Member States to restrict or prohibit cultivation on 
the basis of grounds relating to public interest other than protection of health and the 
environment.210 
                                                
204 2826 Environmental Council meeting, 14th November 2007 
205 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/biotech/eu-considers-pause-thought-gmos/article-168053> last accessed 11 
March 2011.  
206 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the economic and 
social committee and the Committee of the regions on the freedom for Member States to decide on the 
cultivation of genetically modified crops, COM (2010) 375 final.  
207 ibid 5-6. 
208 Note with ref. 7581/09 of the EU Council, cited from, ibid fn 10.  
209 Note with ref. 11226/2/09 REV 2 of the EU Council, cited from, ibid fn 12. 
210 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs in their territory’ COM (2010) 375 final, Article 1 and Recital 8. 
 46  
 
2.3.2 Environmental guarantee measures 
A second space in the regulatory framework, where concerns of safety continue to be 
raised is through environmental ‘guarantee’ measures. These guarantees empower a 
Member State to introduce national provisions after the adoption of a harmonization 
measure either by the European Parliament and Council, by the Council, or by the 
Commission.211 New measures can be adopted by Member States to protect the 
‘environment or the working environment’ on grounds of a problem specific to that 
Member State,212 if it can be demonstrated to be based on ‘new scientific evidence’.213 
Importantly, the environmental guarantee measures have a smaller range of potential 
triggers than the safeguard measures discussed in the previous section, since the 
safeguards can be invoked on the grounds of a serious risk either to human/animal health 
or the environment.214 In contrast, environmental guarantees can be used in a more general 
manner, i.e. states could notify measures that restrict the use of GMOs generally, as 
opposed to safeguard measures that can pertain to only specific GMOs, on a case by case 
basis. Unlike in safeguard measures, the Council has no role in deciding the legality of 
guarantee measures; this authority solely resides with the Commission and is only subject 
to review by EU courts.215  
There are considerable limitations to the operation of these guarantee measures,216 
where the Commission’s interpretation is that these national measures are only allowed if 
they are justified without endangering the unity of the internal market. The Commission is 
expected to approve these measures so as to avoid prejudice to the binding nature and 
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uniform application of EU law, lest the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market be rendered ineffective by Member States retaining the unilateral right to apply 
derogatory national rules. These limitations are clearly emphasized in the judgment of the 
ECJ (as it was called then) in Austria v. Commission.217 The milieu of this case duly 
testifies to the continuing requirement of the centrality of science based assessment for the 
applicability of Article 95 (5) of the EC Treaty (the predecessor and equivalent of Article 
114 (5) of the TFEU) in a manner that is very similar to the restriction of safeguard 
provisions under the Deliberative Release Directive. This is particularly so, because of the 
two requirements that 1) the Member State is expected to demonstrate that the notified 
measure was justified in the light of ‘new scientific evidence’ concerning protection of the 
environment, and 2) was also a problem ‘specific’ to the Member State.218 Cogent critique 
exists that identifies the limitations and narrowness of the Court’s approach in restrictively 
defining new scientific evidence to include only that data which were generated after the 
specific harmonization measure. This, it has been argued, has rendered the provision 
practically useless, and that a more appropriate construction would have been ‘to accept 
all relevant knowledge, including information that was already available at the time of 
adoption of the community measure, but which for some reason has been overlooked or 
deemed irrelevant at the time’.219  
This experience in applying environmental guarantees in GMO regulation is 
similar to the general account of invocations of EU environmental guarantee provisions. 
Originally designed as a guarantee so that environmentally progressive Member States 
could retain or introduce high levels of protection after harmonization, these provisions 
have been more or less rendered redundant by restrictive interpretations of the de-facto 
requirement of new scientific evidence and specificity to privilege uniformity and the 
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internal market.220 No provisions exist for direct consultations or participation for eliciting 
public opinion regarding the invocation or continuation of such measures.  
 
2.4 Other important aspects of EU regulation 
An important aspect of post-release anxieties is captured in the legal complex of labelling, 
traceability and coexistence, which is placed within the larger context of food safety law 
and consumer law. Ensuring traceability and identification of the presence of GM in 
products has a number of objectives. These include consumer information and 
sovereignty, ability to trace and monitor GM sources for health and environmental 
reasons, and an endeavour to preserve the viability of different streams of agriculture, 
including the sanctity of organic food production. EU regulation provides for mandatory 
labelling, which to a large extent helps consumers to avoid consumption of GMOs, if they 
choose to do so. Over and above the general requirements for labelling in the EU, the 
Food and Feed Regulation requires labelling of foods that 1) contain or consist of GMOs, 
or 2) are produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs. Such foods are 
required to have a requisite label either on the package,221 or in a permanent and visible 
display on the shelf of sale, if it is a product not usually sold in packages.222 It is also 
required to mention a product’s composition, nutritional values or effects, intended use or 
specific health concerns, on the label, when it either 1) gives rise to ethical or religious 
concerns, or; 2) where a food is different from its conventional counterpart in 
characteristic or property; as and when this is specified in the authorization.223  
In addition, the Labelling Regulation requires a ‘paper trail’ that traces the original 
transgenic process of a product to the end consumer for facilitating full, accurate and 
reliable labelling of such products, irrespective of the existence of living matter in the 
product at a later stage.224 Such a trail is established through constitution of unique 
identifiers for every authorized GMO, making up a combination of a) name of the 
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applicant or consent holder b) transformation event and c) verification component, 
expressed as nine alphanumeric digits.225 This is relevant not only for the further 
facilitation of consumer information, but also helps operationalise the precautionary 
principle, since it assists post-release monitoring and research of hazards. It also facilitates 
implementation of risk management measures through post authorization monitoring, the 
swift withdrawal of products that may be later identified as dangerous from the market, as 
also tracing the chain of production and distribution to establish causation and liability in 
relevant circumstances.226 Thus any operator who places food products on the market, 
which 1) consists of or contain GMOs, or 2) produced from GMOs, must transmit the 
specified information to the operators receiving the products in writing.227 
While lauding the progressive nature of labelling provisions, Lee emphasizes the 
importance of two categories that are excluded from labelling requirements viz., products 
from a non-food GMO (like cotton cloth) in the traceability regulation as well as food 
produced from a GMO, like meat or milk from a cow fed with GM in the Food and Feed 
Regulation.228 Given the actual and potential size of the market, she rightly remarks that 
this restricts the information flow to consumers for making meaningful, ethical and 
political choices. Here, it is pertinent to remember the important exemption from labelling 
requirements. Labelling provisions are specifically inapplicable in cases where the food or 
feed contains not more than 0.9% transgenic material (considered for each individual GM 
strain) and if the producer can demonstrate that this presence is adventitious or technically 
unavoidable. This might be intended to be a pragmatic recognition of the fait accompli of 
admixture that introduction of GM crops will invariably bring. However, it poses serious 
questions about the integrity of the system, which claims to be designed to keep different 
agricultural practices separate. Discussed in the next subsection, exempting a high 
percentage of admixtures from labelling requirements is feared to endanger effective 
segregation mechanisms and the related need to secure the category of organic production 
of food in a meaningful manner. The 0.9 percent threshold has been maintained even in 
labelling provisions of organic products under a different regulation, much to the 
opposition of consumer groups and the Parliament, who hold that the integrity of food 
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under the organic category may slowly erode.229 Though these aspects appear technical 
and unimportant, it often constitutes the heart of the matter. This becomes clearer after an 
examination of the coexistence guidelines that are intricately related to labelling of 
agricultural produce. 
 
2.4.1 Coexistence measures 
Measures to ensure coexistence of GM, conventional and organic agriculture theoretically 
fall within Member State competence at present. The Directive mandates Member States 
to take appropriate measures to avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products, 
and requires the Commission to coordinate and develop guidelines for coexistence based 
on studies at community and national level.230 Given the enormous trade impact, the 
Directive chalks out a subsidiarity based strategy to regulate coexistence at the national 
level, whereby various Member States have sought to put in place appropriate measures to 
avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products.231  
Through its coordination the Commission has fettered national action on 
coexistence measures by placing them within the wider legal and policy framework to 
enforce the internal market. This is effectuated through the issue of two sets of ‘non-
binding’ recommendations by the Commission, where it was stipulated that such measures 
‘should be efficient, cost effective and proportionate’.232 Contrary to the textual meaning 
of these recommendations as non-binding, the legal effect of these guidelines are counter-
intuitive in nature, where the outer boundaries of Member State action are more or less 
hemmed in by these recommendations.233 While most Member States are in the process of 
putting in place national coexistence regimes, the majority of these efforts were earlier 
objected to by the Commission as potentially restricting intra-Community trade, basing its 
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Environmental Law 198. 
230 Article 26a Deliberate Release Dir. 
231 See as a starting point: Thijs Etty, ‘Current Survey of Substantive European Community Law: 
Biotechnology’ (2005) 5 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 293.  
232 See Commission Recommendation 2003/556/ EC on Guidelines for the Development of National 
Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional 
and Organic Farming [2003] OJ L 189/36, provided under A. 26a (2) of the Deliberate Release Dir.  
233 ‘National authorities and courts are bound to take them into account, especially when they cast light on 
the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to 
supplement binding Community provisions’: Case C-322/88 Grimaldi [1989] ECR 4407. 
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judgement on an ‘extremely limited construction’ of coexistence concerns.234 Subsequent 
to criticism from various quarters, significantly, the Commission has emphasized the 
importance of protecting flexibility for Member States to take into account their regional 
specificities and particular needs in its recent recommendations.235  
The Commission’s continued insistence of coexistence measures as purely an 
economic issue is a significant element of the EU emphasis on segregation of crops.236 
This denies other objectives important for the public like pursuing precaution against 
ecological catastrophes through keeping a form of agriculture like organic production 
completely independent of GMOs. The differences in perspectives on the rationale of 
coexistence measures are emblematic of the range of objectives that can be pursued by the 
coexistence, labelling and organic seed purity regimes. The effect of this insistence on 
coexistence as a purely economic measure is to limit the range of rationales that can 
inform coexistence measures. For instance, an insistence on organic as a mere economic 
category, can thwart ethical and political aspirations of some sections to keep the organic 
form of agriculture intact as a credible public good for a number of other reasons.237 Such 
reasons cited by various sections include public health, social and rural development and 
animal welfare,238 a political choice to avoid consumption of GMOs, a form of resisting 
hegemonic presence by big seed companies, an ethical way of living for green groups, 
political activism about a non-industrialised life, and a reasonable manner of precaution 
through keeping other forms of agriculture intact for the society to fall back on, against 
                                                
234 European Commission, ‘Commission Communication: Report on the implementation of Member States 
Coexistence Measures’ COM (2006)104. See Annex for detailed information on the various Member States 
provisions. See further: Etty (n 229) 377-8, he strongly criticized the Commission’s interpretation of the 
exception under Labelling Regulation of ‘up to 0.9% in-adventitious presence of GM traces’ as a minimum 
tolerable regulatory target as opposed to a more correct approach of a maximum tolerable threshold of 
impurity.  
235 European Commission, ‘Recommendation 2010/C 200/1 EC on Guidelines for the Development of 
National Coexistence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic 
crops’ [2010] OJ C 200/1. See Recital (7): ‘to better reflect the possibility …for Member States to establish 
measures…the current guidelines limit their content to the main general principles for the development of 
coexistence measures, recognising that Member States need sufficient flexibility to take into account their 
regional and national specificities and the particular local needs of conventional, organic and other types of 
crops’. This set of recommendation also repealed the earlier recommendation of 2003 (n 232). 
236 See Annex, 2.3.2 ibid (Commission Recommendation 2010): ‘Member States should consider that there 
may be no need to pursue specific levels of admixture where labeling a crop as GM has no economic 
implications’. See further: European Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation of National Measures on 
the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Farming’ COM (2006) 104 
final. 
237 Organic Reg. (n 229) Recital 1: ‘The organic production method…delivers a public good contributing to 
the protection of the environment and animal welfare, as well as to rural development’. 
238 European Commission, ‘European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming’ COM (2004) 415 final, 
section 1.4. 
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unanticipated genetic catastrophes.239 Further, the setting of technical thresholds of 
contamination as 0.9%, could be regarded a public issue, and the same concern about 
thresholds is visible across the board in areas of labelling, traceability, seed purity and 
coexistence measures. Here, such restricted thresholds are seen by ecological groups as 
threatening the public credibility of preserving an important form of agriculture itself.240 
Discussions regarding how coexistence and labelling measures contribute to the pursuit of 
public values, and the general public’s ability to contribute to the determination of these 
values, are engaged in the sixth Chapter of this thesis.  
 
 
2.4.2 Liability measures  
The Commission White Paper underlined the importance of civil liability regimes due to 
the widespread public concern about, ‘negative effects of GMOs on our health’ and the 
environment.241 The Deliberate Release Directive requires its provisions to be 
complemented with ‘liability rules for different types of environmental damage in all 
areas of the European Union’.242 For activities within the purvey of EU regulation, the 
Commission White Paper had recommended a framework Directive providing strict 
liability for damage caused by certain activities categorised as dangerous activities, and 
fault-based liability was the preferred route for damage to biodiversity caused by non-
dangerous activities.243 However, the Environmental Liability Directive244 has left the 
issue of damage caused by modern biotechnology out of its purview, except for the impact 
on EU designated nature conservation sites or protected species.245 Thereby the important 
aspect of an appropriate liability regime for potential environmental damage is largely left 
to EU Member States.  
                                                
239 See for instance, Lee, ‘Governance of Coexistence’ (n 229). 
240 See further, Les Levidow and Karin Boschert, ‘Coexistence or Contradiction? GM crops versus 
Alternative Agricultures in Europe’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 174. 
241 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Environmental Liability’ COM (2000) 66 final. 
242 Recital 16 Deliberate Release Dir. 
243 Commission White paper (n 241). See for a useful discussion of the White Paper: Gerrit Betlem and 
Edward Brans, ‘The future role of civil liability for environmental damage in the EU’ (2002) 2 Yearbook of 
European Environmental Law 183. 
244 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability with 
regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage [2004] OJ L 143/56 (Liability Dir.). 
245 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Implementing the Community Environmental Liability Directive: GMOs and the 
problem of Unknown Risk’ in Bodiguel and Cardwell (n 29) 198. See further: Thijs Etty, ‘Current Survey of 
Substantive European Community Law: Biotechnology’ (2006) 6 Yearbook of European Environmental 
Law 252. He discusses the slim chance of the Commission including possible damages caused by GMOs in 
the application of the Directive, through administrative provisions in 2014, qua, Art. 18 (2) and 3 (b) of 
Liability Dir. 
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The authorization procedure under the Food and Feed Regulation rules out the use 
of a permit defence in liability claims for GMOs, by emphasising that ‘the granting of 
authorization shall not lessen the general civil and criminal liability’ of any food operator 
in respect of the food concerned.246 In both environmental and health liability the way 
damage is conceptualised appears to be key; for instance, what constitutes damage to 
biodiversity may involve questions of mixing of GM and non-GM crops for some, since 
this compromises the ability for non-GM to stay GM free. Coupled with this question of 
what constitutes harm, issues regarding the kind of liability (strict, fault-based or absolute) 
and what kind of compensation ought to be appropriate, continue to be amorphous at this 
stage, and are largely unclear even in Member States legal regimes, including common 
law tortuous liability regimes.247 The trade dimension of coexistence measures related to 
economic damage due to mixing of GM with non-GM to farmers is a relevant aspect in 
liability laws.  
The issue of coexistence is intricately connected to issues of liability in another 
way. There is significant number of instances where intellectual property infringements 
have been brought to court by seed companies against conventional farmers due to the 
presence of GM material in their fields. In some cases, there is at least a reasonable 
possibility that the conventional farmer neither planted any GM material in their fields, 
nor wanted such presence of GMO material within their agricultural produce.248 This 
highlights problematic situations where neighbouring cultivators of non-GM seeds, whose 
fields are contaminated with GM seeds, possibly have to bear economic loss due to 
contamination and a legal burden of infringement at once.249 There is still some confusion 
regarding as to who has a legitimate right to be compensated from actions arising out of 
transgenic agriculture. There is very little concrete legal experience in Europe on these 
aspects, compared to North America. The intellectual property protection of companies 
for unauthorized presence of GM plants in agricultural fields, and unwanted presence of 
GM plants in organic/non GM certified farmer’s fields are the two main anticipated 
problems. Can loss of organic status, due to contamination of GM seeds from 
neighbouring fields be a cause for monetary damage? 250 Who will bear the cost in those 
                                                
246 Articles 7 (7) and 19 (7). 
247 Etty (n 229) 2007. 
248 See the facts in Watson (n 250).  
249 See for instance, Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, ‘Liability for the escape of GM seeds: Pursuing the 
“victim”?’ 65 Modern Law Review 517. 
250 See the application by organic farmers for certification as a class, regarding a suit for compensation due 
to the spread of GM canola in Canada, a spread which made it virtually impossible for organic farmers to 
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cases? The Commission has maintained that matters concerning liability for economic 
damage are the exclusive competence of the Member States.251 
Negotiations on provisions of liability and redress under the Cartagena Protocol,252 
demonstrate the controversial nature of even basic issues like choice of instrument in an 
inter-state mechanism - ranging from positions of an optional postnational instrument, a 
no instruments stand, to a legally binding instrument.253 The deep divisions in the 
Cartagena Protocol process, on even fundamental issues regarding the meaning, nature 
and extent of damage, not to mention the basic principle of liability invoked, suggest the 
controversial nature of this issue, and the EU has for the time being skirted addressing 
this.254  
Taking stock, this subsection on liability noted the contestations about basic 
questions including what constitutes environmental harm for liability. There is also 
indeterminacy about who will bear the economic costs in cases of involuntary transfer of 
modified genetic material from GM farms to non-GM neighbours, despite ground level 
segregation measures instituted by EU regulators. Related to this is the controversial 
question about the reasonableness of IPR infringement suits on innocent neighbours, 
cultivating non-GM crops, but having inadvertent presence of GM due to gaps in 
regulation.  
To sum up, the general effort in this Chapter has been to provide a cursory 
introduction of the EU regulatory framework on GM food and feed, with an emphasis on 
identifying room for public participation. The Chapter noted the particular visibility of the 
regulatory objective of safety in public decisions about use of GMOs. Here, the regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                   
grow canola: Larry Hoffman, LN Hoffman Farms Inc and Dale Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada and Bayer 
Cropscience Inc 283 DLR (4th) 190 [2005] SKQB 225 (First Instance). The Court did not examine the 
reasonableness of the assertion of harm to the applicants, but rejected the application on a technical ground 
that a class action suit is not maintainable under the relevant statute, since the Court saw the damage as 
purely economic, which precluded the applicants from being considered as a class. See however, R. v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment and MAFF, ex parte Watson [1999] Environmental Law Review 310, 
where an organic farmer in the UK unsuccessfully sued his neighbor for cross-pollination from field trial of 
GMOs. The Court of Appeal decided that whilst field pollination cannot be guaranteed, the government had 
arrived at a perfectly reasonable point at which to strike the balance between the competing interests in play.  
251 Annex 2.5 Commission Coexistence Recommendations 2010 (n 235). 
252 Under Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000 39 ILM 1027 (2000). 
253 See the Report of the Open ended Ad-hoc Working Group of legal and technical experts on liability and 
redress in the context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Work of its Fourth Meeting 
UNEP/CBC/BS/WG-L&R/4/3, 13 November 2007. 
254 European Commission, ‘Commission Communication: Report on the implementation of Member States’ 
Coexistence Measures’ COM (2006)104, has proposed an evaluation of various civil liability systems 
existing in Member States, and the extent to which these apply to GMO-related liabilities. See Chapter 5 for 
a discussion on the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya - Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on 
Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
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tool of risk dominates the way the objective of safety is pursued. This is discernable 
during both authorizations for release of GMOs and the subsequent environmental 
guarantee and product safeguard measures. There is also an emphasis on the recognition 
of the precautionary principle in this regulatory pursuit of safety. Apart from this, 
labelling and coexistence measures were identified as having the potential to pursue other 
public values in regulation. How the public is allowed to participate in the identification of 
other values is further examined in the sixth Chapter. Coming back, the Deliberate 
Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation have provided rights for the general 
public to be informed and consulted during the authorization procedure,255 as well as in 
some circumstances for Contained Use256 and Field trials.257 Legal opportunities for 
public participation are important arenas for the expression of public contestations and 
disagreements about development and use of GMOs in agriculture and food. Whether 
such information and consultation can amount to meaningful participation during the 
regulatory employment of the tool of risk needs further reflection. Towards this end, it is 
imperative that we seek to understand the regulatory tool of risk by conceptually 
navigating the employment of this concept. This is attempted in the next Chapter. 
Subsequent to it, the fourth Chapter builds on this discussion by focusing on the use of the 
precautionary principle in environmental law, and how it has been employed in EU 
regulation of GMOs.  
                                                
255 Text to n 158, and nn 165-167. 
256 Text to n 182. 
257 Text to n 186-187. 
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Chapter 3 
Risk, Science and Society 
 
Risk theory needs to be interested in investigating the forms of knowledge, dominant discourses 
and expert techniques and institutions that serve to render risk calculable and knowable.258 
 
Popular accounts describe contemporary society as increasingly pervaded with 
dangers from technological advances, labelling it a culture of fear.259 The introductory 
account of EU regulation of GMOs in the previous Chapter identified the pursuit of safety 
as the dominant trope for authorization and release of GMOs. Two motifs were further 
discernible viz., the concept of risk and the principle of precaution, as central to the way 
concerns of safety are mediated in EU regulation. This Chapter seeks to focus on risk as a 
dominant regulatory tool to pursue the public objective of safety. The endeavour here is to 
gain conceptual clarity of risk as a regulatory tool, and further understand how it is 
employed in law’s engagement with public contestations about GMOs, and the 
technological trajectories it signifies.  
 Protection of human health and the environment against hazards from the 
introduction of new technologies has long been identified as a central function of the 
modern welfare state.260 Concerns about industrial and technological hazards have grown 
significantly by the 1980s, when resolution of safety concerns became particularly 
important for the acceptability and feasibility of the development and application of new 
technologies. In this vein, many treated the concerns about introduction of new 
technologies like biotechnologies and nano-technologies as restricted only to an issue of 
safety.261 Significantly, the last three decades have seen a slow and steady change in 
regulatory emphasis on safety - from an investigation of hazards to a more complex 
regulation of risks;262 where risk is seen as ‘replacing need as the core principle of social 
policy formulation’.263 
                                                
258 Deborah Lupton, Risk and Socio-cultural Theory (Cambridge University Press 1999) 6. 
259 See Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk taking and the Morality of Low Expectation (Casell 1997) 3, ‘the 
contemporary is dominated by a peculiarly defensive attitude to risk, in which risks are almost always 
framed by the precautionary principle of better safe than sorry’.  
260 See for instance: Hazel Kemshall, Risk, Social policy and Welfare (Open University Press 2002) chs 1 
and 2.  
261 Chauncey Starr, ‘Social Benefit versus Technological Risk: What is our society willing to pay for 
safety?’ (1969) 165 Science 1232. 
262 Here hazard is understood as the intrinsic potential to cause an identified adverse effect whereas risk is 
understood, in a crude sense, as the likelihood of its occurrence. See for a useful treatment of this shift: 
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Although Luhmann points out the conceptual differences between risk and safety 
(see later in the Chapter), mechanisms of risk appear to trump all concerns about safety in 
a regulatory decision about release and application of a GMO. Evidenced in our 
examination of the EU regulatory framework in the previous Chapter, risk is the central 
organizing principle in the commercial release of GMOs, where an ascription of safety 
through risk regulation is deemed as a sufficient condition for the commercialisation of a 
new GMO. The Deliberate Release Directive and the Food & Feed Regulation provide for 
bifurcated risk regulation (by means of technical analysis and political management) 
through a maze of institutional procedures, to ascertain the acceptability of environmental 
and health risks of a decision to permit commercialisation. The aspiration in this 
bifurcation is that a prior technical characterization of the risks involved is subsequently 
implemented through political management, which will also take into account public 
preferences and concerns.  
Such an employment of the concept of risk (more specifically risk to public health 
and the environment) by regulatory regimes in its engagement with public unease of new 
technologies, poses a number of salient issues for the way contemporary law is 
functioning. This Chapter seeks a better understanding of law’s use of the regulatory tool 
of risk in its engagement with public contestations about use of particular new 
technologies, and its implications for public participation in EU regulation of GMOs. 
After recognizing the heterogeneity in the conceptualizations of risk, it introduces a 
dominant axis of differentiation in risk theorization, occupied by realist and constructivist 
positions at the two ends of this continuum. First, the Chapter appreciates the conceptual 
assumptions of techno-scientific approaches to risk, certain related fundamental problems, 
and the difficulties such understandings pose to possibilities of public participation in 
decision-making about new technologies like GMOs. Here, the assumptions behind 
bifurcation of risk and deficit models are examined, and the fundamental weaknesses of 
the assumptions of the classical risk paradigm identified. The point here is not merely to 
observe that techno-scientific ascriptions of risk are conceptually erroneous, and often 
even unscientific, and hence that policy needs to take into account these deficiencies to 
make it more scientific. In addition: if one seeks a keen understanding of the use of the 
tool of risk in the regulation of new technologies, and its role in the relationship of law 
                                                                                                                                                   
Lakshman Guruswamy, ‘Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?’ (2002) 9 Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies 461, 484.  
263 Kemshall (n 260) 10. 
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with public participation of decision-making on GMOs, we need to move beyond these 
inadequate conceptualizations of risk, into examining what are broadly categorized as 
sociological conceptualizations of risk. Once risk is seen as an estimation that depends on 
a number of assumptions about uncertain futures, as elaborated later, contestations about 
risk need not be about public ignorance and lack of awareness of the facts, but could be 
about a conflict of values, norms and priorities.  
Second, important sociological approaches are explored to gain a keener 
understanding of how the concept of risk is employed, assuming that GMOs are part of 
the aforementioned risk contestations about values, norms and priorities. Through this 
exploration, the norms of trust and engagement are identified as central to ascriptions of 
safety for them to be effective. In other words, an emphasis on trust and engagement is not 
just to make an ascription of risk work, but rather, they are necessary to make a workable 
ascription of risk. This is in contrast to the use of public participation for better 
management and implementation of prior constructions of risk by technical bodies. Over 
and above an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of technical risk ascriptions through public 
engagement exercises, it is asserted in this Chapter that an appropriate understanding of 
the tool of risk necessitates public trust and engagement in the core of its construction 
itself. Towards this end, the Chapter engages with ideas of Luhmann, Beck, Douglas and 
Governmentality scholars in the three subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
 
3.0.1 Heterogeneous conceptual employments of risk  
Various theoretical vantage points have differentially treated the appropriate place of risk 
in a historical and contemporary context, including diametrically opposite approaches 
regarding its nature, use and relevance in contemporary society.264 Given the 
heterogeneous treatment of the term as danger, uncertainty, and probability of occurrence 
of an undesirable event, there is some virtue in highlighting the main concepts and 
approaches within risk theorizations.  
                                                
264 ‘From a value neutral concept, like say in gambling, where there is a possibility of both gain and loss, as 
opposed to just loss’, various accounts trace the move towards an actuarial understanding where 
objectivized statistical and probability exercises dominate: Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in 
Cultural Theory (Routledge 1992). Kemshall traces this move towards an actuarial understanding from the 
19th century marine insurance, as well as insurance of soldiers in the Napoleonic wars (both based on 
personal knowledge and market conditions) to the contemporary that is dominated by formal mathematical 
models. The latter is seen to be dominated by numerical information, through the mathematical 
identification of frequencies and averages within an identified population: Hazel Kemshall, ‘Social Policy 
and Risk’ in Mythen and Walklate (n 28) 3.  
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In some aeonian accounts of Europe, fate, determinism and risk are described as 
the respective zeitgeists of pre-renaissance, modern and contemporary eras.265 In this 
characterization, destiny and will of Gods were used to explain danger and causality in the 
pre-renaissance age. In contrast, post-renaissance thought, characterized by enlightenment 
values of probability thinking as well as the rise of science and mathematics, facilitated 
the twentieth century framing of risk within engineering and scientific discourses as a 
statistically calculable hazard. Here, the transition from the first historical stage to the next 
occurs through the replacement of the central idea of fate with that of human agency and 
determinism, a typical ascription of the age of modernity. And the second transition, the 
movement towards a contemporary social setting from the modern, is characterized as a 
shift of understanding that challenges the myth of calculability of risk. This continuing 
transition from the age of determinism to the age of risk, ascribed as the motif of the 
contemporary, is sometimes seen as an important facet in the public’s disquiet over new 
technologies, including GMOs. 
Confusingly, however, the term risk is employed to describe practices that denote 
central ideas in both these ages, of modernity and the contemporary. Risk in a 
deterministic manner is often used to signify a tool that rationalises the future, and thus to 
provide for gripping points to approach the future.266 In an ironic word play, determinism 
is characterized by the use of probabilitization in risk. While in the latter era, risk is meant 
to signify the contingencies of contemporary life, the problem of uncertainty in our frames 
of understanding and knowledge, as well as possibilities and ability to know.267 
Variegations and contestations about the nature, contours and desirability of this supposed 
shift from an era of determinism to an era of risk have contributed to a rich field in risk 
                                                
265 See for instance, David Green, ‘From national health monopoly to national health guarantee’ in David 
Gladstone (ed), How to pay for Health care: Public and Private Alternatives (IEA Health and Welfare Unit 
1997) 144.  
266 Here, it can invariably become a tool to facilitate the development and commercialisation of a particular 
technology, by a technique of externalisation of concerns of safety through the means of probabilitization of 
potential hazards to a level of statistical modelling. 
267 An example of this use, signifying the contingencies and uncertainties of our frames of understanding 
and abilities to know, is in Beck’s era of late modernity, where risk itself becomes a contested and 
personalised facet of modern life. See later in the chapter for more. See for an elaboration of this point, 
Sanjay Reddy, ‘Claims to expert knowledge and the subversion of democracy: The triumph of risk over 
uncertainty’ (1996) 25 Economy and Society 222, 237. In this distinction, where risks are seen as the very 
products of science and technology, which produces as many uncertainties and risks as they are intended to 
resolve; whereby there are always unintended side effects and consequences inherent in the process that 
cannot be probabilitized, due to a lack of existing knowledge and experience.  
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theorization.268 The nature of this confusion, between risk as a tool to characterize and 
control the future, and risk as a description of the present is aptly characterized by Steel:  
 
Theorists using the term risk are divided in whether the most significant thing about this term is thought 
to be threat or uncertainty which it implies, or else (on the contrary) the means of responding to threats 
and uncertainties which its use brings with it…Consequently, they are divided on the question whether 
risk encapsulates the weakness of human decision makers in the face of hazards and the unknown, thus 
compromising the power to act; or whether it encapsulates the very opposite, the route by which human 
beings may achieve control over their own destinies, providing the means to action and decision.269  
 
An important aspect of the productivity for risk theory from the aforementioned tension 
(between the usage of risk as tool to control uncertainty and the uncertainty itself) is an 
attempt to describe and define risk. In turn, the contours of debate in these attempts at 
theorization run parallel to this confusion in the use of risk as both a state that denotes 
uncertainty, and risk as a process of identifying danger.  
An important axis of controversy in our understanding relates to the reality of risk, 
where theories are distinguished in terms of the epistemological status of risk on a 
continuum between pure realist and radical constructivist positions, as to whether a 
particular theory assumes risks to be purely constructed or is considered to be absolutely 
real.270 In this theoretical continuum, the primary benchmark in understanding risk is the 
differentiation about the objectiveness of the existence of risk - whether risk is an entity 
that is objectively accessible beyond the social, or whether it is socially mediated. Most 
claims of constructivism or social mediation do not appear to deny the concrete effects of 
possible hazards in principle, but as discussed in a subsequent section, merely assert that 
such a physical world is only one of the influences on how we make sense of risk and 
uncertainty as social beings. In this crude though useful axis of characterization, many 
sociological approaches (that may aid in understanding laws’ employment of risk as a tool 
to engage with public unease) are opposed to technical-scientific perspectives that are 
                                                
268 Here, the origins of the technique of risk lies in mathematics, statistics and probability: See the 
exploration of risk in finance and economics, history and philosophy of science, Peter Bernstein, Against the 
Gods: The remarkable story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons 1996). See also: Ian Hacking, Emergence of 
Probability (Cambridge University Press 1975): Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge 
University Press 1990), for a history of risk and probability. 
269  Jenny Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart 2004) 3. 
270 Ortwin Renn, ‘Concepts of Risk: A classification’ in Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding (eds), 
Social theories of risk (Praeger 1992) 53. See also: Piet Strydom, Risk, Environment and Society: Ongoing 
debates, Current Issues and Future Prospects (Open University Press 2002); Peter Taylor-Gooby and Jens 
Zinn, ‘Current directions in Risk research, new developments in psychology and sociology’ (2006) 26 Risk 
Analysis 397. 
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termed as realist, where various sociological approaches are identified as weak or strong 
constructivist, or conversely strong or weak realist. 
 
3.1 Techno-scientific approaches to risk 
Conventionally most theories on risk start with techno-scientific approaches, and very 
often end with it as well. Such technocratic approaches emerged from disciplines such as 
science, engineering, psychology, economics, medicine and epidemiology. In this realist 
approach to risk, risk is largely assumed as an objective phenomenon, even an artefact that 
can be accessed through expert investigation and assessment; a tool to measure and 
respond to uncertainty. The focus of research on risk in these fields is the identification of 
risk, mapping their causal factors, building predictive models of risk relation and people’s 
responses to various types of risk, and proposing ways of limiting the effects of risk.271 
Risk here is seen as the probability that a particular adverse event (identified as a hazard) 
occurs during a stated period of time; ‘as a probability in the sense of statistical theory, 
risk obeys all formal laws of combining probabilities’.272 This process can be termed as 
reductive-aggregative as it involves ‘simplification of multivalent complexities to simple 
parameters of likelihood and magnitude, and subsequent aggregation across highly diverse 
dimensions, contexts and etiologies’ to reach an apparently transcendent quantitative 
idiom, which is then taken as synonymous with objective authority.273  
The technocratic risk inquiries are, then, undertaken by adopting a certain 
rationalistic approach that assumes expert scientific measurement and calculation as the 
most appropriate starting point;274 where risk assessment is understood to be a series of 
steps including hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure assessment and 
risk characterization. Here, Knight’s differentiation of risk and uncertainty has continued 
to be an important influence, viz., if you don’t know for sure what will happen, but you 
know the odds, that’s risk, and if you don’t even know the odds, that’s uncertainty.275 
There is a consensus among this kind of risk literature about the objective nature of the 
                                                
271 Lupton, ‘Risk and Socio-cultural Theory’ (n 258) 2. 
272 Royal Society (Great Britain), Risk Assessment: Report of a Royal Society Study Group (Royal Society 
1983). The emphasis on statistical probability is a continuing one among exercises in techno-scientific 
institutional assessment: see for instance, EFSA, ‘Guidance on the environmental risk assessment of 
genetically modified plants’, <http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/scdoc/1879.htm> last accessed 21st 
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thing, and the perception of the thing is independent of the object itself. To the contrary, 
Adams reminds us that despite the formal requirement that the odds be known so that 
numbers are attachable to the probabilities and magnitudes of possible outcomes in risks 
and uncertainty in game theory, operations research, economics or management science, 
they are virtually always assumed or invented in practice since such numbers are rarely 
available.276  
 
3.1.1 A bundle of incertitudes 
What is missing in this conception of risk is the acknowledgement of the incomplete and 
unstable nature of knowledge that underlines its two fundamental parameters viz., 
hazards, and likelihood or probability. Its effect on a full characterization of risk is the loss 
of any meaningful scientific rigour at a fundamental level. Given the paucity of directly 
applicable data in radically new technologies, like say biotechnology or synthetic biology, 
where existing data are usually incomplete, absent or even beyond our present 
understanding, it is only through such a denial that a supposedly unitary and quantified 
techno-scientific artefact of risk can be arrived at. Focussing on such closures can be 
extremely important for our future as a democratic and political society, particularly given 
the way fundamental technologies can shape our societies and constitute our collective 
pathways to a democratic future, thus making the focus on how law uses the tool of risk in 
the regulation of new technologies pertinent. 
Stirling heuristically illustrates the diversity of circumstances of knowledge (or 
problematics) of these parameters that are conventionally rolled together under the term 
risk.277 He terms the cluster of these contrasting states of incomplete knowledge as 
incertitude, and identifies the strict techno-scientific definition of risk (i.e. of a 
probabilitization of identifiable hazards) as only one among them. According to him, the 
incertitude of risk is applicable in many important fields where relevant past experience or 
reliability of scientific models foster high confidence, and where conventional reductive 
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aggregative techniques like risk assessment actually uses a scientifically rigorous 
approach. In the other three states of incertitudes, namely uncertainty, ambiguity and 
ignorance, Stirling demonstrates that the traditional employment of risk is simply not 
applicable, and is unscientific.  
Stirling’s description of uncertainty is a situation in which there is confidence in 
the characterization of the different possibilities of outcome, but the available empirical 
information or analytical models do not present a definitive basis for assigning 
probabilities. In these circumstances though probability cannot exist, it is well possible 
that regulatory bodies may choose one among many equally plausible outcomes, 
exercising their political or ethical judgement, and select one of the many various 
possibilities. Here Stirling comments that the scientifically rigorous approach would be to 
acknowledge the open nature of a variety of different possible interpretations, as opposed 
to a non-transparent reduction of these various possibilities to a single one, as if there is a 
single expected value or prescriptive recommendation, by the exercise of subjective 
judgement. The incertitude of ambiguity is an ideal type that denotes a condition where it 
is the characterization of outcomes that is problematic (as opposed to the probabilities). 
Here, disagreements over the selection, partition, bounding, measurement, prioritization or 
interpretation of outcomes comes into focus, where attention is required for it to be 
extended to ‘broader values, epistemologies and ontologies’ so as to ensure a scientifically 
rigorous process.278 He cites the contending ways of framing issues in GM food 
regulation, viz., the differential invocation of ecological, agronomic, safety, economic, 
social, or even more fundamental values concerning relationships and responsibilities 
within society, nature etc., as a very good example of an instance of the operation of the 
incertitude of ambiguity. The final condition in this matrix, ignorance, is a state in which 
there is an inability to fully characterize both probabilities and outcomes. Ignorance is 
differentiated from uncertainty in that in cases of uncertainty the focus is on agreed known 
parameters like say, carcinogenicity, while it is sought to be distinguished from ambiguity 
in that the parameters are not just contestable or indeterminate, but are unbound and at 
least partially unknown. Stirling remarks that some of the most important contemporary 
environmental issues circle around ignorance, like in the early histories of ozone depletion 
and endocrine disrupting chemicals.279  
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Currently under the techno-scientific paradigm, in the name of risk analysis, all 
four aforementioned ideal types of incertitude are undertaken under the single category of 
risk. The point this raises, is not merely that this practice is not even minimally 
scientifically rigorous, but regards the more important and powerful implications of the 
invocation of science in risk regulation. The regulatory tool of risk analysis in this techno-
scientific paradigm is a convenient alibi for political managers from the considerable 
conceptual difficulties that such application encounters. In some cases it could also 
assuage public fears, with or without scientific basis. Incertitudes, then, become more or 
less inevitable in the introduction of radically new technologies today, even under 
influential internal descriptions (like Knight), whereby the supposed technical assessment 
of risks has to rise to the realm of values and norms, and not mere measurement and 
calculation. 
This recognition of the normativity of the risk assessment is in sharp contrast to the 
divide between scientific risk assessment (fact) and political risk management (value) 
prevalent in most regulatory frameworks today, central also to the risk regulation of 
GMOs in Europe. Thus, despite the well made argument that technical risk assessment is 
permeated with normative assumptions,280 the techno-scientific conceptualization of risk 
has continued to be the dominant tool in chasing the chimera of achieving safety and 
avoiding harm to environment and human health. 
 
3.1.2 Bifurcation and deficit models 
Important facets of this techno-scientific conceptualization include the bifurcation of risk 
regulation into scientific assessment and political management, and the deficit models that 
often accompany them as a solution to problems that arise from bifurcation.281 This 
bifurcation of risk regulation famously gained currency in the Red book of the US 
National Research Council. This report characterized the potential adverse health effects 
of human exposure to toxic substances, where technical risk assessment was partitioned 
from risk management: risk assessment culminates in quantitatively or qualitatively 
estimating the incidence and magnitude of an adverse effect on a given population, 
whereas risk management, drawing upon risk assessment, culminates in developing policy 
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options and evaluating their health, economic, social and political implications.282 The 
‘clear conceptual difference between assessment of risks and the consideration of risk 
management alternatives’, sought to be maintained was so stark that even a perception 
that the latter influenced the former was supposed to have lead to a serious lack of 
credibility.283 The British Royal Society report, in the same year and in a similar vein, 
defined risk as a detriment that is the compound of probability and magnitude of an 
adverse event.284 
This institutionalisation of the fact-value divide in the risk architecture set out in 
the Red book is often identified as the ‘principal point of reference’ for regulatory 
authorities, despite subsequent shifts of nuance and emphasis.285 Adams points out to the 
continuation of this distinction, between ‘the sort of thing the experts know about’ and 
‘the lay person’s often very different anticipation of future events’, in various important 
British and American official reports. For instance, he discusses the subsequent calls for 
bridging the gap between what is stated to be scientific and the way in which the public 
gauges and makes decisions, in the terms of reference of the 1992 UK Royal Society 
report. He refers to the failure of the Committee in this, where the first four Chapters 
continued the aforesaid distinction, while curiously in Chapter 5 this approach is flatly 
rejected: ‘that the view that a separation can be maintained between objective risk and 
subjective or perceived risk has come under increasing attack, to the extent that it is no 
longer a mainstream position’.286 In this Chapter of the report, risk is understood as 
culturally constructed, in which both adverse nature of particular events identified as 
hazards, and their probability are inherently subjective. The assumptions in the bifurcation 
belies the inevitable normative commitments behind technical risk assessment that may 
take the form of ‘subjective judgments, influential social values, contestable assumptions 
and administrative procedures that are open to contingent framings and the tacit or 
deliberate exercise of power’; where political interests and habitual ways of institutional 
and disciplinary thinking can shape risk assessment in determinative ways.287 Despite 
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such possible shifts in understanding, bifurcation continues to be the backbone of GMO 
regulation in Europe till date, and the default regulatory architecture of institutions 
governing environmental and health risks in most parts of the world. Notwithstanding the 
fact that in more recent official reports, the line between the two is drawn less clearly, 
where it is often argued that an understanding of both is needed for a full characterization 
of risk,288 the assumptions informing this bifurcation have continued to shape regulatory 
regimes in Europe and the US. This similarity is despite descriptions that Europe and the 
US have diametrically opposite risk regimes, where one is claimed to be precautionary, 
the other is supposed to be science based.289  
Within this bifurcated regulatory framework, public concerns about safety in most 
parts of Europe appear to be not assuaged by repeated positive reports of risk assessment 
from scientific authorities like EFSA.290 Given the backdrop of the institutionalisation of 
the fact-value divide, this situation is sought to be remedied in policy circles, by either 
attempting to deal with normative aspects in the risk management (since it is after all the 
political stage), or through improvements in risk assessment procedures to explicitly 
account for social, ethical and political concerns. This has elicited three kinds of 
suggestions, 1) risk communication efforts, that seeks to educate and inform the lay public 
about the real nature of the risks, identified through the technical risk assessment, as 
opposed to what their current perceptions, branded as either false, irrational or ill 
informed; 2) explore possibilities to include lay perceptions in the risk assessment to make 
it more acceptable to the public; and 3) to make risk assessment more scientific, say by 
acknowledging the real nature of instabilities of base data, possible ambiguities and 
ignorance, so as to make this more transparent and acceptable to the critics and opponents 
of the process. All these three attempts to fill the deficits in communication or scientific 
rigour fall within a broad techno-scientific understanding of risk that is placed in a 
bifurcated institutional arrangement. 
While the project of the techno-scientific conceptualization is to describe the 
possibilities of danger in a statistical way, what is decided to be chosen or ignored as 
dangerous, and the related base line of such selection, is normative, political and cultural 
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at once. Even when there is a recognition that normative issues are invariably interlaced 
with technical issues that render the former invisible, the prospect of studying the 
technical details of say, toxicology, diminishes the eagerness of policy makers to raise 
such normative issues.291 However, such avoidance is not only democratically 
inappropriate, despite its apparent convenience in the short term, but also conceptually 
incoherent and practically ineffective to engage with public contestations about 
technology. The point here is not merely to observe that techno-scientific ascriptions of 
risk are conceptually erroneous and often unscientific,292 and hence that policy needs to 
take into account these deficiencies to make it better scientific. In addition, if one seeks a 
more appropriate understanding of law’s use of the tool of risk, and the possible room for 
public participation in decision-making on GMOs, we need to move beyond these 
inadequate conceptualizations of risk, to examine what can be crudely clubbed as 
sociological conceptualizations of risk.293  
 
3.2 Engagements with sociological approaches to risk 
The next few sections seek to reach a pertinent understanding of how legal systems 
employ the tool of risk by forensically identifying conceptualizations of risk that are 
loosely termed as sociological approaches. The attempt here is an examination of a variety 
of influential understandings of risk that may help to critically investigate the nature of the 
exclusions and legitimisations possible through risk frames and its effect on democratic 
law, towards a better understanding of the nature and implications of the use of the tool of 
risk in GMO regulation, given the public disquiet about GMOs. Notwithstanding realist 
assertions that hazards have real impacts on the physical world (an aspect that is further 
considered later in this section), the insight that law uses the concept of risk as a construct 
itself predicates this forensic examination of sociological approaches.  
Conflicts about production of risk and production of wealth maybe intricately 
interwoven, where creation of wealth could inevitably lead to concerns of risk, and 
conversely identification and production of risk has distributional issues, with multifarious 
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connections to wealth. For instance, starting an industrial plant may create additional 
wealth for the society, but it can also create hazardous conditions to the neighbouring 
communities. How this additional wealth is allocated in the society may lead to social 
conflicts, and so might how the related hazards are distributed in the society - be it a 
territorial distribution or a class-based distribution. Whether conflicts regarding the two 
are connected depends on the social context.294 Such distributional and related questions 
of justice that accompany the essentially anthropogenic nature of the source of 
technological risks are another important reason that may compel us to engage with 
sociological and constructivist approaches to risk.  
Mary Douglas set forth an influential perspective on risk adopting a cultural 
anthropological approach that introduced the crucial importance of cultural foundations 
into the risk discourse, which till the seventies was dominated by technical-scientific and 
cognitive-rational approaches to risk regulation.295 By posing an important question of 
why certain risks are emphasized, putting particular and significant emphasis on one 
possibility over another, Douglas connects inquisitions about risk to forms of social 
organization that are either defended or attacked. Often termed foundational within 
internal histories of risk theory, her concern did not concentrate much on the reality of risk 
(i.e. if, and how, they exist as concrete entities) but how they are politicised.296  
 
3.2.1 A matter of attribution 
The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, in some ways, built on this powerful critique 
about conceptualization of risk among techno-scientific approaches, which Douglas had 
initiated through her assertion of the context of politics and culture in the reification of 
risk, despite considerable differences in their projects and variations in the epistemic 
object of risk within these projects. Since Luhmann’s systems theory pays attention to ‘the 
constitutive character of risk for modern society’, naturally, he does not conceptualise risk 
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as an objectively given danger.297 In his conceptual separation between risk and danger, 
the distinction between the two is not objectively given, and is, further, predicated on a 
first order differentiation of risk and safety. Safety as a material state of being (like health) 
is a goal that is not really achievable, and is only understandable in relation to its opposite, 
uncertainty (like illness). Here, safety is described as a state which is also never certain, 
wherein by choosing the apparently safe option one cannot be sure whether another option 
may not have provided more advantageous or even safer opportunities.  
This uncertainty of both safety and risk, coupled with another concern that such 
uncertainty does not freeze decision making at large, makes a second order distinction of 
risk and danger necessary for Luhmann. Illustrations of decisions related to installation of 
a nuclear power plant and solemnisation of a marriage are used to show how uncertainty 
exists in an every-day sense, which requires that decisions have to be taken in spite of 
uncertainty. For decisions to be made even with uncertain and incomplete information, 
entailing uncertain consequences as in the future of a marriage, he reasons, we are 
prepared to take a decision without being absolutely sure only when we are in control. 
Thus for those in control of a decision the consequences of which they cannot be 
absolutely sure of, risk implies the uncertainty of the consequences of their decisions. On 
the contrary, negative effects caused by external events over which one has no control, for 
instance of a community living next to a nuclear plant that may not have any say in the 
institution or running of the plant, the uncertainty and possible negative effects may be 
regarded as dangers. The difference between risk and danger, here, is not then about 
uncertainty but about attribution as to whether one had control over a decision that 
subsequently led to an undesirable event. Thus, risks taken by some can become 
dangerous to others due to potential harm caused to others who do not identify themselves 
with the decision (and thus the attribution of risk), while those who identify themselves 
with the decision (thus those who feel themselves in control) would attribute the potential 
harm of the decision as risk.298 Whereby in cases where the damage is not voluntarily 
accepted, the distinction between decision makers who identify something specific as risk, 
and those who feel affected by it becomes stark.299  
The decision-maker may evaluate and take a risk, which may become a danger for 
someone, either to her personhood or something which she values. Thus, it is the decision-
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maker who would appear to have caused the potential harm, though who the decision 
maker is, again depends on the attribution.300 In an instance of genetic modification of 
crops, is the biotech company the decision-maker for developing a crop technology in a 
specific technological pathway, as opposed to say, a farmer who ought to have used the 
technology in a specific manner or the regulatory agencies who evaluated the release 
application? Ralph Nader’s efforts to challenge the long term supposition regarding motor 
vehicles accidents in the US that it is the reckless driver who is the dominant risk object/ 
decision-maker is a good illustration to make this point. He pointed out several alternative 
possibilities of risk objects including the car manufacturers who insist on having particular 
safety and operational designs, the road planners and traffic designers who might make 
attributions of risk that might be dangerous for users.301 Here, the risk-danger distinction 
made by Luhmann coincides with differences in political and normative priorities between 
those making a decision and those affected by it. This can complicate the role law plays in 
the regulation of technologies where, devoid of popular participation, a simple claim to 
procedural democracy based on expert advice may be insufficient to address these 
normative questions.302 
 
3.2.2 Epistemic difficulties in an engagement with the reality conundrum  
Before we seek to further understand how risk is used as a tool in law’s engagements with 
disagreements about technological pathways, it is necessary we highlight a key concern in 
these sociological engagements that is related to the theoretical controversy about the 
reality of dangers. Various realist, sociological and psychometric approaches differ on this 
important aspect of objectiveness and calculability, where some realist perspectives 
understand risks as real events or dangers that can be identified without taking into 
account social and subjective factors, as best seen in various techno-scientific 
perspectives, while some constructivists would assert that all risk is always constructed.  
Prominent intermediate positions can be seen in the works of Douglas as objective 
risks mediated by social factors, or Risk Society scholars like Beck and Giddens, who 
combine the realist and constructivist positions in peculiar manners, mingling the reality 
of risks with its social mediation and construction by social institutions. Others view risk 
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as primarily constructed, like Governmentality scholars and sociologists like Luhmann. 
As discussed earlier, for Luhmann, risk is constituted by decision-making and the 
ascription of decisions to social actors. For Governmentality scholars, public concerns can 
only be explained by social factors, where the tool of risk crystallizes as a specific way to 
manage uncertainty by calculative (statistical/probabilistic) techniques. Outside of the 
important semantics through risk, hazard, danger, harm and safety that gives us a very 
useful handle to understand reality, these significant epistemic differences can be seen as a 
stumbling block for a forensic use of various sociological understandings in our present 
endeavour. This is since risk can be either exclusively real, purely constructed or can only 
be both, depending upon the epistemic stands of different theories that we find useful 
here.  
There is an important realist charge that irrespective of anything the constructivist 
may argue the central question of the physicality of an environmental disaster or the 
concreteness of the death of a human being or an animal cannot be explained away by 
phantasms of risks being social constructions. Most constructivist approaches do not 
appear to negate in principle the reality of a hazard or harm, or of a physical world, but 
only assert that such a physical world is only one of the influences on how we make sense 
of risk and uncertainty as social beings. Of course, there is also an important reminder that 
this divide between realism and constructivism, or between the natural and the social, is 
itself an artificial divide of modernity.303 Further, some would point to the existence of the 
strong semantic in the distinction between real and perceived risk:  
 
[P]erhaps available in most societies, where realist critique uses real facts to expose beliefs and 
ideologies as unreasonable, and is often successfully used regarding new technological developments 
and inventions. Positivist positions justify themselves because ‘they work’. In this perspective, all the 
different interpretations and ideologies of the world can be confronted with an assumed reality of 
expected harms, losses or injuries which are hardly discussable. The objectivity of the facts is intended 
to silence doubts. Constructivist perspective successfully shows that even scientific expert knowledge is 
socially constructed. Both positions contribute important perspectives to risk discourse, where strategies 
that draws heavily only from one source can be intensely problematic.304 
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Zinn’s representation of the critical realist conceptualization of risk point to the 
possibilities of such a creole position (as if in between realist and constructivist 
orthodoxies) within risk theorizations. He aptly describes the underlying difficulties 
‘where a realist approach is too narrow because it underestimates the possibility of failure 
of scientific knowledge and neglects the value decisions regularly implied in objective 
risk-knowledge. The constructivist perspective becomes weak when it denies that there 
are facts which have real impacts, even though we do not know about them or interpret 
them differently.’ Thus, the difficulties thrown open by the two contrasting ends of this 
theoretical continuum, result in an attempt to combine both perspectives either as a 
reflexive/weak constructivism or a critical realism, leading to an acceptable position that 
even when risks are real, they are at the same time also constructed.305  
In a different vein, it would be instructive to respond to the aforesaid realist 
concern of the physicality of harm through its examination in a concrete case like GMOs, 
by discussing the possibility of the existence of a hazard, say X, that lies outside our 
construction. Here, three possibilities are foreseeable: 1) it could be that effect X does not 
actually exist, but social actors only construct and imagine it, in which case the concern of 
a real hazard existing, but the dangers of us not recognizing it is not relevant, 2) it could 
be that neither organized science nor the lay public know about the existence of effect X, 
in which case techno-scientific realist paradigm may not work anyway, and 3) the much 
more difficult case where scientists as putative augurs who access the real natural world, 
demonstrate the existence of a hazard but other social actors refuse to accept the prognosis 
due to the limitations of their risk framings.  
While the third situation poses a serious fillip to a specific charge that deviating 
from a realist frame might encourage unrecognized existence of physical harm, this 
situation is simply not applicable in popular regulatory accounts about GMO controversies 
in the EU. A cursory examination of risk assessments by EFSA reveals a pattern of 
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consistent favourable reports by the technical body, stating that they find the risks in the 
various applications to release acceptable. In contrast, objections are consistently raised in 
political risk management, regarding many concerns of safety, which are left out of 
technical investigation during the prior risk assessment.306 Thus the situation here is 
diametrically opposite, where sections of society may have alternate frames of risk, that 
lead to unease about the safety of the product, while dominant techno-scientific 
communities may deny the veracity of such scepticism, and doubt the existence of dangers 
from GMOs. Hence, the aforementioned third situation regarding the concern of real harm 
lurking behind lay complacence that can only be revealed through scientific investigations 
is not relevant in the case of GMOs in Europe.  
Returning to the issue of arriving at an appropriate manner to understand how risk 
is employed in the EU regulatory framework for release of GMOs, it was earlier noted 
that despite repeated positive risk assessment reports from EFSA, considerable sections of 
the public have repeatedly feared the releases to be unsafe. In this regard both Douglas’ 
and Luhmann’s insights can take us forward in understanding this impasse. The cultural 
turn spurred by Douglas’ work, as well as the second order differentiation of risk and 
danger, and the emphasis of risk as attribution by Luhmann, help us understand the 
employment of the concept of risk in legal systems in a more pertinent way for 
contestations and controversies about technological safety, than the techno-scientific 
conceptualizations. 
Amidst the competing characterizations of risk following Douglas, two streams of 
scholarship that are relevant for our endeavour have recently gained currency. First is 
Governmentality scholarship, which explores ways in which the state and other 
governmental apparatuses work together to manage and regulate populations via 
discourses and strategies. They have delineated risk as part of a specific kind of liberal 
governance, also suggesting a broader theoretical approach to management of uncertainty 
beyond risk.307 Second the Risk Society thesis, primarily ascribed to Ulrich Beck, to a 
lesser extent to Anthony Giddens and various others, provided a major impetus to recent 
sociological examination of risk, especially risks arising from new technologies. 
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3.3 Techno-science and the Risk Society thesis 
It is apposite that a peek into the Risk Society thesis in the context of GMO regulation is 
attempted through the reflections of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, given his 
particular emphasis on technological risks, and the breadth of his contribution.308 Along 
with the limited collaboration with the English sociologist Anthony Giddens in the 1990s, 
these contributions have had considerable influence on imaginations of risk regulation in 
contemporary times. His identification of prominent inadequacies of risk governance are 
important gripping points for an internal perspective of risk governance in a technological 
age, and consequently in law’s mediation of anxieties around marketing of new 
technologies. These gripping points include a focus on erosion of the monopoly of truth 
claims of techno-scientific knowledge for practical application, growing transnational 
political regulation in issues of technological hazards, an acknowledgement of the 
relevance of different forms of everyday knowledge outside of organized science and an 
examination of the shifting boundaries of our understandings on nature and society.  
An important part of Beck’s work focuses on new technological risks, with which 
he leads us towards his own general thesis on contemporary modes of general social 
change.309 His core thesis is that:  
 
In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social 
production of risk. Accordingly, the problems and conflicts relating to distribution in a society of 
scarcity overlap with the problems and conflicts that arise from the production, definition, and 
distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks. 310  
 
The impact of new risks, including possible ecological hazards from new technologies like 
nuclear energy and genetic engineering, differ significantly in many respects for him. In 
his sketchy periodization of risk history (into pre-modern, early modern and late modern 
periods: see later), the contemporary late modern epoch that he terms Risk Society is 
marked by difficulties to manage the new side-effects of modernization and new 
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technologies due to the inability to govern through scientific control - by knowledge or 
statistical probabilistic calculation of costs.  
Beck’s Risk Society (the coinage of which has become a short hand for not only 
his general approach, but also as denoting an understanding of the contemporary as a 
specific epoch), is then a new epoch in which risk consciousness becomes the dominant 
way of thinking about and responding to immediate and potential problems.  
 
3.3.1 Reflexivity and erosion of scientific monopoly 
An important aspect for us is Beck’s treatment of the breakdown of science’s monopoly in 
defining risk,311 and the resultant sharing of scientific and social rationalities in the 
contemporary epoch. The contemporary is the third of the epochs in his categorization of 
history, viz., pre-modern, early modern and late modern.312 In early modernity, scientific 
processes are understood and processed as an application of science to a given nature, 
people, and society,313 where scientific critique is organized and managed within science. 
Whereby, the claim of truth production through science is largely unquestioned in spaces 
outside of organized science.314 In his late modernity, there is skepticism among the 
general public towards accepting scientific and expert judgments without critical scrutiny. 
This is due to a number of reasons including latent side-effects to health and environment 
that are not predicted by science (or sometimes even not recognized or causally 
connected), the politics and economics of the production of scientific truth, and finally 
also due to the lessening of direct social or economic benefits to already affluent western 
societies. The considerable time taken for recognizing the causal connections between 
various grave health concerns due to consumption of tobacco or use of various types of 
industrial asbestos is illustrative of this. 
Beck used Brian Wynne’s account of the continued use of the herbicide Agent 
Orange in the United States to elaborate this point. Here the latent side-effects were 
systemically ignored by the scientific establishment, where scientific assertions of safety 
based on laboratory testing repeatedly failed in practice. Scientific knowledge was seen to 
be produced in such a manner that it covered the dangerous and harmful effects of the 
herbicide, through prescription of safe use based on laboratory conditions. The assumption 
                                                
311 ibid 29. 
312 In the first period natural disasters and hazards marks the horizon of societal understanding of risk, while 
the early modern period witnesses the advent of industrial hazards, where risks are perceived as calculable 
and manageable by financial compensation.  
313 Beck, ‘Risk Society’ (n 310) 154. 
314 ibid 164. 
 76  
was that the ‘use of the herbicide offers no hazard to users, to the general publics, to 
domestic animals and to wildlife or to the environment generally, provided that the 
product is used as directed’. 315 Wynne demonstrated the problematic process through 
which this scientific assumption, based on laboratory conditions, was used time and again 
to reject various applications from the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers. 
316 These applications sought a ban on the chemical based on substantial empirical 
evidence of grave health effects accompanying the use of the chemical to workers. Thus, 
the confident scientific assertions of safety based on laboratory testing are persisted with, 
despite repeatedly failing in practice, since organized science can either demonstrate or 
claim a lack of hazard under laboratory conditions. This insistence has also purportedly 
fuelled the public skepticism about organized science. For aforementioned reasons, Beck 
remarks that science has, either by its success or its widespread application, shifted to a 
reflexive phase, whereby it has to convince the public of the veracity of its claims. This 
contributes to a situation where it is no longer science that determines the validity of 
knowledge, but it is depended on societal acceptance and ethical compatibility.317  
There is a central question of politics that Beck is silent about in his treatment of 
latent side-effects, since they are neither latent nor peripheral for sections that are affected 
by it. The framing of what can be precisely termed latent or peripheral side-effects by the 
regulatory groups corresponds to the characterization of the future as risk as opposed to 
uncertainty or ambiguity.318 For Beck, risks due to new technology become problematic 
because of factors of uncertainty, since there is never enough existing knowledge 
available from science and technology to control their occurrence or to deal with them 
through insurance.319 This corresponds to the earlier mentioned characterization of a range 
of incertitudes including uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance by Stirling, and the effect 
of the same on conventional science based understanding of risk governance.320 
Irreversibility of the effects of new technologies, say like potentially to biodiversity in the 
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case of GMOs, or catastrophic health effects on unborn babies in nuclear issues, make the 
effect of these incertitudes even more problematic. Further, there exist considerable 
amounts of complexity, contradiction, differentiation and fragmentation of scientific 
knowledge in various disciplines that have eroded scientific authority. He terms this 
contemporary condition as reflexive modernity, which requires both science and public 
institutions to be reflexive. Thus, this brings Beck to the truism that in Risk Society 
questions of true knowledge, especially in identifying risks, can no longer be answered 
only by science, but need further consideration. Though this does not mean that science 
becomes irrelevant, it leads to a competition between different scientific views, 
buttressing of various political positions with often conflicting scientific expertise,321 
where faith, values and interests additionally need to be attended to, leading to a blurring 
of epistemic boundaries between science and politics.322 
 
3.3.2 Organized irresponsibility  
The effects of eroding scientific rationality are particularly stark for the promise held by 
techno-scientific approaches to risk, because of the role of science in, what Beck calls 
organized irresponsibility. He elaborates on organized irresponsibility by seeking an 
account of ‘how and why institutions of modern society unavoidably acknowledge the 
reality of catastrophe while simultaneously deny its existence, cover its origins and 
preclude compensation or control’.323 The systemic avoidance of the latent side-effects by 
the scientific establishment, in the earlier mentioned case of Agent Orange, provides a 
fitting foreground to his description of organized irresponsibility.324 First, the institutional 
process of negotiating risks has become conflictual and contradictory, since institutional 
and legal forms that define risks, at the same time legitimize and produce them.325 The 
fragmentary nature of knowledge production, during the microcosmic focus of various 
disciplines, does not correspond to the complexities of risks that are unevenly distributed, 
cumulate socially, spatially, and temporally, whereby cause-effect relationships are 
particularly difficult to establish. Second, ‘as long as a regulatory measure can be taken 
only when harm is proven beyond doubt, science supports and covers ongoing production 
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of harms and dangers and the poisoning of the environment’.326 Beck uses the example of 
toxic substances, where the list of banned substances always systematically lags behind 
the invention of new substances, as their use is allowed till proven to be unsafe, 
particularly since animal experimentation can be no substitute for effects on humans. 
Finally, the assumption that a specific level of final probability would imply safety 
legitimizes a high level of risk in practice. This is since the acknowledgement that 
acceptable levels of emission of harmful substances by single sources are misleading, as 
they accumulate over space and time. For instance, despite the existence of the stipulation 
in the recitals of the Deliberate Release Directive to study the risks of the cumulative and 
long term effects of GMOs, the inability of risk assessors like EFSA to meaningfully 
incorporate them into their assessment has been strongly criticized.327 
‘Organized irresponsibility’ is related to Beck’s identification of a mismatch in Risk 
Society between the character of hazards and uncertainties related to hazards produced by 
late industrial society, and its outdated ‘relations of definitions’. Beck describes his 
‘relations of definitions’ as the complex of rules, institutions and capacities that structure 
the conceptualization, identification and assessment of risk, and focuses on four such 
relations of definition in Risk Society. They are: 328 
 
1. Who is to determine the harmfulness of products or the danger of risks? Is it a responsibility that 
resides with those who generate those risks, with those who benefit from them, or with the public 
agencies? 
2. What kind of knowledge or non-knowledge about the causes, dimensions, actors, etc., is involved? To 
whom does the proof have to be submitted? 
3. What is to count as sufficient proof in a world in which we necessarily deal with contested knowledge 
and probabilities? 
4. If there are dangers and damages, who is to decide on compensation for the afflicted, and on 
appropriate forms of future control and regulations?  
 
These relations of definitions are constituted by the legal, epistemological and cultural 
mix in which risk politics is conducted, where Beck asserts that we are trapped in a 
vocabulary that lends itself to an interrogation of the risks and hazards through the prior 
relations of definition of simple, classic first modernity. He seeks to understand the shifts 
in these four relations of definitions, where the increase in obviousness of the nature and 
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degree of danger is accompanied by a slip through the nets of proofs, attributions and 
compensation with which the legal and political systems have attempted to deal with these 
dangers. 329  
 
3.3.3 Science as saviour and Beck’s notion of risk 
Despite the fundamental nature of these ‘relations of definitions’, having profound 
impacts on how we organize our societies and necessitating political resolutions, Beck 
appears to go back to the rationality and institutions of science as the solution to his 
problem. Decisions like appropriate forms of compensation, or the question of who has 
the responsibility to ascribe harmfulness of a substance (the producers of the substance 
that profit from it or the public agencies) are intensely political.  
However, in his delineation of the scientific and social rationalities, he calls for a 
critical transformation of the pedagogy of scientific rationality towards self control and 
self limitation of science. Given the multiplicity of scientific assertions when science 
continues to be a medium for managing new risks, he feels that scientific rationality can 
be changed through a discussion that is internal to science, i.e. its discourses, rationality 
and institutions.330 This volte face, when faced with the problem of suggesting ways 
forward, is often connected to the nature of his conceptualization of risk;331 a curious 
mixture of realist and constructivist frames of risks, where he combines the immateriality 
of mediated and contested definitions of risk with its materiality manufactured by experts 
and industries worldwide.332 Beck attempts an epistemic integration of realist and 
constructivist perspectives, and argues that risk is both real and socially constructed at the 
same time.333 He refers to Latour334 and Haraway,335 to emphasize that the nature- culture 
divide is a cultural construction, one made by modernity itself.336 This tension between 
nature and the social in his work is particularly visible, when on the one hand he 
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understands risk as danger or harm, and on the other, he significantly assumes that the 
quality of new (technological) risks has a direct impact on the social.337 
Tension between risk and its perception is one which is difficult to resolve, where 
‘hazards will have impacts even though we do not receive them until it is too late, or they 
might be hypothetical and therefore mainly brought into being by our concerns’.338 Thus, 
acknowledgement and knowledge about them can be the only basis for a claim for 
regulatory actions, whereby risks are real in the sense that they have real impacts, but the 
knowledge socially constructed by science and other instances is more or less uncertain. 
Further, as opposed to earlier industrial risks, the risks Beck describes can neither be in 
one time or place nor be accountable according to the currently established rules of 
causality, blame and ability, compensation and insurance.339 For Beck then, this 
invisibilization of risk (say in global warming, ozone hole, radiations, food contamination 
through pesticides) can only be assessed by scientific methods and culturally represented 
by scientific and media knowledge systems.  
On the contrary, as Beck himself says elsewhere, this knowledge is not restricted 
to scientific establishments, but is also of lay people, citizen groups, civil society 
organizations and other social institutions often mediated by the media. Though scientific 
foundation is often used by a range of social actors, social impact of risk definitions 
cannot be determined by scientific evidence and provability, but only through public 
engagement.340 This is also since people are acutely aware of expert disagreements and 
economic interests of the scientific-industry establishment, who is also recognized to 
produce risk in the process of generation of technology.341 Beck identifies the particular 
breakdown of this rationality in risky technologies like nuclear and biotechnologies, since 
these technologies have to be built or grown to study their functioning and risks, where 
mistakes in this activity can mean that reactors can leak or explode, people get killed, CJD 
(mad cow disease) and so on, where society becomes a laboratory, where there is no one 
responsible for its outcomes.342  
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Therefore, not only is the monopoly of rationality of science already undermined 
in this account,343 but it also reflects the dangers often posed by techno-science itself. He 
himself underlines the ambivalent position of science in society, instead of the earlier 
image of science as the motor for economic growth and healthy well-being. Thus, in 
situations of risk conflicts, politicians can no longer reasonably rely on scientific experts, 
since there are always competing and conflicting claims about the definition of risk in 
every concrete context of risk conflict, where conflicting knowledge cannot be a matter of 
good and bad experts. Experts can only supply more or less uncertain factual information 
about probabilities, but can never answer which risk is acceptable and which is not. At the 
same time, various groups use science to make their arguments more persuasive and to 
immunize ideologies and interests with scientific rationalities.  
Further, experts and lay-people may refer to different risks, while experts make a 
balance of the gains against possible deaths in the normal production process lay people 
regularly refer to the impacts of possible accidents even though they are highly 
unlikely.344 The nature of applicability of scientific advice becomes a question that wider 
society has to answer in broadly ethical and political terms, since a mere implementation 
of scientific advice locks society into the mistakes, modes and uncertainties of scientific 
knowledge (reminiscent of Popper’s characterization of the basic rationality of science as 
to learn from its mistakes). Beck, thus, reasons that politics and morality have to gain 
priority over shifting scientific reasoning. Following this, in Beck’s constructivist avatar, 
new reasonable strategies to manage uncertainties and ignorance are required in Risk 
Society. This is because in the modern strategy to control the future rationally through risk 
calculation, the acceptance and reliability of the forms of statistical-probabilistic 
calculation are eroded, and faith and values are additionally needed to gain social trust. It 
is inexplicable how Risk Society scholarship, of which Beck can be taken as an important 
marker, prescribes that better science can resolve the debate for regulation. Given their 
emphasis on the breakdown of scientific rationality and the erosion of its monopoly, and 
an inquiry into the four relationships of definition revealing organized irresponsibility, it is 
perplexing how Risk Society scholars like Beck prescribe a reform and return to science.  
After considerable scrutiny, Adams remarked that for two of the most eminent risk 
theorists of their times, this spectacular missing of the point of all their preceding 
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argument and analysis, is almost as if they have not read their own books.345 Beck appears 
to retreat to the safety of scientific rationality with the intention of reforming it, hoping 
that with good science, society can identify the limits beyond which it should not go. But 
as he himself suggested earlier, since science can ‘only scratch at the margins of the 
problem’,346 he could not possibly have meant that we just need to organize 
irresponsibility in an effective and efficient manner, so that the public can’t see it 
anymore. Given the fact that we are dealing with the problem of risk produced through 
specific technological trajectories, for instance as opposed to natural disasters,347 the 
central dilemma is about deciding what kind of risks society is willing and able to take. Is 
it not more appropriate for Beck, then, to merely state an inability to see a desirable route 
forward, rather than prescribe an irresponsible solution?  
Though the prognosis on situations of risk controversies of Beck is an important 
and useful handle for understanding the erosion of the monopoly of science, including in 
the frames of organized irresponsibility, his implicit denial of the political aspects of his 
relations of definitions requires us to look further. For instance, Beck’s focus on latent 
side-effects in the production of risk denies the intense political nature of the production 
of risks, where the side-effects produced are neither latent nor peripheral for groups 
affected by these technologies in their everyday life. Thus, how this aspect of society itself 
being made a laboratory is invisibilized and made latent, during the co-production of 
techno-scientific wealth and techno-scientific risk, then has an important connection to 
how affected publics might view this framing. Thus additional intellectual resources may 
be necessary to understand the engagement of law with the public contestations about 
those controversial technologies, and choices between their various trajectories. 
 
3.4 Risk in Governmentality scholarship 
Governmentality scholarship conceptualizes risk as being part of a specific technique to 
govern societies which developed in liberal states in western industrialised Europe, during 
early and later modernity.348 As an analytical technique, Governmentality seeks fault-lines 
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in the suppositions of stability in the contemporary, towards revealing its contingency. Its 
foundations are generally attributed to Foucault’s 1978 essay on Governmentality that 
discusses the change in rationality of modern governments from seventeenth century 
Europe.349 
 
The focus was to be on destabilizing and questioning the present by revealing its contingent formation, 
its non-necessity. In governmentality, emphasis would be on how that which appears as necessary is to 
be understood as assembled together out of available materials, ideas, practices, and so on, in response 
to a specific understanding of the nature of the problems to be solved. In tandem with this, emphasis 
was placed on the understandings and constructions of the world that give rise to efforts to change it. In 
this view, that which appears natural is not to be taken for granted as something – like “population” or 
“the economy” – unproblematically real and just waiting to be discovered. Rather, it is to be regarded as 
invented, reflecting or embodying governmental understandings of the way things are. In the same 
moment, as the arbitrariness of many taken-for-granted categories in the present is made visible, 
possibilities for change emerge – the analytic gives rise to insights into how things might have been 
otherwise, and thus how they could be different in the future. 350  
 
The argument is that Governmentality or governmental rationalities are always linked to 
the techniques of answering the question ‘what is to be done?’.351 ‘Welfare liberalism, the 
governmental rationality that dominated much of the twentieth century in Europe, was 
linked to all manner of practical technologies- such as risk based schemes’.352 Various 
scholars including Defert, Ewald and Castel used the Governmentality approach to 
examine the contemporary governance tool of risk; albeit prominently in specific realms 
of risk technologies of insurance and psychiatry.353 
Dean attacks the over-generalization in Risk Society theorization, and its emphasis 
on incalculability of risk, when one takes into account that risk is always calculated and 
represented in an attempt to construct coherent programmes of government in the face of 
uncertainty, even though such calculation may be ad hoc, likely to fail, and primarily 
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taken in order to be seen to be doing something.354 Risk within Governmentality 
scholarship is not regarded as intrinsically real, but seen as a very abstract probabilistic 
tool, a particular way through which a problem is imagined and dealt with. While a large 
number of events are sorted into a distribution towards making probabilistic predictions, 
particular details of each case are submerged or stripped away for a complex assemblage 
of elements to achieve some ends. Within this scholarship, the point is not to evaluate 
whether such procedures are fair, but rather to analyze the specific characteristics of 
governing uncertain future events.355 Risk is therefore understood not as harm or danger, 
but as a specific way to manage such threat with the help of calculative technologies. ‘A 
harm or danger just happens; it only becomes a risk when it is brought into being as a 
probability of an event, also usually attributed to a specific reason’.356  
Further, risk is seen as part of a societal discourse that produces the knowledge or 
truth assertion to define reasonable action and decision making, linking it to normative 
and moral issues in society in a fundamental way.357 Where, even in cases risk is 
introduced as evidence based, whether and how such objectivist calculations are applied 
and which criteria are selected are necessarily confounded with moral judgements. 
O’Malley stressed that differing approaches to risk have in turn given shape to different 
forms of liberal government.358 Here, different applications of calculative technologies 
like insurance risk, epidemiological risk, case management risk and clinical risk are 
focused upon to understand how these technologies are embedded and connected to social 
sense making. Admittedly, most of the Governmentality scholarship has focused more on 
actuarial and psychiatric risk, but there is an underlying connection which gives us a 
handle to understand epidemiological kind of risk, far more applicable in the regulatory 
experience in risk assessments of GMOs. Dean emphasized that different kinds of risk, 
like insurance, criminological, epidemiological risks, denote different rationalities, and 
hence cannot be seen generalised in a singular manner. However, ‘epidemiological risk is 
similar to insurance risk in that the calculus of risk is undertaken on the basis of a range of 
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abstract factors and their correlation within population… though, it has its own discursive 
rationality and set of techniques and interventions’.359  
Unlike in the realm of insurance, it is not the loss of capital but of health outcomes 
of populations that are subject to risk calculation in epidemiological risk. The protection 
of investment capital in terms of goals like protection of innovation, techno-scientific 
development for economic growth and well-being, defined as public interest, could be 
values that can come into the picture in the frames of risk calculation here. The technical 
means of epidemiological risk are ‘public health interventions such as sanitation, 
quarantine measures, inspection of food supply and inoculation programmes’.360 Nearer to 
environmental and health hazards from GMOs, Castel examined the psychiatric category 
of risk in contrast to dangerousness. The principally qualitative case management risk, 
here, ‘is linked to clinical practice in which certain symptoms lead to the imputation of 
dangerousness, for instance, of the likelihood of mentally ill patients committing a violent 
act’. 361 Since the psychiatric diagnosis of dangerousness is subjective to the professional, 
the emergence of risk in psychiatry resolved the problem by making the diagnosis look 
objective, with objective statistical properties. Where aggregate objective characteristics 
could be represented with statistical precision, risk came to be regarded as real, visible, 
and manifest, rather than merely hypothetical diagnoses of individuals based on medical 
opinion. 
Though the patterns of epidemiological risk are less explored in Governmentality 
scholarship two relevant factors stand out. First, Dean seeks to argue that in 
epidemiological risk the attempt is to reduce projections of risk, and individuals are not 
centred at all in these projections, using statistical and probability modelling.362 Second, 
like Risk Society scholarship, Governmentality researchers also have drawn attention to 
the importance placed upon the self management of risk and the increasing privatization 
of risk.363 Both these aspects appear to be relevant in an examination of the EU risk 
regulation of GMOs. For instance, in the previous Chapter we saw that data about 
potential hazards is generated, collated, located and analyzed by the private applicants 
interested in their market use, right from the start of the development of this technology. 
The beginning point of the regulation of GMOs under the Contained Use Directive is a 
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dossier that is prepared by the applicant who is pursuing the research and development of 
specific GMOs within laboratories and green houses. The basis of classification for the 
purpose of containment and danger is based on this assessment.364 The importance of the 
dossier, which provides the field data in the decision for field trials under the Deliberate 
Release Directive forwarded by private parties developing the GMOs, is pivotal to the 
subsequent statistical analysis by EFSA and Member State authorities.365 Similarly, the 
base date used for statistical risk analysis before authorization of release under the 
Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation is also generated by the 
developers who are interested in the swift authorization of their application to release or 
cultivate.366 In each of these instances, the private party is responsible for observing and 
collecting relevant data, whereby the generation and control of the initial steps are always 
with them. They are also responsible for analyzing the data and share their risk analysis 
with the public authorities like EFSA, and to a limited extent with the general public.367 
Thus, in this movement of key information through different phases of risk regulation that 
ends in formal risk analysis, it is only at the very last stage of formal risk analysis that a 
formal transfer of data from the individual operator to a public body like EFSA is 
required. Such data, which is so pivotal in the risk analysis and its techniques of statistical 
predictions, is fully generated and collated under the control of the developer. This aspect 
is further complicated in jurisdictions like the US where the system of end user 
agreements have been used to stifle public scientific enquiries. Here, technology 
stewardship agreements generally accompany most seed sales that, inter alia, have 
forbidden buyers from conducting even non-profit research on the seed without prior 
permission from the patent owning corporation. Independent scientists who might feel that 
appropriate environmental and food safety tests are not conducted before the regulatory 
approval for the seed will not be able to conduct them on their own, without prior industry 
approval.368 In this context, critics in the USA cite their personal experience, to assert that 
‘only studies that the seed companies have approved ever see the light of a peer-reviewed 
journal’.369 In a number of cases, ‘experiments that had the implicit go-ahead from the 
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seed company were later blocked from publication because the results were not 
flattering’.370 What is the nature of proof that is employed here, to borrow Beck’s 
relations of definitions, which allows the same person to generate the knowledge (which is 
the basis of subsequent statistical projection by public agencies), as well as own and profit 
from it? The challenge for law is to ensure a safety regime that does not get affected by 
such convergence of institutional locations which generate data that is used to model 
prediction of danger as well as generate profit. It would appear that such a convergence 
can only be legitimated by active building of trust in these mechanisms, rather than by an 
assumption of passive trust in expert institutions, based on traditional notions of 
legitimacy assuming experts as representatives of general public, and expert rationality as 
the spokesperson for public judgment. 
A second line of enquiry regards the nature of techniques through which the side-
effects of the use of GMOs, which temporally, spatially and socially accumulate, are 
avoided in the statistical projections of risk analysis, despite the stated regulatory 
objective of a reduction in epidemiological risk to the environment and human health. 
While there is a professed emphasis on reduction of risk as rectification for a general 
cultural expectation of safety,371 the process through which a specific probabilistic model 
and level of risk can legally imply safety needs further understanding. A specific level of 
risk that is found to be acceptable in a regulatory system is related to the rationality and 
normativity employed in it, a level which some sections of the public may find too low. 
The type of public participation needed to make these choices in an acceptable and 
trustworthy manner needs wider deliberation through law. In recent times, the 
precautionary principle has been professed as a logic and norm to regulate safety concerns 
of technologies in general to enhance public trust and reliability. Before we attempt a 
detailed examination of the principle it is important to underline the importance of the 
stated values of trust and engagement in the employment of the tool of risk and 
articulations of safety. 
 
3.5 Towards trust and engagement 
If risk is not an artefact that is discovered or measured through expert meditation, but 
understood as an ascriptive tool that makes the issue of safety governable, and also as a 
trope through which anxieties accompanying techno-scientific progress are mediated to 
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further dominant rationalities, then trust and engagement are to be seen as values that are 
desired by law. This is keeping in mind the unknowns and uncertainties intrinsic to the 
risk assessment of emerging technologies,372 ‘as opposed to scientist as experts on 
scientific truths, as truth speaking to power in a traditional picture, in risk assessment 
scientists enter the public arena as experts who are part of a complex rhetoric and political 
system’. 373 In the event of intense risk conflicts, such a political system would require an 
emphasis on the enhancement of trust and legitimacy through various levels and types of 
public engagement.374 These values have been recognized as key features of any risk 
regulation system ‘if it is to work’.375 At the same time, commentators notice the wide 
discrepancy regarding the professed acceptance of social, political and ethical 
considerations by mainstream regulators that ‘rarely feed through into decision-
making’.376 This is since the ‘broadly conceptualized concerns about the social or ethical 
commitment embedded in a technology’ is sidestepped by turning to ‘technical expertise 
on “safety” and “risk”’.377 
Given organized techno-science’s fractured relationship of trust with wide sections 
of the public, the related credibility issues, the power and information imbalances between 
techno-scientific realms and other sections of the society, meaningful public participation 
that actively builds public trust and political engagement could be recognized as pertinent. 
This recalls Luhmann’s category of risk communication, and his second order 
differentiation between risk and danger, where those who feel they are in control of a 
decision consider a dangerous event arising from a decision as risk, while others may 
consider it as danger. In principle, the core question that arises here concerns the kind of 
process law has to imagine for mediating and engaging with the question of attribution. If 
this should be a political process, the contours of possible engagement between the 
decision-maker and the outsider, including the opposition to a technology, becomes 
central. What tools of engagement could make the outsider feel part of a decision, and 
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build the kind of trust to bridge this gap? The concern for exploring conceptual and 
institutional arenas necessary for such shift leads the thesis to enquire about the room 
provided by EU legislations for public participation in GMO regulation.  
As argued in this Chapter, issues of trust do not necessarily pertain to the 
normativity of science, but to the statistical projections and models through which the 
occurrence of hazards are probabilitized in techno-scientific characterizations of risk. 
These evaluations will surely have to include sufficient competence in technical 
investigations about dangers due to the use of a technology and probabilitize its 
occurrence. Towards this end, two kinds of trust need attention: first scientific/ technical 
processes should be honed towards identifying and investigating all types of potential 
hazards, including some that are not considered particularly relevant by techno-scientific 
communities, but are required due to the need for wider engagements toward an active 
pursuit of social trust. Second, trust for governance and regulation around risk, needs 
wider engagement than mere investigations by techno-scientific communities. Though the 
modalities and norms of this engagement require more elaboration, it would include a 
more public estimation of the social value and a comparative appraisal of alternate 
trajectories that has similar social functions.  
In other words, the challenge relates to the movement from an imagination of 
passive trust in classical risk mechanisms (where trust is invested mainly in expert bodies 
as part of the conceptualization of delegation within formalistic liberal democracies) 
towards generating institutional rationalities for active trust and democratic validation 
through programmes of public engagement and participation. The nature and contours of 
such programmes needs broader deliberation, including the challenge of nurturing high 
levels of competence and scientific research about dangers in new technologies during 
these endeavours. Can they be attempts at transforming expert systems to democratic 
public spheres, where conflicts of beliefs, emotions and interests can be politically fought? 
Normatively, the tropes through which distinctions between friend, enemy and 
adversary378 are made in this exchange have a bearing on how to label our technological 
artefacts as safe or unsafe. In other words what rationalities are considered legitimate and 
what irrelevant in attempts at collectively dealing with uncertainties of various kinds. 
 To sum up, by engaging with the sociological descriptions of risk and identifying the 
serious limitations of techno-scientific conceptualization of risk, this Chapter has aimed at 
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understanding law’s employment of risk as a tool of governing technology. Given the 
assumptions of post-normality in science, and where risk is understood as ascriptions to 
make questions of safety governable, public participation is argued as central for an 
appropriate characterization and employment of risk. To reiterate the point, usually public 
participation mechanisms are seen as instruments to make risk ascriptions more acceptable 
to various sections of the society, given its normative superiority for democratic 
legitimation. However, this Chapter has sought to demonstrate that contemporary 
sociological understandings put public participation at the heart of the construction of risk, 
and not as an adjunct to make expert constructions more acceptable. If this is so, newer 
institutional and conceptual arenas that facilitate engagement between expert systems and 
other sections need to be imagined. Explorations of appropriate frames to answer these 
questions require a further examination of the safety regime for releases of GMOs in 
Europe. Continuing from the previous Chapter where the framework of the EU GMO 
regulation was identified, the following Chapter examines the nature and contours of 
employment of the precautionary principle. The principle is often asserted as the corner 
stone of the GMO regulatory framework, and has had a peculiar relationship with the 
concept of risk, central to cultural demands of safety, and the connected issue of trust. 
Therefore its employment in the EU GMO regulation requires a detailed examination. 
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Chapter 4 
Precaution, Public Participation and Technocratic Responses 
 
How precaution can function in a debate is doubly speculative: the future science and technology 
is still uncertain, let alone the future world in which these may function and have effects.379 
 
The precautionary principle has been asserted as a corner-stone in the risk 
regulatory framework for GMOs in Europe. As suggested in this Chapter, invocations of 
the principle in many regulatory realms often appear to be geared towards fostering public 
confidence and trust, either explicitly or covertly, and for regaining legitimacy for a food 
safety system battered by controversies like BSE. In view of the identification of trust and 
engagement as key features of such systems that ascribe safety in the previous Chapter, 
we now take a closer examination of EU GMO regulation to understand the implications 
of a declared emphasis on precaution. Given constructions of classical risk and precaution 
as emerging from different paradigms, this Chapter seeks to understand if and how 
improvements have been made to take public disaffections, about statistical models of 
probabilitization that underpin a classical mode of risk governance, seriously. This 
investigation about any substantial improvement based on the precautionary principle 
includes how the current regime is more responsive to earlier identified norms of trust and 
engagement in ascriptions of safety, including in attempts at public engagement and 
participation. 
Originally intended to provide guidance in environmental cases where societal 
stakes are high and scientific claims uncertain or complex, the principle has emerged as 
‘the hippest environmental principle on the global block’ by the turn of the century.380 
Though conventional histories trace the principle from German administrative law 
principles in Vorsorgeprinzip,381 simultaneous and equally lengthy histories of 
precautionary-type policies in many other jurisdictions are amply documented.382 Termed 
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as a sobering rejoinder to the overzealous promotion of ‘sound science’ in public 
policy,383 the principle is now part of law and policy in a number of jurisdictions across 
most parts of the world.384 An inordinate breadth of literature regarding a) the range of 
divergence in the employment of the principle in national, international and regional legal 
instruments,385 b) its substance and meaning,386 c) normative and practical implications of 
the principle,387 and d) plurality of related terminologies388 elicited a commentator’s quip 
that academic attention has spent rivers of ink on precaution.389  
Parallel to this divergence in the substance, meaning and implications of the 
principle, precaution has also become a ubiquitous feature in regulatory architectures 
pertaining to environmental and health issues, and even beyond, in other important 
regulatory realms.390 The principle is increasingly exhorted as a guiding principle of EU 
law in various fundamental ways, and has been an established feature in EU risk 
regulation regimes over the past two decades. Article 114 of the TFEU stipulates 
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community policy to be based on the precautionary principle while aiming at a high level 
of protection for the environment. The integration principle (enunciated in Article 11 of 
the TFEU) implies that the precautionary principle ought to apply to the development and 
implementation of all environmental initiatives regardless of the particular policy sphere 
in which they occur.391 The principle has been particularly important in health, 
environment and agricultural sectors of the EU regulatory policy,392 and in the way risk 
and other standards of social appropriateness regarding safety of new technologies are 
adjudicated by EU courts.393 The Commission identified the principle as a ‘key tenet of its 
policy’ in not only the realm of the environment but also for human, animal and plant 
health.394  
The quest for public trust in risk regulation through the invocation of the principle 
is discernible in Member States policy documents. For instance, the UK Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs aspires for the ‘gain (of) public trust in the policy 
areas for which we have responsibility by following and communicating a precautionary 
approach—we will not always wait until we have proof of a potential threat and its impact 
before taking action or issuing advice.’395 The Dutch Scientific Council for Government 
Policy termed precaution as a constitutional task in an attempt to ‘future proof’ the safety 
policy framework.396 The Council suggested that the policy framework has to be 
developed within a new paradigm that starts from the normative perspective of the 
precautionary principle, requiring a proactive approach to uncertainty and vulnerability of 
people, society and the natural environment.  
It would appear that the explicit invocation of the precautionary principle in the 
current GMO regime (dealt with in a later section) was absolutely necessary for those 
sections that were sceptical of the existing ‘science-based’ release mechanism. During its 
introduction, the current regime was hailed as the most rigorous assessment framework in 
the world, because of its precautionary assertions: ‘one that will reinforce international 
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credibility, increase public confidence, and address the most critical concerns of the 
environment and human health’.397 
 
4.1 Core claims and its critiques 
While avoiding an exercise of ‘precaution-spotting’,398 it is important to recognize at the 
outset, that substantive versions of this principle vary greatly in various international,399 
and EU legal instruments.400 ‘Deeply ambivalent and apparently infinitely malleable’, the 
principle, depending on ones perspective is either asserted as ‘a significant step towards 
better environmental regulation’ or derided as ‘a dangerous and meaningless principle that 
threatens to destroy industrial economies’.401 Notwithstanding different formulations four 
elements stand out amongst commentaries as most relevant to make sense of the 
principle:402 the trigger for the invocation and use of the principle,403 the timing, 404 the 
nature of regulatory response,405 and iteration.406 
Principle 15 of the Rio declaration is often quoted by legal scholars as an 
authoritative formulation of the principle: 
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in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.407 
 
Core of the principle lies in the recognition of the need for avoidance and minimization of 
harm to human health and the environment through anticipatory and preventive regulatory 
controls; it is often conceptually asserted that the principle embodies notions of caution, 
care, preventive action, common sense and prudential responsibility.408 To this end there 
is an expectation to put regulatory restrictions (that are not necessarily a ban) in place, on 
activities and technologies, whose environmental and health consequences are uncertain 
and potentially serious, at least until the uncertainty is more or less resolved.  
Reviewing the evidence of early warnings of the devastating effects of regulatory 
responses to the use of particular technological products, which were initially publicised 
as wonderfully advantageous for society, and the social and economic cost of these 
regulatory lapses, David Gee and Morris Greenberg noted:  
 
[L]ong term environmental and health monitoring rarely meets the short-term needs of anyone, thus 
requiring particular institutional arrangements if it is to meet society’s long term needs....the early 
warnings of 1898-1906 in the UK and France were not followed up by the kind of long term medical 
and dust exposure surveys of workers that would have been possible at the time, and which would have 
helped strengthen the case for tightening controls on dust levels. Even now, leading asbestos 
epidemiologists can conclude it is unfortunate that the evolution of the epidemic of asbestos induced 
mesothelioma, which far exceeds the combined effects of other known occupational industrial 
carcinogens, cannot be adequately monitored.409 
 
This characterization points to scenarios where expert communities invariably fail to pick 
up early warnings (regarding new technological products that are hailed by their 
proponents as wonderful solutions to fundamental problems) emanating from other 
sections of the public who experience and engage with technology differently. This 
underlines the importance of development of new institutional arrangements to overcome 
this difficulty, for the effective realization of safety concerns.  
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In a significant academic collaboration that provides an overview of the 
implementability and applicability of the principle,410 four major themes were identified 
as widely considered essential for an appropriate understanding of the principle. First is a 
thematic focus on the widespread implications of implementation of the principle for 
decision-making institutions and processes. Here the principle is intended to serve as a 
basis for deliberation at different levels of decision-making, in contrast with classical risk 
regulation, and in particular the appropriate role of science in decision-making.411 Second, 
a necessary emphasis on the legal and regulatory cultures in which the principle operates 
makes the description and understanding of the principle even more complicated. It is 
therefore necessary to move beyond conventional descriptions of the principle, say in 
terms of a shifting of the burden of proof or as an adjustment to the standard of proof, 
since existing institutional landscapes are far more varied; making such rudimentary 
remarks not very useful. Third, particular environmental and public health problems 
create specific challenges, in particular regarding the question of scientific ignorance, viz., 
‘we don’t know what we don’t know’.412 The fourth theme is of deliberation, and explores 
the close connection between application of the principle and deliberative practices 
outside the confines of formal institutional democracy, as well as civil and political 
society. Once deliberation is understood in a broader sense, i.e. as free and public 
reasoning among equals concerned with the weighing of pros and cons in relation to 
particular choices, options and measures of public concern with a view to decision-
making, the institutional forms in which deliberation can take place, and the type of 
communication that is necessary in particular participatory processes become inextricably 
connected with the employment of the principle. 
Both substantive and procedural rationalities coexist in the quest for better 
governance of safety concerns through precaution:  
 
Here substantive rationality is in terms of providing a more appropriate decision-making tool to deal 
with situations of scientific uncertainty, ignorance and lack of identified (yet proven) causality of 
identified potential hazard/harm. Procedurally, the principle facilitates the communication between risk 
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assessors, risk managers and the public in a potentially enabling way of democratic societal choice 
about the level of acceptable risk, as well as the procedure for ascertaining it.413  
 
Varying possibilities of identification and characterization of threats, and degrees of its 
certainty, provide windows for a range of rationalities and worldviews in the 
implementation of the principle. Justification for a particular kind of substantive 
rationality of the principle in the EU legal framework is well captured in von 
Schomberg’s formulation:  
 
Where, following an assessment of available scientific information, there are reasonable grounds for 
concern for the possibility of adverse effects but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk 
management measures based on a broad cost-benefit analysis whereby priority will be given to human 
health and the environment, necessary to ensure the chosen high level of protection in the Community 
and proportionate to this level of protection, may be adopted, pending further scientific information for 
a more comprehensive risk assessment, without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those 
adverse effects become fully apparent.414 
 
Here, at the very least, the principle empowers public decisions attempting to prevent 
harm in situations of possibilities of hazards against the argument of lack of full scientific 
certainty. It includes justification for wider participation and active public engagement in 
investigations about concerns of safety and appropriateness of technological trajectories, 
societal needs and pathways of development. The concept of scientific uncertainty here 
bridges the substantive and procedural rationalities of the principle, where often an 
acknowledgement of scientific uncertainty is intricately connected to the possibilities of 
its comprehensive representation.415 The assumption here is that better informatively 
characterized scientific uncertainty improves decision-making, requiring scientists like 
risk analysts whose work affects policy-making to make better reporting of the 
uncertainties that are associated with their findings.416 This could diminish the masking of 
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error or implicit cultural biases in the scientific enquiry or findings, and promotes a self-
critical attitude to the scientific enquiry significant to the process.417  
However, identification, acknowledgement and characterization of scientific 
incertitude that are inherent to a technological process may not be a matter that can be left 
exclusively to expert activity, and would need wider participation and engagement. 
Wynne’s work regarding the effect of Sellafield nuclear plant on the neighbouring 
Cumbrian sheep-farming community is extremely important here. He highlights the 
experience of lay contestations, assertions based on real everyday experiences, which are 
usually explained away as irrelevant by expert construction for decades; subsequently 
being recognized as scientific uncertainty at a much later stage. He effectively argues that 
scientific uncertainty is not necessarily exposed through expert disagreements, but rather 
that public contestations about scientific certainty informed by their everyday experiences 
can lead to gradual recognition of those concerns by some experts, which may later lead 
to minority opinions and disagreements between experts.418 However this recognition may 
be considered too late in cases where irreversible or extremely serious harm could have 
occurred, a scenario which is traditionally identified as a key rationale for the invocation 
of the precautionary principle. In situations where the need of precaution is already felt or 
demanded, particularly in cases of radical incertitude like ambiguity and ignorance, how 
can expert estimations of uncertainty be taken as the final word? While the object of tying 
the trigger of the principle to scientific advice may be to discipline the potential arbitrary 
use of the principle, the situation of radical incertitudes may be completely missed out in 
such scenarios. Radical incertitudes denote situations of limitations of understandings and 
rationalities emanating from techno-scientific spaces, where letting the trigger of the 
principle be controlled through them would mean that techno-scientific spaces decide the 
limitations of its own understanding. Since these are exactly the instances where the 
regulatory innovation of precaution is most important, they could end up making legal 
implementations of precaution much similar to classical risk models, an aspect elaborated 
later in this Chapter regarding the experience in EU regulation of GMOs.419 
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418 Brian Wynne, ‘May the Sheep safely graze? A Reflexive view of the expert-lay knowledge divide’ Scott 
Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski and Brian Wynne (eds), Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New 
Ecology (Sage 1996) 44. 
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The earlier-mentioned collaboration provides a sympathetic and yet critical 
account of precaution, where it identifies three important tracks of criticism regarding the 
legitimacy and workability of the principle. ‘Some critics describe the principle as a “no-
risk” and “non-science based principle”; however, in practice regulators using the 
principle have paid more attention to science and have considered a wider array of 
possible regulatory response’.420 A second identified track of criticism ‘accuses the 
principle of providing no clear guidance to decision makers, and ascribes a lack of 
internal coherence to the principle due to its various contrasting formulations’.421 The 
collaborators remind us that such criticisms blindly ignore the nature of a legal principle 
(its inherent flexibility) and influence of legal culture, and thus suggest that the 
aforementioned authors do not know the basic methodological principles of comparative 
law.422  
An important (third) fear identified is that the principle will be a means of 
justification of arbitrary action or ulterior motives because decision-makers do not need to 
rely on ‘facts’ for making decisions.423 This overlooks the reality that in circumstances of 
scientific incertitudes, what is an arbitrary decision, itself is open to question, and relying 
on the facts in such circumstances is profoundly problematic, because the nature of 
scientifically establishable facts is itself in doubt.424 It is also connected to public 
memories of a number of abject failures of scientific inputs to protection of human health 
and environment, for instance, in the denial of already visible hazards of industrial 
asbestos, pesticides like DDT and thalidomide, tobacco and BSE, for decades in some 
cases, giving strength to the public demand (which also underpins the assumption of the 
precautionary principle) that risk governance and related regulation of technologies ought 
to have wider social and political input and control.425  
                                                
420 Fisher, Jones and von Schomberg, ‘Perspectives and Prospects’ (n 411) 4, citations omitted.  
421 ibid 5, citations omitted. 
422 ibid 5. 
423 Giandomenico Majone, ‘What price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Policy implications’ 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 89; Gary Marchant and Kenneth Mossman, Arbitrary and 
Capricious: The Precautionary Principle in the EU Courts (AEI Press 2004). Connected to this fear is the 
attempt to ‘rein-in’ or discipline precaution and limit it to environmental protection, and not in other realms, 
like say health protection, see Han Somsen, ‘Cloning Trojan horses: Precaution in Reproductive 
Technologies’ in Karen Yeung and Roger Brownsword (eds), Regulating Technologies (Hart Publishing 
2008) 221. 
424 Elizabeth Fisher and Ronnie Harding, ‘The Precautionary Principle and Administrative 
Constitutionalism: The Development of frameworks for applying the Precautionary Principle’ in Elizabeth 
Fisher, Judith Jones and Rene von Schomberg (eds), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: 
Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar 2006) 113; Harremoes (n 382). 
425 Brian Wynne, Risk Management and Hazardous Waste: Implementation and the Dialectics of Credibility 
(Springer-Verlag 1987). 
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The epistemic difficulties of knowability of relevant regulatory facts beforehand 
has forced a move (grudging in some cases) beyond the principle of prevention, which 
bases itself on ‘provable scientific facts’, towards the acceptance of precaution as a 
guiding norm behind regulatory action.426 After all, it is all but obvious that in a modern 
welfare state any public action known to cause harm to the environment or health needs to 
be prevented, and the real challenge is the epistemic difficulty in being able to know.427 
As we earlier saw in Beck’s Risk Society, the controversy is rather about the process of 
acknowledging and anticipating uncertain and unknown hazards, and constructing 
statistical models in this regard, requiring precautionary approaches in a world of 
reflexive science and other institutions. If the normative justification of the principle is 
acceptable, what transpires as the most difficult challenge is to decide the social ambit of 
its trigger. There are reasons of governance that makes the trigger tied to scientific/expert 
opinion. However as mentioned earlier, if the difficulty is also about limits of 
expert/scientific rationality, then tying the applicability of the principle to expert 
understandings and predictive capacity is suspect. Further, the wisdom of tying the trigger 
to the same space becomes spurious, when techno-scientific spaces that generate these 
technologies, judges its own limitations and also profits from them. 
 
4.1.1 Multiplicity, vagueness and ambivalence 
Given the lack of a universally accepted definition and interpretation of the precautionary 
principle, including about its role in policy, legislation and decision making, it is 
surprising that little analysis about the social dynamics of precaution in techno-scientific 
controversies exist. A multiplicity of meanings, seen first in official legislative 
instruments, policy documents and court decisions, second in sympathetic criticisms to 
strengthen the objectives and mechanisms of precaution for greater levels of protection 
from potential hazards and stronger public participation, and third in normative and 
practical objections to the implementation of the principle, all begin their analyzes from 
drastically different characterizations of the principle.428  
                                                
426 See generally Beck, ‘Ecological Politics’ (n 319) and ‘Risk Society’ (n. 310). 
427 ‘Many modern treaties exhibit this new status quo by mentioning...solely the precautionary principle, 
where as it is evidently not the parties’ intention to combat uncertain threats while leaving certain threats 
alone’, Trouwborst (n 399) 192. 
428 See for a review of literature in this regard: Carolina Moreno, Oliver Todt and Jose Luis Lujan, ‘The 
context(s) of Precaution: Ideological and Instrumental appeals to the Precautionary Principle’ (2010) 32 
Science Communication 76, 77. 
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Recent sociological attention discusses the principle’s topical recurrence in the 
Spanish and other European media, based on personal interviews with a variety of 
relevant social actors (both supporters and critics of GM technology).429 An earlier 
qualitative survey, by the same authors, of media reports about the debate on GMOs in 
Spain demonstrates that the precautionary principle is commonly used by a wide variety 
of social actors in public and political debates about health and the environment.430 A 
survey of literature by the authors discusses the role of the principle as a regulatory 
guideline during techno-scientific conflicts and the role of science in regulatory decision-
making, including its introduction in a range of legislation in the EU. Two contrasting 
ideal-types of implementing the principle are identified here as informed by different 
visions of the principle, viz., (1) ‘as one element (among many others) of a process of 
decision making guided basically by scientific knowledge, which understands scientific 
uncertainty as a temporary lack of knowledge’, and (2) ‘as a decision criterion to select 
technological trajectories, precaution being more important than scientific knowledge in 
taking decisions’.431 These ideal-types are portrayed as growing from opposing 
ideological positions on the role of science in decision-making. 
The sociological studies reflect on the two ways of understanding the fundamental 
role and importance of science in regulation and public policy making: one group of 
social actors (who subscribe to the ‘technology governability interpretation’) tends to hold 
the view that technological progress and the application of new technologies (such as 
biotechnology), under normal circumstances, is always positive for society. Although the 
existence of scientific uncertainty is not denied, this group’s interpretation is that 
uncertainty is a temporary lack of scientific knowledge, a knowledge, which can and will 
be generated over time through strict application of expert knowledge and scientific 
analysis. This makes precaution subsidiary to scientific risk analysis and turns it into just 
one among several aspects of decision making. In principle, and in spite of uncertainty, 
the undesired consequences of technology are supposed to be manageable through 
regulation. The other group of social actors (who subscribe to the ‘technology selection 
interpretation’) considers precaution to be an overarching decision-making criterion, 
especially because technological progress is seen as not only holding benefits but also 
risks and disadvantages for society. Here, scientific uncertainty is interpreted as intrinsic 
                                                
429 ibid. 
430 Jose Luis Luján and Oliver Todt, ‘Precaution in Public: The Social Perception of the role of Science 
and Values in Policy making’ (2007) 16 Public Understanding of Science 97. 
431 Moreno et. al (n 428) 82. 
 102  
to certain technologies because of their complexity. That turns uncertainty into a form of 
scientific ignorance about the future effects and impacts of a new technology that is not 
sufficiently predictable or controllable. The precautionary principle, in this paradigm, 
would guide the de-selection of technologies whose benefits are unclear and whose 
negative impacts are possibly severe and uncontrollable. Science in turn, is subsidiary to 
the debate about the reasons for accepting or rejecting the technology in question, even 
possibilities of its uncertainties, benefits, and costs.432 
The key difference between the two views, as delineated in this study through the 
survey and its literature review, is the interpretation of the role of scientific knowledge in 
decision-making. One group favours decisions being guided mainly by scientific 
knowledge, with possible negative effects to be managed if and when they occur (ex post 
regulation). The other group argues for intervention in the process of innovation in order 
to minimize possible negative effects from materializing (ex ante regulation), using the 
precautionary principle as a decision-making guideline (while considering scientific 
knowledge as merely one among several sources of information). ‘In other words, it is the 
understanding of what role science should play in regulatory and policy decisions, which 
ultimately sets apart those who desire precaution to be used as a fundamental guide for 
policy making, from those who desire precaution to be subject to science.’433  
Prioritization of the former (even by some who acknowledge the conceptual and 
normative superiority of the latter for reasons of major industrial and regulatory failures) 
is often defended for its easy implementability and the need to have clear and consistent 
frameworks that classical risk-based approaches might appear to provide. Some 
commentators suggest that the experience of EU regulation shows that the core of the 
principle in Europe resides in the discretion of policy-making institutions to legislate and 
to make complex assignments of political, social and other considerations, in a 
proportional manner.434 However, such complex assignments and considerations of 
proportionality are also intricately connected with grave ascriptions by some that 
governing elites exhort the acceptance of the principle as a guiding light, while in reality, 
subvert, emaciate and cadaverize the principle during its implementation, in the name of 
workability, proportionality and anti-discrimination. Here, the assertion appears to be that 
while the general applicability and normative superiority of the principle is upheld by 
                                                
432 ibid. 
433 ibid 77. 
434 See for more: Ilona Cheyne, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC and WTO law: Searching for a Common 
Understanding’ (2006) 8 Environmental Law Review 257. 
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governance structures, and often used for reasons of legitimacy and trust, the reality of 
implementation shows its subversion, ‘reduced as it were from a tiger to a domestic 
cat’.435 Thus in this account, opponents of the principle, including influential governing 
elites, put pressure on the principle by accepting the generality of the principle and then 
vigourously seek to alter the principle and emaciate it. This trend of interpretative 
emaciation of the principle, noted by various commentators, is intricately connected to the 
official view that the precautionary principle offers an unwelcome and technically 
insupportable alternative to decision-making predominantly informed by scientific 
experts. This comes from a particular political position that informs the regulatory 
assumption that economic expansion and technological innovation is the best route to 
social welfare, including improved environment and human health.436 
Without contesting the need for thinking through appropriate strategies for 
implementation in a proportionate, non-discriminate and non-arbitrary manner,437 the 
concern for critique is to ensure that these attempts keep intact the fundamental 
underlying rationale of the precautionary principle, which is closely connected with the 
need to democratize expertise in general and scientific expertise in particular. In its core, 
the principle limits the pure reliance on technical/scientific expertise to assess the safety 
or acceptability of existing and new technologies or industrial and commercial activities, 
given the recognition of the epistemic and ontological limits of scientific discourses in 
regulation. This brings us to an important tension between the core concerns that have 
strengthened precaution, namely the common-sense of protecting the vulnerable from 
harms, even when science is unable to ascertain or even formally anticipate it. On the 
other hand, this identification of the limits of scientific discourses is understood in many 
dominant institutional spaces as an issue to be decided by experts. When risk, uncertainty 
and weight of evidence as characterized by scientific experts play a determinative role in 
the trigger, impact and extent of the applicability of the principle, the principle is 
seemingly linked to concrete factors. Thence, the operationalization of the principle 
betrays the very reason why there are calls for actions to be based on precaution in the 
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first place, which is related to the difficulty of classical risk frameworks, and the evidence 
it produces.  
Notwithstanding varying hues of the principle, lest technocratic governance 
structures should merely use the principle to claim legitimacy, and simultaneously subvert 
the principle in its application so as to make the principle useless, an insistence on 
sticking to the core of the principle is imperative. Otherwise the original problem that led 
to the invocation of the principle would be left unaddressed, especially if we recognize 
post-normal science as an important marker of the contemporary social condition.438  
 
4.2 Regulatory employment of precaution in governance of GMOs 
Placing an attempt to understand the employment of the principle in the EU regulatory 
framework of GMOs within the aforementioned broader controversial settings would 
further the investigation of how the system is responding to norms of trust and 
engagement. The second Chapter explored the contours of the current regulatory 
framework on GMOs. It identified three important stages in the decision-making for 
commercial release: a risk assessment by EFSA, a national Authority or both, followed by 
risk management through a comitology process, as well as possibilities of a subsequent 
re-examination through environmental guarantee and product safeguard measures. This 
section takes this identification forward by investigating the concrete differences that 
invocation of precaution has effectuated in these stages. The contours of differences that 
will be identified are twofold: do such invocations correspond to a meaningful 
incorporation of precaution in the regime, and does this incorporation foster trust and 
encourage wider public engagement.  
Though this section will only examine employment of the precautionary principle 
directly related to mechanisms of release, it is important to remember that precaution can 
be implied (at the very least) in other stages of regulation like coexistence and labeling.439 
The Deliberate Release Directive expressly affirms that measures under the Directive ‘to 
approximate laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States and to 
                                                
438 ‘For instance, all three major environmental threats in the current decade have, in practice seen cautious 
approaches to precaution: climate change, hazardous chemicals, and over fishing’: David van der Zwaag, ‘The 
Pprecautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection:  Slippery shores, rough seas and rising 
normative tides’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 165. 
439 As mentioned in Chapter 2, though Commission guidelines claim that coexistence is only about 
economics, there is a precautionary logic to coexistence measures and the protection of organic chain of 
production. See for more, Lee, ‘Governance of Coexistence’ (n 229). However, the invocation of the 
precautionary principle is far more explicit in the legislative instruments on Labeling and Traceability.  
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protect human health and environment’ ought to be in accordance with the precautionary 
principle.440 The Directive requires Member States to adhere to the principle to ensure 
taking all appropriate measures to avoid adverse effects on human health and the 
environment.441 Further, the choice in the Directive for a case-by-case evaluation of the 
socio-economic, environmental and health risks for every application of release of GMOs, 
as opposed to the doctrine of substantial equivalence that is applied in some other realms, 
shows the precautionary intent in the EU legal regime.442 
However, in the classical bifurcation of risk into technical analysis and political 
management used in the release mechanisms, technical assessment is placed at a prior 
stage in a manner pre-determinative of the whole safety inquisition. Crucially, the 
Commission in its Communication has negated the use of the precautionary principle at 
the stage of risk analysis, terming precaution a politically accepted strategy of risk 
management.443 This is in contravention to the legislative injunctions in the Deliberate 
Release Directive that require general principles for environmental risk assessment to be 
in accordance with the precautionary principle and acknowledge ‘delayed effects on 
human health or the environment that may not be observable during the period of release, 
but only become apparent as direct or indirect effect either at the stage or after the 
decision of the release’.444 This legislative prescription is persistently violated by the 
influential position of the Commission that the principle is confined to risk management 
and inapplicable in risk assessment. In a further twist of inconsistency, the EU in its 
argument before the WTO Appellate Body in the EC- Hormones I dispute recognized and 
asserted the need to apply the principle in both the phases of risk management and risk 
assessment.445 Such a position of the Commission, which effectuates a restrictive 
application of the principle in contravention to legislative injunctions, and to its own 
position before a judicial body, would appear to turn precaution an adjunct to the classical 
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risk paradigm with little real impact of its own. Whether this prima facie position is 
indeed correct, requires further investigation in the three aforementioned stages viz., risk 
assessment and risk management before release, as well as reexamination of safety 
considerations during environmental guarantee and product safeguard measures.  
 
4.2.1 Central role of EFSA in the current regulation of risk 
The breakdown of the earlier release mechanism for transgenic food, due to high level of 
distrust between Member States regarding their risk assessment procedures,446 was sought 
to be tackled by a certain degree of centralization of risk assessment processes through 
EFSA (European Food Safety Authority).447 EFSA has important responsibilities for EU 
risk assessment in general, and plays a key centralizing role in GM food regulation in 
particular. Of the eight scientific panels in EFSA seeking to cover risk analysis in various 
stages of the complete food chain, one panel is singularly devoted to the analysis of 
GMOs.448 The Authority is responsible for centralized ‘scientific’ risk assessment, 
through its key position in the risk ascertainment processes, and plays a palpably 
important role in the attempt at harmonization of the release of GMOs.449 
There are multiple aspirations for EFSA as an institution, including serving as the 
primary point of scientific reference, and to act as the catalyst of scientific consensus in 
the EU through networking with Member States’ and EU scientific institutions. The 
White Paper on Food Safety recommended the setting up of this organization that shall be 
‘the scientific point of reference for the whole Union’.450 The Authority is mandated to 
provide independent scientific advice and technical support for EU legislation and 
policies in all fields that have a direct impact on food and feed safety, as well as on related 
risks.451 The institution is entrusted with assessing the risk of regulated substances, such 
                                                
446 Amply demonstrated by the facts in the Greenpeace decision (n 192). 
447 Set up under the Food Safety Regulation (n 198). The management board of EFSA is comprised of 14 
members from various Member States’ organizations, one representative of the Commission, one from a 
consumer association and four from agriculture and industrial associations. The board is responsible for 
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of the Authority: Alberto Alemanno, ‘The European Food safety authority at Five’ (2008) 1 European Food 
and Feed Law Review 1. 
449 See Sebastian Krapohl, ‘Credible commitment in Non-independent regulatory agencies: A comparative 
analysis of the European agencies for Pharmaceuticals and Food stuffs’ (2004)10 European Law Journal 518. 
450 White Paper on Food Safety, COM (99) 719, 12 Jan. 2000. It sketched out the main features of the 
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the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, establishing the European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food safety’ COM 
(2000) 716. 
451 Article 22, Food Safety Reg. (n 198). 
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as GMOs, following notification procedures and time schedules established by EU 
legislations such as the Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation. It 
is also required to monitor specific risk factors, identify and characterize emerging risk, as 
well as to develop, promote and apply new and harmonized scientific approaches to 
hazard and risk assessment of food and feed.452 
The general EU regulatory scheme aims to foster scientific consensus in the Union 
through EFSA in a number of ways. One of the objectives of setting up of EFSA is the 
quest to keep the precautionary principle in check by adopting a uniform scientific basis 
throughout the EU,453 and by requiring EFSA to base its risk assessment on available 
scientific evidence.454 The risk managers are required to take into account risk 
assessment, and in particular, the opinions of the Authority referred to in Article 22 of the 
Food Safety Regulation, other factors legitimate to the matter under consideration, and the 
precautionary principle.455 Precaution is stipulated under the Food Safety Regulation to 
singularly reside in the management stage, and is to be applied on a provisional basis in 
specific circumstances. This application hinges upon a report of technical assessment of 
available information by EFSA where the possibility of harmful effects on health is 
identified and a finding that scientific uncertainty persists is recorded.456 This general 
scheme, which conceptualizes the dominance of the techno-scientific space, recognizes an 
extremely weak role for other publics during the preparation, evaluation and revision of 
food law, including through consultations of the lay public either directly or through 
representative bodies.457 Here, in situations where there are reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a food or feed may present a risk for human or animal health, the Authority is 
advised, depending on the nature, seriousness and extent of that risk, to inform the public 
of the nature of the risk to health, identifying the risk that it may present to the fullest 
extent possible, and the measures taken or about to be taken to prevent, reduce or 
eliminate them.458  
In cases where there is an overlap between applicability of the Deliberate Release 
Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation, EFSA is required to consult all national 
competent bodies while it carries out risk assessments. Again, during the process of 
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authorization of seeds or similar material, EFSA has to consult a national competent body, 
which shall carry out an environmental risk assessment.459 EFSA as a ‘scientific point of 
reference’ is required to act ‘in close cooperation with the Competent Authorities in the 
Members States’ carrying out similar tasks to those of the Authority.460 Importantly, the 
impact of such consultation processes on the ultimate decision-making is unclear, though 
it is without doubt that transparency of the decision-making process at this stage would 
make GM regulation more robust and open to contestations.461  
Chapter 2 noted that food safety assessment procedures under the Food and Feed 
Regulation are far more centralized than in an environmental risk assessment under a joint 
application under the Regulation and the Deliberate Release Directive, and less open to 
public and citizen involvement. Here in cases of divergence or even potential sources of 
divergence with national food agencies or other similar bodies, the Authority is required 
to take the initiative to ensure the sharing and identification of potentially contentious 
scientific issues between these expert bodies.462 In this endeavour to foster scientific 
consensus through the Authority, there exist significant institutional encouragement in the 
regulatory framework to resolve these differences internally. Although EFSA is required 
to circulate draft reports among national technical authorities (and in certain enumerated 
cases, consult them) as well as to make the report publicly accessible, the effect of these 
on the final decisions appears minimal.463 Further, in extreme cases of divergence 
between expert bodies that cannot be resolved between these bodies, a joint document 
identifying the uncertainties and contentious issues are to be publicly presented.464  
Here, the precautionary principle in GMO regulation reflects an imagination of 
scientific uncertainty that is temporary, which can be routinely overcome by more 
research, with no recognition of the systemic ambiguities and ignorance inherent in the 
post-normal condition of the scientific enterprise. Would EFSA’s statutory mandate to be 
mindful of divergences of expert opinion among different Member States authorities, and 
to foster cooperation among them, be able to make its assessment precautionary in 
substance? It would appear that this would be insufficient, since precaution also 
anticipates scenarios at the limits of scientific rationality and expert understanding itself, 
                                                
459 A joint reading of Article 6 (6) of Food and Feed Reg. and Food Safety Reg. The real impact of such 
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transparency in decision-making. 
460 Article 22 (7) Food Safety Reg. 
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462 Article 30 Food Safety Reg. 
463 Lee, ‘EU Regulation’ (n 28) 149-150. 
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and not mere disagreements between experts. Concerns of divergence about uncertainties 
can only be partly tackled through attention for minority opinions, as various sociological 
works demonstrate the limitations of expert networks to recognize divergences that lay 
publics have already pointed out. Wynn effectively demonstrates that scientific 
uncertainty is not necessarily exposed through expert disagreements, but rather that public 
contestations about scientific certainty informed by their everyday experiences can lead to 
gradual recognition of those concerns by some experts, which may later lead to minority 
opinions and disagreements between experts.465 The effect of restricting the precautionary 
principle to risk management is the prevention of public fact-gathering that can lead to the 
questioning of existing frames of technical assessment, often uncomfortable to dominant 
conventional scientific orthodoxies, which in turn can trigger new scientific research that 
recognizes possibilities of various kinds of scientific incertitudes, including uncertainty, 
ignorance and ambiguity. In previous decades, these kinds of steps could have led to 
earlier identification of hazards in the use of substances like tobacco, asbestos or Agent 
Orange, contributing significantly to earlier awareness and better protection of health and 
the environment.466  
Further, allegations have been persistent that the framing of GMO risk assessment 
processes by EFSA has often been one-dimensional, inter alia excluding cumulative and 
long term environmental effects and biodiversity issues. These have led to periodic 
exhortations from the Council to improve scientific consistency and transparency of 
EFSA decisions on GMOs.467 A profound contradiction is perceivable in this situation. 
On the one hand, the Deliberate Release Directive invokes the precautionary principle as 
a corner stone of EU GMO regulation, and emphasizes that general principles for 
environmental risk assessment should adhere to the precautionary principle. On the other 
hand, the Commission insists that the principle is inapplicable during risk assessment, and 
can only be triggered by a scientific evaluation by technical bodies like EFSA. 
                                                
465 Wynne, ‘May sheep safely graze’ (n 418).  
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The current regulatory framework appears very much within the classical risk 
paradigm. It is apparent that EFSA plays a central role in the framework for release of 
GMOs in a number of ways. Prior to decisions for release of specific GMOs, there are 
little overtures for public fact-gathering that precaution employed in technical risk 
assessment promise to bring in. In the bifurcated risk regulation that leads to a decision on 
release, the technical risk assessment conducted by EFSA precedes risk management in a 
manner quasi-determinative of the contours of the whole exercise. Though the risk 
managers are not obliged to adhere to the technical opinion of the Authority, regulators 
are required explain deviations from the relevant technical advice.468 Placing the 
scientific/technical assessment exercise at such a vantage position at the beginning of the 
regulatory process ensures that the construction and definition of risk is strongly 
determined by the scientific body, despite grave public reservations about the competence 
and legitimacy of such an exclusive reliance on technical expertise. Thus, the palpably 
central role played by the technical risk-assessors in the current GMO regime, in an 
insistently non-precautionary manner,469 makes the release procedures appear well within 
the classical model of risk. Whether precaution employed during risk management can 




4.2.2 Risk management through committee procedure 
In the second Chapter we saw that politically appointed scientific experts in the GMO 
regulatory Committee repeatedly failed to reach a qualified majority to accept or reject 
Commission recommendations to release specific GMOs for agriculture. Such deadlock 
has persisted in the Environment Council, and has led the Commission to permit releases 
of specific GMOs on the basis of the prior positive technical report from EFSA. In most 
cases, such permission to release was despite a simple majority of both experts (in the 
regulatory committees) and the Council voting against the releases. Permissions to release 
GM crops in the past five years (in the face of considerable opposition to every such 
permission) have been doubly controversial because the Commission has insisted that the 
precautionary principle can only be employed in risk management, and not in the context 
of risk assessment. Does this not then mean that in cases of such systemic deadlocks at the 
                                                
468 Article 7 Food and Feed Reg. 
469 See the insistence of the Commission in its Communication (n 394). 
 111  
management stage, when permissions are solely based on the proceedings of the technical 
assessment the whole GM release-structure be considered anything but precautionary?  
There is a related controversy which adds to the conundrum of the application of 
the principle in the GMO regime. Accompanying the Commission’s insistence that 
precaution can only be employed in risk management is its stipulation that the principle 
can be triggered only through the technical characterization of scientific uncertainty by an 
expert body like EFSA. Further, EU courts and the Food Safety Regulation have insisted 
that scientific advice can be overruled by a regulator (risk manager), only through 
invocation of what could be considered as superior scientific evidence.470 These two lines 
of reasoning mean that the trigger of precaution itself revolves around discourses of 
techno-scientific risk. It is usually the very same institutional arenas which generate and 
fine tune these technologies that also provide the information, data and expertise upon 
which these scientific judgments regarding uncertainty can be made. In an age of post-
normal science:  
 
forces behind technological development are systematically biased in the direction of generating and 
neglecting certain kinds of undesirable consequences, … and where profits drive the deployment of a 
technology and there is no profit in identifying its harms, there is no reason to think that the 
technologist will spend adequate resources to identify the harms.471  
 
Such convergence of interests in institutional arenas makes application of the 
precautionary principle problematic, since concrete and legitimate exceptions to use 
technical expertise must now be initiated by the very same technological spaces. Thus it 
becomes clear that what constitutes scientific uncertainty is a question which is both 
vexed in practice and in principle, and blind reliance on scientific ascertainment of 
scientific uncertainties is plagued by the very same conceptual problems that accompany 
classical risk regimes. That is to say, in situations of uncertainty, ignorance and similar 
incertitudes, there is neither any institutional incentive nor a reasonable possibility for 
technological spaces to go all out to identify possible trajectories of hazard analysis, until 
the public demands it. And an insistence on preliminary risk-based characterization of 
uncertainty to trigger precaution chills any available possibilities within a precautionary 
framework to address these issues. A prescription of public involvement in fact gathering 
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and framing of the risk assessment process is intricately connected to the promise of 
precaution avoiding a purely science based regulation, at least in principle.  
4.2.3 Public determination of social value through precaution 
Connected is the question of political determination between the two idealized conceptual 
frameworks within which the precautionary principle has to operate viz., technology 
governability and technology selection, mentioned earlier.472 The second idealized vision 
has an overarching decision criterion as a precautionary paradigm, according to which 
scientific uncertainty is intrinsic to certain technological trajectories. Here, the existence 
of ignorance and ambiguities about future effects and impacts invalidate the idea of 
accurate a priori predictions through previous models. The limits of scientific appraisals of 
risk in radically new technologies become stark due to the lack of empirical data, which 
make the prediction of possible risk outcomes particularly limited. This is because such 
probabilities are constructed from existing theoretical models and assumptions, based on 
analogies from other older risk models.  
Such inadequate empirical predictions are influenced by social, cultural and 
political factors that are dominant among expert communities. Experts might not only 
underplay incertitudes due to these normative factors, but policy makers might also 
invisibilize these factors and dress policy-making in an objective and scientific garb. 
Often, time constraints and demands from the industry for an urgent decision for an early-
mover advantage limit a comprehensive risk assessment. This might exclude identifying 
and examining long term ecological effects and other lines of enquiries that might be 
considered in scientific spaces as hypothetical at the time.473 Instruments of food safety, 
for instance normally focus on the impact of a single ingredient or food regarding a 
specific aspect of human or animal health. The complex nature of the human body and the 
environment as well as the uncertainty of data and methods makes risk ascertainment of 
new technologies in this manner inherently inadequate. Given the fragmentary nature of 
information and uncertainty, use of science is a necessary but insufficient basis for policy 
decisions. In such cases, science becomes subsidiary to other sources of reason for 
regulating technologies, for instance political and economic justice. This gives space for 
the precautionary principle to be a facilitator of choices between technological 
trajectories, and affords conversational space for public contestations and disagreements 
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about the development and use of specific technologies. Ideally, this second framework 
has the potential to mediate such contestations where issues of social value can be brought 
into institutionalized evaluations of safety through, for instance, deliberation with groups 
outside expert systems.474 
The potential to include social values in precaution is patently negated in the EU 
GMO regime by the insistence that precaution can be employed only at the risk 
management stage through a trigger of a technical finding of scientific uncertainty. Hence 
an opportunity to address issues of public trust, engagement and acceptability through a 
precautionary approach to the regulatory tool of risk is lost. In this absence of overt 
regulatory attempts to influence the shaping of the development and employment of 
technology, law appears to be banking on the market to choose between technological 
trajectories, including through consumer choice. Such reliance on the market for 
incorporating social value during regulation has serious limitations, including in fostering 
public trust and engagement. To be sure, any institutional attempts to incorporate 
considerations of social value in a participatory manner, through the precautionary 
principle will not be an easy endeavour, and would be beset with epistemic and other 
complexities that need attention and energy. While calls for incorporation of social values 
are often characterized as messy and unworkable, it is difficult to deny its normative and 
cognitive superiority. The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy has called for 
regulatory attention to foster institutional innovations towards this end. It reiterated the 
links between the second ideal-type of precaution,475 with the value of public participation 
in the regulation of the development and use of technology, requiring the involvement of 
political norms and not merely technocratic ascertainment. 476 
Further, it is imperative to emphasize the application of a version of the principle 
that is not ‘cadaverized by ruling elites’, but which is precautionary not only in name but 
also in substance.477 Recent studies on deliberative exercises that sought citizen 
participation in issues concerning technological risk are important here.478 An empirical 
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focus on the aforementioned deliberative exercises within these studies concluded ‘that 
deliberative mini-publics almost always produce recommendations that reflect a world 
view more precautionary479 than the promethean480 outlook more common among 
governing elites’.481 This is, the studies insist, ‘despite varied circumstances of the 
establishment of these exercises by policy making elites who either commission these 
exercises or are the intended audience’. 482  
 
Whatever the complexion of the political elite, the outcomes of the deliberative exercises are normally 
precautionary. If elites are promethean this poses some major question about their ability to 
accommodate a more deliberative democracy, at least when it comes to technology and risk. Since, 
ideologically, it would appear that one of the top priorities of contemporary national governments is to 
ensure economic competitiveness in a globalizing world, where large costs can be expected for a state 
due to departure from promethean facilitation of technological innovation, diffusion and 
marketization.483  
 
In situations of precautionary public opposition to technological risk, the authors note that 
national governments find it hard to legitimize their commitment to technology and trade 
driven economic growth within trans-national regimes like the WTO. They assert that the 
calculations of the costs of departure from their existing trans-national commitments may 
not be as high as it is made out to be. Further, they continue that the scale of these 
economic imperatives being calculated as extremely high could be mere ideological 
constructions where States in fact do have maneuvering room to move away from this 
‘narrow alley’.484 Though the commercialisation of transgenic food and crops have been 
often characterized as an encounter that brings out the tension between Promethean elites 
and precautionary publics, the authors asserted that a collision course between the two 
realities can be avoided through weakening the link between economic imperatives and 
                                                                                                                                                   
study examines construction of mini-publics about GM-foods in France, US, Canada, UK, Australia, Denmark 
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479 Precautionary worldview, ascribed to substantial sections of the public, approaches the public uncertainties 
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481 Dryzek and others (n 478) 264. 
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Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Polity 
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Promethean commitments. They felt that such a feat is achieved in north European 
countries ‘to the degree they feature an ideology of ecological modernization’.485  
Thus ascriptions of safety are tied with economic growth through investment in 
techno-scientific spaces, imbibing modernist optimism. However, given the centrality of 
technology, and modes of living with it in contemporary risk societies, it is asserted that 
such an important choice between the different (precautionary) trajectories should be 
made in a far more democratic and participatory manner, as opposed to it being a 
technocratic decision. If a new social contract of innovation is a worthwhile imagery, 
revolving around a genuinely precautionary basis, then the time to innovate regulatory 
pathways for a radically different precautionary trigger is now. 
In sum, the existence of a possible primary inclination of the release regime to 
allow releases, despite strongly articulated opposition of a majority during risk 
management, brings forth the point of democratic deficit with renewed strength. 
Notwithstanding the legislative exhortations and regulatory claims of precaution as the 
lynch-pin of EU regulation on transgenic food and feed, there is a fundamental ambiguity 
in the way the principle is given expression in the mechanisms for granting permissions 
for release. It would appear from the close examination here, that there is little precaution 
involved in the deliberate release of GMOs. Despite all the invocations of the 
precautionary principle in legislative documents, it appears that the classical model of risk 
continues to dominate the current framework in a manner where the room for public 
participation is extremely limited.  
Further, can precaution, in the way it is intended to be employed at the stage of 
risk management be any different from the way risk management is supposed to be 
conducted in a classical risk paradigm that does not claim itself to be precautionary? In 
other words risk management in any case is envisaged to apply and arrange the technical 
findings in a manner that is normatively appropriate for the political community. Hence, 
what are the real implications of precaution singularly residing at the management stage, 
and how different is the current GMO framework from any classical risk paradigm? From 
the discussion about the lack of precaution in risk assessment, and an examination of the 
pattern of decisions in the risk management stage it appears that this framework is 
precautionary only in name. It is not even governance by committees and comitology 
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(which are in any case beset with the problems of democratic deficit), but it is a practice 
of technocratic governance by the Commission with the justification for the decision 
singularly arising from a technical risk assessment that it expressly insists to be non-
precautionary. The room for participation for the public is negligible given neither space 
for public fact-gathering in risk assessment, nor any effective oversight of normative and 
political factors that frames it.  
 
4.2.4 Emergency responses and interpretative role of EU courts 
An examination of the nature of ascriptions of safety at the stage of emergency responses, 
demonstrates two aspects of precaution. First, the imagination of the principle arising 
from EU court decisions reflects an expert-led model of the classical risk paradigm. 
Second, it also brings further clarity to the inadequacies in the employment of the 
principle in the regulatory framework for GMOs. As described in Chapter 2, continuation 
of concerns of safety are expressed in two stages of the regulation subsequent to 
deliberate release decisions, viz., the general environmental guarantee provisions in the 
TFEU, and the product-specific emergency safeguard measures under EU legislation. 
Though legislations providing for these safety measures may textually appear to grant 
scope for divergences at the national and regional levels, with possibilities of nuanced 
approaches that avoid classical risk-related standards of evidence, EU courts have limited 
such discretion. While decisions by EU courts facilitated an extension of the scope of the 
principle from strictly environmental issues to other realms like health regulation and 
consumer rights,486 the conceptualization of the principle within these decisions appears 
to be well within a narrow imagination of precaution. Thus, uncertainties are viewed as 
something to be overcome by way of further research (and not as intrinsic to the 
development of techno-science), where the identification of uncertainties that triggers the 
principle is left exclusively to experts.  
This is amply clear in the manner of interpretation by EU courts of the notion 
‘scientific evidence’ that can legitimately trigger an environmental guarantee. The milieu 
of Austria v. Commission duly testifies to the conservative construction by EU courts, 
where the requirements of newness of evidence and specificity are expected to be 
demonstrated in a strict manner in the interests of uniformity and aspirations of the 
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internal market, over the objectives of higher levels of protection of environment and 
health of citizens.487 The Court’s approach of legitimising the current regulatory measures 
by asking for strict scientific proof that is based on studies conducted after the original 
decision is taken is criticised by Fleurke.488 She elaborates on how this interpretative 
requirement has rendered the guarantee provision practically useless, and that a more 
appropriate construction would have been ‘to accept all relevant knowledge, including 
information that was already available at the time of adoption of the Community measure, 
but which for some reason has been overlooked or deemed irrelevant at the time’.489  
The manner in which the text of the safeguard clause in the current Deliberate 
Release Directive ties its invocation to a positivist requirement of narrow scientific proof 
was noted in Chapter 2. The earlier Directive of 1990, however, provided for a safeguard 
clause that empowered provisional derogation by Member States, if there were ‘justifiable 
reasons’ to consider the constitution of risk to human health or the environment.490 
Though the safeguard measures from the previous Directive could be considered textually 
wider than in the current Deliberate Release Directive, this difference appears to have had 
little consequence due to the interpretation of the earlier guarantee by EU courts. In the 
Greenpeace decision, signatures of one-fifth of the population of Austria in support of the 
safeguard measures as constitutive of addressing possible risk to their health were 
adduced. Justifications based on such public concerns about expert constructions of risk, 
however, were not regarded by the ECJ (as it was called then) as ‘justifiable reason’ for 
maintaining safeguard measures.491 In both aforementioned decisions, textually 
conceivable alternative interpretations could have avoided an insistence on strict scientific 
proof as opposed to, say, a reliance on either ‘other relevant factors’ or scientific 
information that may not amount to scientific proof. It would have been more appropriate 
to tackle controversies about safety in a new paradigm that is more attuned to the 
normative claims and aspirations of precaution. These factors combined with the 
Commission’s controversial attempts at outlawing the Austrian safeguard bans, described 
in Chapter 2, clearly show the lack of an overtly precautionary approach in the safeguard 
or guarantee measures. This is since substantive requirements of EU courts insist on 
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scientific proof of risk in a way that is not particularly resonating precautionary 
emphases.492 
Further, the interpretative role played by EU courts in the conservative 
construction of emergency responses, is similar to its track record in a plethora of other 
decisions, which examine the use of the precautionary principle in EU regulatory regimes. 
A number of important commentaries have identified this pattern in judgments of EU 
courts from Danish food to Artegoden and Pfizer.493 Scott focuses on the stipulation in the 
Pfizer decision by the European Court of Justice (as it was then called) by stating that: 
 
A regulatory measure ought “not to be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, which has not 
been scientifically verified.” (para. 146) Thus the precautionary principle can apply only to situations 
where there is a risk, which although not founded on mere hypotheses that have not been scientifically 
confirmed, has not yet been fully demonstrated (para. 172). Secondly, within wider procedural criteria 
aiming at risk assessment based on excellence, transparency and independence (para. 146), while 
decision-makers may for reasons of democratic legitimacy disregard scientific advice such explanation 
may operate at a scientific level at least commensurable with original report, of EFSA. 494  
 
Pertinently, Scott pointed out that the ECJ’s insistence that science can only be tackled 
with science, happens to coincide with decisions of the WTO tribunals on the point.495 
She discusses the interpretative fidelity of EU courts with the WTO adjudicators, in 
particular the decision of the Appellate Body in EC- Hormones I.496 Though details of 
these WTO tribunal decisions are examined in the next Chapter, the possible self 
imagination of EU courts in its interpretative role, to fit the implementation of the 
principle in the EU with the scheme of the WTO framework is important to take note of. 
Scott clearly demonstrates the descriptive and normative inadequacies of the traditional 
conception of the role of the judiciary, as mere norm elaborators and enforcers, as 
opposed to the significant role wielded by courts as catalysts, in areas of normative 
uncertainty or complexity. In such situations, she argues that courts can undertake a 
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normatively motivated enquiry facilitating the realization of process values and 
legitimacy principles by the institutional actors responsible for norm elaboration within 
new governance.497 Here the role of EU courts is crucial in unfolding a particular 
imagination of the precautionary principle as the only viable one for the EU, where there 
is a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between courts and other institutions of new 
governance like the Commission. An insistence on the strictly ‘scientific’ by the Court is 
in line with the Commission’s general approach on the implementation of the 
precautionary principle, of strictly tying it to the cultural rigors of the scientific 
establishment. Tying the trigger of the principle to a scientific recommendation or proof is 
clearly driven by the objective to make it visibly non-discriminatory, and as an easy way 
of adjudicating and making precautionary measures accountable to easy judicial scrutiny 
and review. 
These cases show that EU courts have consistently approached the employment of 
the precautionary principle as well within the first ideal-type (precaution within a 
technology governance framework),498 since employing conventional risk assessment as a 
trigger for precaution is convenient and appealing for courts that are beset with complex 
technical arguments. The insistence of the Commission, through its Communication, that 
the principle of precaution can only be triggered through a scientific evaluation by a 
technical body converges with the general approach of EU courts here. This takes us back 
to the very same conceptual problems encountered with a complete reliance on techno-
scientific risk, within the classical risk paradigm. Prima facie a benign step to implement 
the principle, this brings back the largely discredited central reliance on the expert-centric 
probabilistic techniques for regulation of new and controversial techniques through the 
back door. In effect, this goes beyond monopolizing the responsibility to identify possible 
uncertainties by the techno-scientific community, which is problematic by itself. Further, 
it also lends the same spaces that generate these risk-based probabilistic techniques the 
gate-keeping function to trigger precaution, in the name of a preliminary evaluation of the 
probability and seriousness of uncertainties. 
Even within the classical bifurcation of risk, political factors were sought to be 
included during risk management. In contrast, almost every decision to release a GM crop 
in the current regime has been taken solely relying on the technical reports of EFSA, 
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given the inability of the opposition (to specific releases) to increase their simple majority 
to a qualified majority. Though the precautionary invocation in the current regime implied 
the recognition of the pitfalls of a classical risk framework, the sole reliance on EFSA 
reports for release in contrast, is a regression. Through the invocation of the precautionary 
principle, the current regime appeared to recognize various conceptual and normative 
limitations of the classical risk paradigm. An emphasis on precaution was intended to 
overcome the limitations of exclusive reliance on scientific rationality, which is signified 
in widespread public disaffection about GMOs, as well as simmering tensions and 
periodic rebellion from various Member States about decisions to release specific GMOs. 
In this supposedly precautionary regime for the release of GMOs, there was an ambition 
to marry scientific and social rationalities through recognizing a protracted role for 
political risk management. However the embodiment of the principle in the GMO regime 
appears to be only in name, from the above discussion, and differences between the 
classical risk framework and the supposed precautionary framework are marginal. A close 
examination earlier in this Chapter shows that fundamental opportunities to involve wider 
publics, including in issues of social value of technology, are missed due to the way the 
precautionary principle is applied in EU GMO regulation. 
 
4.3 What now for democratic attempts for effective ascriptions of safety?  
The exclusion of a precautionary approach in risk assessment gives the supposed shift 
from the classical risk paradigm little meaning. Employment of the precautionary 
principle here can give a fillip to public fact gathering in risk assessment, given the acute 
inadequacies faced by expert systems on risk identification and characterization, in 
situations of systemic incertitude where uncertainties, ambiguity and ignorance are 
inherent to techno-scientific processes. Rip points out how prudence leads 
nanotechnologists and government actors to consider social and ethical aspects at an early 
stage of development, ‘a precaution to ensure continued progress of a nanotechnology 
turns into (some precaution) applied to nanotechnology’.499 He pertinently argues that 
precaution is not merely about uncertainty, or about the possible adverse effects (and the 
accompanying cause for concern, appropriate proportionality or extent of measures), but 
also ‘about addressing ignorance, and explore the future with the help of science fiction 
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and social science fiction’.500 At what point can one say that reasonable grounds (i.e. 
scientifically informed) for regulatory concern come to exist is a tricky question which 
cannot be left to experts alone. Involving various sections of publics, to identify the nature 
and extent of uncertainties, can only sharpen and enrich the vigour of technical enquiries, 
and open new lines of enquiry for technical investigation, characterization and 
assessment. 
Though blue-prints for such institutional arrangements need far more attention, an 
a priori position of ruling out such attempts as not workable is unsatisfactory, and belies 
the crucial necessity of these regulatory innovations. These engagements cannot, of 
course, be confused with derivatives of risk communication, or spurious attempts at 
engineering legitimacy in the name of participation without a genuine conversation about 
the range and depth of concerns that fuel contestations and disagreements. Rip’s comment 
about nanotechnology is relevant here:  
 
The notion of responsible innovation is important, but should not be seen as an attempt to create 
harmony. The situation is one of struggle and of force being exerted to push one or the other position. 
Deliberative approaches can help to articulate positions and support interaction, but will not create a 
consensus. In other words, struggle is unavoidable, but through the contestation some learning can 
occur, and in this struggle, genuine invocation of a precautionary approach shifts the balance of 
forces.501 
 
A number of proposals to make classical risk paradigms more in tune with contemporary 
understandings and realities, by attempting institutional changes to make precaution and 
public participation intrinsic in ascriptions of safety already exist.502 Irrespective of the 
viabilities of individual proposals, it is important to recognize the need to attempt 
innovations in the phase of risk assessment to widen it to non-expert communities. Given 
the limited room for public participation that is found in the EU regulation of GMOs, this 
recognition is fundamental for any attempt for law to insist on rights of lay publics to 
participate in such regulation. The objective here is twofold. First, in situations of post-
normal science effective measures of risk assessment need wider public input.503 Rip 
describes how nanotechnologists, when discussing possible impacts and concerns about 
the technology, recognize the need to avoid the impasse that beset green biotechnology at 
                                                
500 ibid 277. 
501 ibid 275. 
502 WRR (n 2) and Stirling and others (n 437). 
503 Text to nn 85- 92, 372- 375. 
 122  
all costs, by taking on board the societal concerns and ethical, legal and social aspects.504 
Second, new ways of accommodating citizen’s normative preferences and political 
participation in risk assessment are important for a more democratic and legitimate model 
of risk governance. These different points necessitate bringing together a range of 
concerns identified by groups inside and outside of techno-scientific expert communities 
through new institutional arrangements of public participation.  
This position implies that the modern assumption of trust invested on experts by 
political communities cannot be absolute in situations of post-normal science, and has to 
be exercised through engagement with other sections of society. Mouffe argues for the 
pursuit of active trust in post-traditional contexts through reflexive institutions, where 
expert positions are open to critique and guidance by citizens, since assumptions of 
passive trust have proved to be inadequate.505 We have already seen how a monopolistic 
use of scientific trust in the regulation of technology is beset with a number of concerns. 
These include issues of institutional legitimacy (since the same space generates 
technologies and sits in judgment on the safety of them), issues of erosion of trust 
(political, economic and safety scandals that accompany the increase in control and 
domination of techno-science by profit) and issues of institutional capability (the logical 
inability of an expert system to demarcate the limits of its own rational understanding).  
Though generation of active trust through interaction and engagement with various 
sections of society is necessary for the democratisation of technology, it is a difficult task 
that requires considerable rethinking of existing regulatory frameworks. The normative 
and institutional contours of transforming expert systems into democratic public spheres 
need further reflection. Mouffe, for instance, insists that this reflection is an intensely 
political endeavour, which itself needs wider debate and discussion.506 This can be done 
only by wider political engagement that brings out fundamental disagreements into the 
open, with a recognition that risk is never just about what experts ascribe as the best 
possible statistical probability. Existing global rules, especially in the WTO regime, may 
impact the contours of attempts at these kinds of regulatory innovation in the EU 
regulation of technologies like GMOs. Hence the next Chapter describes the relevant 
global rules to identify the legal permissibility of such improvisation, which includes 
allowing wider communities at the regulatory table for a more public deliberation.  
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Chapter 5 
Participation in Safety and Public morals Regulation: 
Ambit in Global Rules 
 
Das kann stimmen, aber nur so können wir in Europa etwas verändern  
(That may be true, but it’s the only way we can change something in Europe)507 
  
It appears that citizen endeavours seeking to influence regulatory strategies on 
specific technologies are well aware of the effect of postnational legal frameworks on 
social change. This is indicative in the above quoted response from the organizers of an 
Austrian citizen’s initiative (Volksbegehren) to a query about Austria risking a case in the 
ECJ if their campaign succeeds in a national ban on GM maize agriculture. Such 
participation by publics to influence the regulation of GMOs is intricately affected by 
postnational rules. This Chapter seeks to understand this effect on EU regulation of 
GMOs, in particular how trade regimes (like the WTO) and environmental instruments 
(like the Convention on Biodiversity) provide room for public participation in the 
regulation of GMOs.  
The discussion in the previous Chapters, related to the centrality of public 
participation in conceptual understandings of the classical regulatory tool of risk and the 
principle of precaution, is continued here. An appropriate effectuation of the precautionary 
principle includes new institutional arrangements for public engagement in key areas of 
risk analysis and management, since the current disposition leaves insignificant room for 
public participation in safety ascriptions. An examination of global rules in GATT/WTO 
and the Cartagena Protocol is important in order to understand the permissible ambit for 
public participation in the regulatory pursuit of safety. It is toward this end that the 
Chapter describes the permissible ambit of deviation from classical risk parameters for EU 
regulation in these global rules. The legal analysis of WTO law, which is a large and 
distinct field by itself, is restricted to this narrow enquiry. In a similar vein, the Chapter 
also examines constraints imposed by the WTO/GATT in the protection of public morals 
and values on EU regulation of GMOs, since EU rulemaking is supposed to proceed 
subject to these global rules, standards and principles.  
                                                
507 Cited from Adrian Ely, ‘Nur so können wir in Europa etwas verändern’ (2004) December Soziale 
Technik 9, 10.  
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Currently the global complex of rules on safety in the use and transport of GMOs 
consists of trade rules within the WTO regime, a voluntary expert health standard-setting 
mechanism in the Codex Alimentarius Commission that is intricately linked to the WTO 
regime, and environmental rules on trans-boundary movement of specific types of GMOs 
in the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity. How these regimes interact 
with each other, and how they affect EU rule-making that responds to public concerns is 
discussed in subsequent sections of the Chapter. The next section examines the rules on 
trans-boundary movement of GMOs under the Cartagena Protocol. The subsequent 
section introduces the general framework of the WTO regime and identifies the various 
applicable international agreements in the regime. It notes the role of the Dispute 
Settlement Body and expert committees in it. It further identifies the specific provisions in 
GATT, SPS and TBT that are relevant to Members’ protection of health and environment, 
and examines how they are judicially interpreted to be in consonance with WTO goals of 
free trade.  
The WTO panel decision in EC-Biotech is an important element in understanding 
the ambit of this configuration between concerns of free trade and safety, in the specific 
context of claims of scientific uncertainty and lack of public trust with expert estimations 
of risk. This decision is critically examined in the section after that against the background 
of related cases that interpret relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. This section 
seeks to identify the inadequacies of ignoring intrinsic scientific incertitudes, which 
require innovation of legal and institutional mechanisms within the classical risk 
paradigm. This identification is done through examining three elements in the decision, 
viz., the question of which scientific studies are recognized as a risk assessment, how the 
panel treats the term ‘insufficiency of scientific evidence’, and the applicability of the 
precautionary principle. The latter directly relates to issues of fragmentation of 
international law; particularly concerns about interpretations of trade rules in the WTO 
regime making multilateral environmental agreements like the Cartagena Protocol 
obsolete. In the subsequent section, the functioning and normative role of expert 
committees in the trade regime like Codex Alimentarius Commission is examined. It 
identifies the promise and limitations of Committee procedures in situations of 
disagreements and scientific controversies. It also underlines the limited role of 
Committees in issues of fragmentation in international law, if the attempt is only to 
construct consensus within expert communities without reference to accompanying 
normative and political conflicts that fuel public contestations about specific technologies. 
 125  
This is followed by a summing up of the room available for public participation in the 
regulatory pursuit of safety for Member States. In the final section, we examine the 
existing room for protection of public values that might accommodate public concerns 
about GMOs within the WTO regime. 
 
5.1 Impact of the Biosafety protocol 
The most recent addition in the complex of global rules on GMOs regards the trans-
national movement of certain types of GMOs through the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol to 
the Convention on Biodiversity.508 Emphasis on a precautionary approach is discernible in 
the preamble, as well as in a number of substantive provisions, which are discussed later 
in this section. These provisions suggest that recognizing the lack of scientific certainty 
due to insufficient relevant information and knowledge, regarding the extent of potential 
adverse effects, need not deter members in the pursuit of their regulatory objects in 
biosafety.509 The Protocol recognizes that different levels of protection may be found 
appropriate by different Member States. These levels of protection pertain to baselines 
that identify adverse effects on human health as well as on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity due to the trans-boundary transfer, handling and use 
of these organisms.510  
Primarily, the Protocol establishes a duty on states exporting specific types of 
GMOs that falls within the purview of the Protocol to elicit Advanced Informed Consent 
from the state of intended import.511 The GMOs which fall within the purview of the 
Protocol, designated as living modified organisms (LMOs), are categorized into two viz., 
first organisms that are intended only for direct use as food or feed, and second, organisms 
which are intended to be introduced into the environment as living organism, say as seeds 
in agriculture.512 The obligations to elicit Advanced Informed Consent differ between 
                                                
508 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000 39 ILM 1027 (2000) 
(referred here as the Cartagena Protocol). The Cartagena Protocol came into force on 11 Sep. 2003 after 
fifty states had ratified it; three years after it was finalized and signed in Montreal on 29 Jan. 2000. 
Currently (Mar. 2012) 163 states have ratified them, including the EU and its Member States, Nigeria, 
Brazil, India, South Africa, Switzerland, Iran, Mexico, New Zealand, China and Japan. Prominent states that 
have not ratified the treaty also happen to be complainants in the WTO EC-Biotech dispute viz., the USA, 
Argentina and Canada, as well as Australia. See for the text, and details on ratification: <http://bch.cbd.int> 
accessed 30 Mar. 2012.  
509 Ruth Mackenzie, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin, Antonio La Viña and Jacob Werksman, An Explanatory 
Guide to the Cartagena Protocol (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law paper No. 46 2003) paras 61-67. 
510 Article 4 and Annex III.4 of the Cartagena Protocol. 
511 Articles 8-10 ibid 
512 Article 3 (g) and (h) ibid: any biological entity (‘capable of transferring or replicating genetic material, 
including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids’) ‘that possesses a novel combination of genetic material 
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these categories. Member States who intend to export LMOs also have labelling 
obligations that differ between these two categories.  
Prerequisites for seeking an Advance Informed Consent for import intended to 
introduce LMOs into the environment, include a risk analysis carried out by the intended 
exporter. This analysis is to be made available to the state of intended import along with 
various enumerated information about the LMO.513 Though this state is free to accept or 
reject the application for import of the LMO, a decision to reject such imports is required 
to be based on a risk assessment conducted in a ‘scientifically sound manner’, and based 
on ‘available scientific evidence in order to identify and evaluate the possible adverse 
effects of living modified organisms’, to human health as well as conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.514 It is salient that this textual emphasis on sound 
science, often employed in classical risk paradigms, is accompanied by a version of the 
precautionary principle in the Protocol. This version of the principle emphasizes the 
maintenance of appropriate regulatory action despite the lack of scientific certainty arising 
from insufficient scientific information and relevant knowledge regarding the extent of 
potential adverse effects.515 The reader might recall the discussion in Chapter 4, in 
principle arguing that for an appropriate precautionary emphasis in safety paradigms, 
characterization of scientific uncertainty cannot be controlled by techno-scientific 
communities alone, but should involve wider public participation.516 The contradictions 
between the precautionary emphasis and insistence on sound science in the Protocol are 
continued later in the section. It is significant that socio-economic factors can be 
considered for imports of LMOs in a limited category viz., when those imports may 
impact the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.517  
The obligations of seeking advance informed consent are considered lower for 
LMOs that are intended only for direct use as food, feed or processed food, and are not 
                                                                                                                                                   
obtained through the use of modern biotechnology’. Article 5 (ibid) excludes the applicability of LMOs that 
are pharmaceuticals as these are addressed by other relevant international agreements. 
513 Article 8.1 and Annex I (i) ibid. 
514 Article 15.1 ibid. 
515 Article 10.6 ibid. 
516 See for the conceptual differences between a framework based on ‘sound science’ and the use of 
scientific information during in a precautionary framework: Anne Ingeborg Myhr and Terje Traavik, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Omitted research in the Context of GMO use and 
release’ (2002) 15 Journal of Environmental Ethics 73, 76-77.  
517 Article 26.1 Cartagena Protocol. Here, the evaluation ought to be consistent with their international 
obligations, in particular with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local 
communities. 
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intended to be introduced in the environment as living organisms.518 Parties making a 
decision in connection to the domestic use of such an LMO are expected to offer detailed 
information of the decision, through the requisite procedure in a Biosafety Clearing 
House, including a risk assessment as well as characteristics and suggested methods of 
handling and use for other parties.519 Further, there is an obligation to indicate relevant 
information in the label of the produce that it ‘may include LMOs’ in the label, and that 
there is no intention to introduce these LMOs into the environment of the importing 
country.520 The latter information is required in the label so that they can avail of lower 
level of obligations under the Protocol. Freedom of other parties to use their own domestic 
regulatory framework to reach a different decision on the specific LMO is recognized, 
albeit with the explicit mention that those restrictions should be ‘consistent with the 
objectives of this protocol’.521  
In particular, the right to invoke the precautionary principle in decisions regarding 
import of this category of LMOs is explicitly recognized. Thus, lack of scientific certainty 
due to insufficient scientific knowledge relevant to the extent of the potential adverse 
effects of the import does not prevent the party from taking any particular regulatory 
decision.522 It could be argued that the textual versions of the precautionary principle in 
the Cartagena Protocol, seen in Article 11.8 and Article 10.6, are relatively strong 
versions.523 This is because they provide for the restriction of movement of LMOs into or 
through the territory of an importing state, provided a lack of scientific certainty arising 
from insufficient scientific information and relevant knowledge regarding the extent of the 
potential adverse effects can be established. There is no emphasis on these measures being 
provisional, and insufficiency of scientific information is enough to establish a lack of 
scientific certainty. 
Though commentators identify the recognition of the problems with the regulatory 
domination by techno-scientific spaces in the spirit of the Protocol,524 it remains to be seen 
                                                
518 Article 7.1 and 7.2 ibid. 
519 Article 11.1 and Annex III ibid. Developing countries/ transition economies that lack a domestic 
regulatory framework may declare through the clearinghouse mechanism that it will make its decision 
regarding the first import of an LMO for direct use as food, feed or processing according to an Annex III 
risk assessment within a specified period of time.  
520 Article 18.2 (a) ibid. 
521 Article 11.4 ibid. 
522 Article 11.8 ibid. 
523 See for different versions of the principle, text to nn 428- 436 (Chapter 4). 
524 Mackenzie et. al (n 509) 13-14. ‘Even with proper risk assessment, some uncertainty may still remain 
and that in such circumstances countries should have the right to adopt precautionary measures to protect 
biodiversity and human health’: para 65.  
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how the Cartagena Protocol will be implemented. Given the textual emphasis on ‘a 
scientifically sound manner based on available scientific evidence’,525 the responsibility of 
characterization of scientific uncertainty could still be limited to techno-scientific spaces 
through expert committees. Generally, control of the trigger of the precautionary principle 
within expert communities gives techno-scientific reason and classical risk parameters a 
definitive say in ascriptions for safety. This is since the contours and possibilities of lack 
of scientific certainty will still be controlled by spaces that develop these technologies in 
the first place.526 If so, it appears that the version of the precautionary principle employed 
in the Cartagena Protocol may be inadequate to recognize public contestations about 
inherent scientific incertitudes. However, it is significant that the Protocol requires 
Members to promote effective access to information, facilitate public awareness including 
information about means of such access, and facilitate education and participation 
regarding the objectives of the Protocol.527 Further, the Protocol exhorts Members to 
consult the public in the decision-making process regarding LMOs, and make these results 
available to the public.528 
The ratification of supplementary rules that provide mechanisms for 
implementation, liability, redress and dispute resolution of the provisions of the Protocol 
are still pending.529 The lack of dispute resolution mechanisms becomes particularly 
important with the aforementioned textual ambiguities in the Protocol since there are 
multiple routes for Members to implement the precautionary principle.530 Further, a 
                                                
525 Article 15.1 Cartagena Protocol. 
526 Lee remarks that the approach to the precautionary principle in the Cartagena Protocol ‘is very similar to 
the SPS Agreement’, ‘EU regulation’ (n 28) 227. The version of precaution in the SPS Agreement is 
generally considered as a weak version of the principle, Applegate (n 384).  
527 Article 23(1) Cartagena Protocol. 
528 Article 23(2) ibid. 
529 Article 27 ibid. The Nagoya - Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was opened for signature in New York on 7 March 2011, and shall enter 
into force ninety days after the fortieth instrument of ratification (Article 18). Forty five States including a 
number of states from the EU, Colombia, Tunisia and Panama have currently signed it: 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/notifications/2011/ntf-2011-054-bs-en.pdf> last accessed 30 Jan. 2012. The 
Protocol requires Parties to develop civil liability laws (strict or fault-based, as appropriate), for ascertaining 
damages where causation can be established (Article 4), with the exemptions of force majeure and acts of 
war (Article 6), specifying response measures for ascertaining liability (Article 5) accompanied by time and 
financial limits (Articles 7 and 8 respectively). 
530 Commentators underline the effect of tenuous negotiations and compromises involved in the drafting of 
the text on the considerable textual ambiguity between provisions. These include strong positions of the 
developing countries, and the Organisation of African countries and the European communities, on the one 
hand as well as particularly vocal positions of observer countries loosely called the Miami group (US, 
Canada, Australia and Argentina), who have not signed the document. See for more details on the various 
negotiating blocks of countries: Paul Hagen and John Weiner, ‘The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety: New 
roles for International Trade in Living Modified Organisms’ (2000) 12 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 697, 710; Stanley W. Burgiel, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Taking the 
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number of conflicts with the provisions of the WTO regime are apparent, discussed later 
in this Chapter.531 Potentially, a dispute resolution mechanism set up by the Protocol may 
have given a set of viable alternative interpretative possibilities in competition to the 
WTO tribunals. Before we examine the WTO system, and possible conflicts with the 
Protocol, it is important to emphasize the textual ambiguities and contradictions in the 
Protocol, as well as their effects on the nature of precautionary principle employed in the 
Protocol.  
Considerable contradictions in the text of the Protocol are visible in the 
Preambular clauses themselves, which start by 
 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to 
achieving sustainable development,  
Emphasising that this protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements,  
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements… 
 
Halfon brings out the conceptual difficulties in such broad and contradictory wordings in 
the Protocol, ‘where the second clause, a classic savings clause suggests deference to free 
trade agreements, but the third seemingly reverses that’; while the first hints towards a 
legal approach to balance trade and environment through use of the term sustainable 
development.532 
Given the textual ambiguities, the construction of the precautionary principle and 
characterization of scientific uncertainty can be tied to ‘available scientific knowledge’ of 
other countries.533 This could be against the spirit of precaution since these 
characterizations will be based on risk frames specific to, first the concerns of different 
biosystems and ecological necessities,534 and second a different level of protection in 
another country. It needs to be seen how notions of availability and different levels of 
                                                                                                                                                   
steps from negotiation to implementation’ (2002) 11 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 53, 55-56. 
531 See Sabrina Safrin, ‘Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO Agreements’ (2002) 96 
American Journal of International Law 606. Further, for the contradictions and inconsistencies within the 
Protocol, and inter se the WTO regime, see: Gilbert R. Winsham, ‘International regime conflict in Trade and 
Environment: The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO’ (2003) 2 World Trade Review 131, 143. 
532 Saul Halfon, ‘Confronting the WTO: Intervention Strategies in GMO Adjudication’ (2010) 35 Science, 
Technology & Human Values 307, 319.  
533 Article 15.1 Cartagena Protocol. 
534 See Annex III 9(h) ibid regarding points to consider related to environmental risk assessment: 
‘information on the location, geographical, climatic and ecological characteristics’.  
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protection are read together by a judicial tribunal. A later section in the Chapter identifies 
the problematic experience of the relationship between these two terms in the WTO 
framework (‘levels of protection’ and available in ‘available scientific knowledge’). As 
seen in that section, scientific evidence found adequate for a lower level of protection may 
be inappropriate and inadequate for a higher level of protection. This can contravene a 
precautionary approach and higher level of protection that may be demanded by the public 
in that Member State. As discussed in Chapter 4, a precautionary approach may also 
require the expression and consideration of a range of public concerns, wider than that 
recognized by expert communities. This embodiment of the precautionary principle in the 
Protocol by Member States depends partly on how they are constructed in those states, 
and partly on how the permissibilities are shaped in the interpretation of the Protocol by 
postnational judicial bodies. However, whether postnational environmental tribunals will 
prefer the rationality and logic of stronger versions of precaution over classical risk 
parameters remains to be seen.535 Constructions of scientific uncertainty in the regulation 
of GMOs were required to be consistent with the stipulations of insufficiency of scientific 
evidence under the WTO regime in the EC-Biotech decision. Due to a particular 
interpretative technique in the decision, the Protocol was found to be inapplicable to the 
facts of the decision. The effects of and problems with the WTO panel’s reasoning are 
discussed in a later section of the Chapter. Our next task here is to explore the contours of 
the WTO regime. 
 
5.2 Room for environmental and health safety provisions in the WTO  
The WTO regime purports to facilitate international trade without discrimination.536 
Though the stated objective of the WTO complex is limited to the regulation of 
international movement of goods and services, it is often characterized as the engine of 
global administrative law.537 The increasing reach of trade concerns in other international 
law realms at one level, and the difficulty in separating trade aspects from other legitimate 
                                                
535 See Stephen Hockman, ‘An International Court for the Environment’ (2008) 11 Environmental Law 
Review 1. 
536 Core principles that were already enunciated in the original GATT of 1947, include the Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) principle (that appears in Article I), requiring Members to treat products emanating from all 
other Members in a similar manner; a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions viz., quotas, embargoes 
and licensing schemes related to international trade of goods (Article XI); as well as the principle of national 
treatment (Article III). The latter requires Members to treat domestic products and imported products that 
are similar to the imported products in the same way. GATT 1994 incorporates GATT 1947 by reference, 31 
Annex 1 A (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1153. 
537 Sabino Cassese, ‘Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure’ (2006) 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 109, 113-115.  
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issues, have effectuated an extremely strong presence of the trade regime in regulatory 
concerns of health, environment, ethics, human rights and development.538 Obligations of 
Members with an obvious relevance to the regulation of GMOs primarily appear in 
GATT, 1994,539 and the two WTO side agreements of TBT540 and SPS.541 All three 
agreements, in principle, recognize legitimate exceptions towards a variegated obligation 
for free movement of goods, in a conceptual recognition of national regulatory 
sovereignty. The nature and application of these exceptions substantially differ between 
these Agreements, though in effect, these differences are papered over in the trade of 
GMOs, by the dominance of SPS over others through judicial interpretation in the EC-
Biotech decision (examined in the next section). 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, set up by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding,542 is the judicial arbiter of the fine line between, on the one hand, 
sovereign rights of Members to take appropriate measures to protect public morals, 
environment and health issues in their respective jurisdictions, and on the other hand, 
arbitrary or discriminatory measures that restrict global trade. Unlike many international 
arbitration bodies, the twin-tier DSB, comprising of Panels of First Instance (Panel) and 
an Appellate Body (AB), is characterized by a compulsory jurisdiction and typically strict 
time frames. Termed as the ‘central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multi-lateral trading system’, the DSB seeks to ensure effective implementation of the 
principles that underpin the WTO regime.543 It is significant that the adoption of a report 
by DSB cannot be blocked by the losing party,544 and trade-retaliation measures are 
                                                
538 See Andrew T Guzman, ‘Global Governance and the WTO’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law 
Journal 303. 
539 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 
1125. 
540 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1994 (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1140. 
541 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A-4 
to Final Act Embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of the Multi-lateral trade negotiations, (1994) 33 
International Legal Materials 1153. 
542 Articles 1.1, 23 and Appendix 1 of Dispute Settlement Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement (1994)33 International Legal Materials 1226 
(DSU); Article 4.3 of the WTO agreement and Article 11.1 of the SPS Agreement, and Article 14.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. See generally: Peter van den Bosche, ‘World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement in 
1997 (Part I)’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 161; Peter van den Bosche, ‘World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement in 1997 (Part II)’ (1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 479; 
John H. Jackson, ‘Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems’ (1998) 1 Journal of International 
Economic Law 329.  
543 Alberto Alemanno, ‘Judicial enforcement of the WTO Hormones ruling within the European 
Community: Toward EC liability for the non-implementation of WTO Dispute Settlement decisions?’ 
(2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 541, 543. 
544 The initial report by a panel is adopted within 20-60 days of it circulation among Members, unless an 
appeal is pending or it is decided by consensus not to adopt the report, Article 16, DSU.  
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automatically made available in cases of non-compliance.545 The DSB is widely 
recognized to have played a powerful and effective role in strengthening the trade regime 
into a ubiquitous and powerful instrument of global governance.546 Though, traditionally a 
focus on international trade negotiations and dispute resolution is the main avenue for 
understanding the global trade regime as an instrument of global governance, recent work 
on the functioning of expert committees within the WTO regime has revealed another 
important site where global rulemaking affects Members regulation.547 The work of the 
Codex Alimentarius, TBT and SPS Committees in the relevant global rule-making for 
GMOs is examined in a subsequent section to understand their effects on public 
participation in GMO regulation. The current section identifies the textual and interpreted 
principles in the aforesaid agreements, which are relevant to the protection of 
environmental and health concerns even while principles of free trade are effectuated. 
Members can pursue a range of policy concerns, enumerated in the general 
exceptions of GATT, 1994 as long as they are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiably 
discriminatory manner.548 These exceptions include measures ‘necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health’,549 ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’550 and ‘necessary to protect public morals’.551 These exceptions are 
applied in conjunction with a number of related obligations in the chapeau of the Article, 
to ensure the use of such exceptions does not amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between like goods or circumstances, and is not a disguised restriction on 
international trade.552  
The general exceptions are examined in a WTO tribunal only if the respondent 
invokes it as a defence against a complaint, and is subsequent to a demonstration by the 
complainant that there is a prima facie violation of a trade obligation. The respondent, in 
                                                
545 See for more, Robert E. Hudec, ‘Free trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The future of World Trade 
Organisation’ (2002) 1 World Trade Review 211. 
546 See, Jide O Nzelibe, ‘Interest groups, Power Politics and the Risks of WTO mission creep’ (2004) 28 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 89, 90. 
547 Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott, ‘The hidden world of WTO Governance’ (2009) 20 European Journal of 
International Law 575. 
548 A combination of Articles I, III and XI GATT, seeks to unfetter restrictions on free trade and outlaw 
discrimination of like goods irrespective of national origins. This chapter does not attempt a detailed 
description of the central tenets of the WTO and GATT. Ample literature already deals with these issues that 
constitute an entire field of legal studies as International Trade Law. See, Grant Isaac and William Kerr, 
‘Genetically Modified Organisms and Trade Rules: Identifying Important challenges for the WTO’ (2003) 
26 World Economy 28, 29-32.  
549 Article XX (b) GATT. 
550 Article XX (g) ibid. 
551 Article XX (a) ibid. 
552 Article XX ibid. 
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such situations, can declare that this supposed violation is in pursuance of a defined policy 
purpose falling within a specific exception.553 It is for the defendant to establish that the 
impugned measure falls within the purview of the identified exemption. A plethora of 
lines of enquiries are used by WTO tribunals to ascertain the legality of these measures 
including how two sets of products concerned are ‘like goods’, whether the imported 
goods are treated less favourably than these ‘like goods’, and whether such a treatment is 
necessary and permitted under any provided exceptions.554 A two stage enquiry is 
suggested by the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp/ Turtle - first, a substantive examination to 
determine whether the impugned measure falls within the specific exception.555 Second, 
this is followed by a procedural examination of the manner in which the impugned 
measure is implemented by the Member to ascertain the necessity of the measure, and 
whether there are other measures reasonably available that entail lesser degrees of 
inconsistency with other provisions in GATT.556 ‘Weighing and balancing’ is recognized 
in WTO law scholarship as a prominent judicial technique used for the examination of the 
effect of the impugned measure.557 It involves investigation of three factors, viz., ‘1) the 
contribution of the disputed measure to the country employing it, 2) the importance of the 
common interests or values protected by the measure, and 3) the impact of the measure on 
trade’.558 Interpretations about what measures are ‘necessary’ towards this end have been 
                                                
553 ibid. See further, Frieder Roessler, ‘Appellate Body ruling in China-Publications and Audiovisual 
Products’ (2011) 10 World Trade Review 119, 121. 
554 Benn McGrady, ‘Neccessity exceptions in WTO law: Retreaded tyers, Regulatory purpose and 
Cumulative Regulatory measures’ (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 153; Christopher 
Doyle, ‘Gimme Shelter: The necessary element of GATT Article XX in the context of the China Audio-
visual products case’ (2011) 29 Boston University International Law Journal 143.  
555 WTO Appellate Body Report, US-Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 Oct. 1998. The complaint pertained to certain US restrictions on the import of 
shrimp that were not fished using a turtle excluder device. The Appellate Body recognised that the ‘natural 
resources’ in the exception of ‘conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ in XX (g) GATT include 
endangered species of animals or plants. 
556 ibid. 
557 Veijo Heiskanen, ‘The regulatory philosophy of International Trade Law’ (2004) 38 Journal of World 
Trade 22. 
558 The technique was used in a catena of decisions from Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and Brazil- Retreaded 
Tyers, to clarify the application of the necessity test (Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 Jan. 2001; European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 Apr. 2001; 
Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 20 Aug. 2009). See 
further: Bernard Hoekman and Joel Trachtman, ‘Continued suspense: EC-Hormones and WTO disciplines 
on Discrimination and Domestic Regulation’ (2010) 9 World Trade Review 151, 164: ‘Hudec points out the 
stricter disciplines to justify a measure under one of XX provisions are designed to require Members to 
justify in dispute settlement that the measures are aimed and tailored for non- protectionist objectives… 
These stricter disciplines are enforced by placing a justificatory burden that assumes the occurrence of a 
GATT violation through a presumption of discrimination and possible protectionism.’  
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a matter of considerable judicial attention, and in part constitute a reasonably large field of 
enquiry within WTO jurisprudence called Trade and Environment/Health. 559  
Though the textual difference between ‘necessary to’ in health measures (in XX b) 
and ‘related to’ in conservation efforts (in XX g) are generally important, it becomes 
marginal in the case of international trade rules on GMOs because of the effect of the SPS 
Agreement on both these exceptions. This is because of, first, the principle that GATT 
must give way to specialised agreements like SPS or TBT.560 Second, the dominance of 
the provisions of the SPS Agreement is also effectuated by the decision of the Panel in 
EC-Biotech, an aspect which is discussed in detail in a subsequent section.561 Related 
aspects of judicial interpretations of general exceptions are elaborated in greater detail in a 
subsequent section regarding the relevant exceptions on protection of public morality.562 
The two side agreements of SPS and TBT arose out of the concern that measures 
that prima facie appear to be for protection of the environment or health may in fact be 
disguised protectionism.563 The relative achievement of minimizing obvious 
discriminatory protectionism led to a focus on Members’ regulations that could potentially 
disguise protectionism in the name of safety. Such a situation necessitated additional legal 
instruments to ensure that the DSB do not get inundated with delicate and complicated 
balancing of Members’ regulatory measures that apparently seek to protect human health, 
safety or environment.  
The SPS regime sets forth rights and obligations of Members with respect to any 
measure taken by a Member to protect the health or life of human, animals, or plants that 
                                                
559 See further: Robert Howse and Elisabeth Tuerk, ‘The WTO impact on Internal Regulations – A case 
study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute’ in George Bermann and Petros Mavroidis (eds), Trade and 
Human Health and Safety (Columbia Studies in WTO Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press 2006) 
77.  
560 General Interpretative note to Annex 1 A of the WTO Agreement: ‘In the event of conflict between a 
provision of the GATT and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1 A …the provision of the other 
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.’ 
561 There is a contrary possibility arising from the recent decision of Appellate Body in China-Audiovisuals 
(n 681), examined in the last section of this Chapter. Here, the Appellate Body recognized the possibility of 
the use of Article XX defence in other trade agreements than GATT, thus making these defences possible 
even for a breach of SPS provisions.  
562 Text to nn 684- 690. It is instructive to recount an important remark by some prominent commentators, 
describing the pattern of judicial decisions on these exceptions, as one of strict interpretation in a way that 
trade rules trumps domestic social objectives. See for instance, Steve Charnovitz, ‘An analysis of Pascal 
Lamy’s Proposal on Collective preferences’ (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic Law 449, 467-469; 
Sanford E Gaines, ‘The WTO’s reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on 
Environmental Measures’ (2001) 22 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
739. 
563 Article XX GATT. The chapeau requires that the employment of general exceptions is subject to them 
being not a disguised restriction on international trade. See further, Gabrielle Marceau and Joel Trachtman, 
‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 811. 
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may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade.564 The letter and scheme of the SPS 
Agreement have science - scientific principles, process and evidence - as the yardstick to 
ascertain the legality of national regulatory measures.565 There is a textual recognition of 
the Members’ right to set their own appropriate level of protection, and the regulatory 
measures are sought to be disciplined by requiring them to be based upon a risk 
assessment, with a demonstrable and rational relationship between the risk assessment and 
the measure in question.566 Further, such Member autonomy in setting the appropriate 
level of protection must be consistent across similar products, and cannot be either 
arbitrary or unjustifiably chosen for particular products that may lead to an unjustified 
restriction on international trade.567 
Importantly, the SPS Agreement provides for maintenance of provisional 
measures, if insufficiency of scientific evidence can be demonstrated.568 These provisional 
measures are required to be based on available pertinent information, including 
harmonized global standards in SPS Committees and relevant international organizations, 
as well as from SPS measures of other Members.569 However, Members in the wake of 
such provisional measures are enjoined to seek additional information necessary for a new 
risk assessment to review its provisional measures within a reasonable period of time. It is 
important that the treatment of scientific uncertainty in this provision is generally 
considered weaker than versions of the precautionary principle found in international 
environmental law.570 The Appellate Body in Japan- Apples, emphasized that this 
provision is primarily intended to deal with new risks where little or no reliable evidence 
is available on the subject matter. 571 It underlined that the insufficiency condition is only 
fulfilled if ‘the body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or 
qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as required’.572 Such 
                                                
564 SPS Agreement, Preamble, Article 1.1 and Annex A.1. Pertinently the definition includes prevention or 
restriction of ‘other damage’ from the entry, establishment or spread of pests Article 1.1 (d). 
565 The SPS Agreement requires that any sanitary measure is based on scientific ‘principles’, is not 
maintained ‘without sufficient scientific evidence’ and that a risk assessment procedure is undertaken that 
took into account the existing available information on toxicity and exposure. See Articles 2.2, 3 and 5.1.  
566 Article 5.5 SPS. 
567 ibid. See for more, Jeffery Atik, ‘The weakest link: Demonstrating the inconsistency of “appropriate 
levels of protection” in Australia-Salmon’ (2004) 24 Risk Analysis 483. 
568 Article 5.7 SPS. 
569 ibid. 
570 Applegate (n 384) 51-5.  
571 WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan- Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R, 
AB-2003-4 (2003) adopted 10th Dec. 2003. 
572 ibid para 179. 
 136  
maintenance of provisional restrictions based on insufficiency of scientific is examined in 
more detail in the next section.  
The TBT Agreement is similar in its scheme to achieve a balance between 
regulatory measures and ‘protectionist’ discrimination in the realm of technical 
regulations; albeit with far less emphasis on scientific justification and identification of 
scientific agencies that shall produce standards for harmonization.573 The balancing 
between national regulatory autonomy and checks against protectionism is configured in a 
different manner in the TBT Agreement, whereby technical regulations that are restrictive 
of trade are permitted as long as it is necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective such as 
protection of human health or safety, animal and plant life, or health or protection of the 
environment.574 It contrasts itself with the SPS framework through the absence of a formal 
and strict requirement of risk assessment and a scientific basis.575 There is a process of 
international harmonization of standards envisaged through TBT Committees, and in 
cases where measures fall within both TBT and SPS Agreements the former is expected to 
defer to the latter.576  
The SPS agreement also embodies an ideal to promote global harmonization of 
these regulatory measures, through establishment of scientific standards, guidelines and 
recommendations by certain identified global agencies like Codex Alimentarius.577 Here 
the default expectation is that national measures will adhere to the global standards, and 
any deviation ought to be consistent to the rigours of the scientific principle through a risk 
assessment. SPS discipline is supposed to have heralded a shift to a post-discrimination 
paradigm in international trade law, since it is applicable to all international trade, 
irrespective of GATT’s injunction against discrimination. In other words, unlike GATT 
where a violation of non-discrimination has to be established (for instance in Article XX 
b), SPS requirements of scientific rationality are necessary even without an a priori state 
                                                
573 See Andrew Thomison, ‘A new and controversial mandate for the SPS Agreement: The WTO Panel’s 
Interim report in the EC-Biotech Dispute’ (2007) 32 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 287, 291- 2.  
574 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.  
575 Prior to the Uruguay Round, the TBT Agreement, 1979 was the relevant legislation. It had limited 
effects: wherein, as long as a ‘health regulation was necessary and was not a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or poses a disguised restriction on international trade’ such a measure was 
deemed legitimate; the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 1979 (1979) 18 International Legal 
Materials 1079. 
576 Article 1.5 TBT. See Lang and Scott for more on this aspect of TBT Committees (n 547).  
577 See the Preamble, Article 3 and Annex A3 of SPS. See for an elaboration of this point: Vern Walker, 
‘Keeping the WTO from Becoming the World Trans-science Organization: Scientific Uncertainty, Science 
Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones Dispute’ (1998) 31 Cornell International Law Journal 
251, 272- 277. 
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of discrimination in trade.578 Thus, it is arguable that the ambit and impact of these side 
agreements (especially SPS) have gone far beyond the concerns about protectionism, 
towards an aspiration to universality, uniformity and singular reason to direct national 
regulations. Such disciplines, considered unique even within the trade regime, are 
criticized for having the effect of double-guessing and unduly restraining legitimate 
democratic choices, right at the outset of the regulatory process. 579  
Considerably earlier than the publishing of the panel report in EC- Biotech, 
speculative anticipation of the decision brought much normative attention for the 
appropriate relationships between the SPS and other trade regimes inter se, as well as 
between trade regimes and protection of environment and health.580 Various 
commentators have correctly pointed out that the institutional and other kinds of rigours 
vis-à-vis environmental and health regimes the world over are being tightened due to the 
widening ambit of the SPS agreement.581 Despite a number of earlier decisions, the 
expansion of SPS architecture into national regulatory geographies, over and above the 
other trade principles, clearly manifests itself in EC-Biotech. The panel interpreted SPS 
measures broadly, and held many concerns that would traditionally be considered as an 
environmental issue as SPS measures. These include risks associated with consumption of 
GM pollen or plants by insects or wild animals (as a food risk to animal health), and 
damage to geochemical cycles or internal dynamics of population of species (as ‘other 
damage’ from risks associated with pests).582 Such expansion has been observed to make 
consideration of important factors like public opinion difficult, as also to chill public 
pressure to actively pursue alternative trajectories to controversial technologies; including 
                                                
578 See: Robert Hudec, ‘Science and post-discriminatory WTO law’ (2003) 26 Boston College of 
International and Comparative Law Review 185. See for an argument against this conventional position, 
Hoekman and Trachtman (n 558) 162-164. 
579 Tracey Epps and Andrew James Green, ‘The WTO, Science and the Environment: Moving towards 
consistency’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 285. 
580 See for instance, Scott ‘European regulation of GMOs and WTO (n 213); Winham (n 531); Isaac and 
Kerr (n 548); Mystery Bridgers, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms and the Precautionary Principle: How the 
GMO Dispute before the World Trade Organization could decide the fate of international GMO Regulation’ 
(2004) 22 Temple Environmental Law and Technology Journal 171; Gavin Goh, ‘GM Food labelling and 
the WTO Agreements’ (2004) 13 Review of Community and International Environmental Law 306; Robert 
Neff, ‘The Cartagena Protocol and the WTO: Will the EU Biotech products case leave room for the 
Protocol’ (2005) 16 Fordham Environmental Law Review 261.  
581 See for instance, Christian Joerges and Julius Neyer, ‘Politics, Risk Management, World Trade 
Organization Governance and the Limits of Legalisation’ (2003) 30 Science and Public Policy 219; Joanne 
Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’ in Joseph Weiler 
(ed), The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a common law of International Trade? (Oxford 
University Press 2000) 125. 
582 European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, adopted 21 Nov. 
2006, paras 7.207, 7.292. See further, Lee, ‘EU Regulation’ (n 28) 234-235. 
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limiting the effect public pressure can have on the framing of environmental risk 
regulations.583 
Though the WTO Panel is not expected to engage in a de novo assessment of the 
matter, exigencies of judicial review usually go beyond the matter of veracity of formal 
procedures and the evaluation of the existence of manifest error. The panel often examines 
questions like whether the studies or reports cited by a Member amount to a ‘risk 
assessment’ for the purposes of the SPS Agreement, whether ‘available scientific 
evidence’ is taken into account during the course of the assessment, and even further as to 
whether the scientific evidence that is supporting the impugned measures is sufficient.584 
In all the six cases in which SPS disciplines were discussed till date, WTO tribunals have 
employed a four pronged enquiry:585  
1) identifying the scientific basis upon which the measure was adopted, (through which 
the issue whether the measure in question is an SPS measure is also investigated),  
2) examining the veracity and credibility of the source of the study, including an 
examination whether international guidelines (like CODEX guidelines) and other 
Members’ risk assessments have been taken into account,  
3) an assessment of the coherence and objectivity of the cited scientific study, so as to 
accept it as a risk assessment, and  
4) an assessment whether there is a rational relationship between the findings of the 
scientific study and the SPS measure in question.586  
  
                                                
583 See for an apt elaboration of this point Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any other name…Might be an SPS 
Risk!: Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures Agreement’ 
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 1009. Also see, Thomison (n 572) 307: ‘with its 
demanding requirements for SPS measures and now a broadened mandate, the SPS agreement appears 
increasingly likely to surface on the WTO scene as the premier instrument for attacking disputed health and 
environmental protection measures in the global trade arena’.  
584 See EC- Hormones I (n 445) para 589. See for an examination about the requirement of risk assessment 
is procedural or substantive under the SPS process in this decision: Jacqueline Peel, ‘Risk regulation under 
the WTO SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick?’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 
02/04) http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04 last accessed 19 Oct. 2009.  
585 These are: EC- Hormones I (ibid); WTO Appellate Body Report Australia- Measures Affecting 
Importation of Salmon, WT/ DS18/ AB/ R, AB-1998-5 (1998) adopted 20 Oct. 1998; WTO Appellate Body 
Report Japan- Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc WT/DS76/AB/R, AB-1998-8 (1999) 
adopted 22 Feb. 1999; Japan- Apples  (n 571); EC- Biotech (n 582); Canada/United States– Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC– Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R,WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 
Nov. 2008 (EC-Hormones II). All the decisions appear to have involved various degrees of substantial 
examination of the regulatory measures. See further: Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures as applied in the first three SPS Disputes EC- Hormones, Australia- 
Salmon and Japan Apples’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 641, 644. 
586 See further, Catharina Koops, ‘Suspensions: To be continued, the Consequences of AB Report in 
Hormones II’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 353, 361. 
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The next section examines the relevant findings of the Panel in EC-Biotech to investigate 
the room for public contestations and participation in regulation of technology in WTO 
law. This is pertinent because it involved important interpretations regarding the meaning 
and ambit of ‘scientific uncertainty’ in the regulation of GMOs, and the application of the 
precautionary principle in it. The milieu of dispute, including the facts, circumstances and 
parties in the case, makes its examination directly relevant for our purpose.  
 
5.3 Examining the EC-Biotech decision: Emphasis on ‘sound science’? 
The dispute in EC-Biotech was initiated after a series of complaints about the obstacles to 
the approval of a number of GM agricultural products in EU, which were sought to be 
imported from the USA, Canada and Argentina.587 Howse aptly encapsulates the broad 
context of the EC-Biotech dispute at the WTO:  
 
Not only did the Panel have to take a stand on the limits of science, or technocratic regulatory controls 
to protect against objective risk, but in this regard faced more complex issues than ever addressed 
before by an adjudicating body. The dispute also concerned an extremely charged political issue, partly 
because of inherent ethical sensitivities with regard to foodstuffs, partly due to public skepticism about 
the role of science, and partly due to a common public perception of the complaint as being driven by 
the interests of an untrustworthy industry.588  
 
The panel took almost thirty months to issue its final report, as opposed to the usual 
provision for six months (or at the very most, nine months in exceptional 
circumstances),589 giving a glimpse of the intensity and complexities of the GM debate in 
agriculture.590  
The main issues identified by the panel for adjudication were limited to procedural 
questions. These were: 
a) whether there was a general moratorium on GM products between October 1998 and 
August 2003 in the EC (as it then was called),  
                                                
587 EC-Biotech (n 582). 
588 Robert L Howse and Henrik Horn, ‘European Communities- Measures affecting the approval and 
marketing of Biotech Products’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 49. 
589 Text to n 544. 
590 The complainants are among the four biggest growers of biotech crops. In 2005, the U.S. accounted for 
55% of the global area planted with biotech crops (49.8 million hectares), Argentina 19% (17,2 million 
hectares) and Canada 6% (6,1 million hectares), cited from Clive James, ‘Global status of commercialized 
Biotech/ GM crops: 2006’ (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Acquisitions, ISAAA 
Brief # 35, 2006) <http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/35/pptslides/Brief35slides.pdf> last 
accessed on 26 May 2011. 
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(b) alternatively whether there was a product specific moratorium in the same period, c) 
whether either of these EC measures were illegal, and  
d) whether the 27 impugned Member State safeguard measures against specific products 
earlier approved by the community regime violated the WTO regime.  
 
The last issue was accompanied by a technical question whether specific scientific studies 
that were cited to justify the safeguard measures can be accepted as risk assessments 
within the ambit of the SPS Agreement. Having found the existence of a general 
moratorium on GM products, the panel held all the aforementioned measures to violate 
various provisions of the SPS Agreement. In the face of such violations, the panel found it 
unnecessary to examine violations to the other agreements of the WTO regime arising 
from the same measures. Given the fact that the dispute was about procedural issues, and 
that too pertaining to the earlier regulatory regime, commentators have pointed out that 
the decision invalidating EU and Member State measures have not particularly altered the 
current EU framework (despite initial alarmist commentary).591  
Cheyne identified a number of important issues that are left unresolved by the 
Biotech panel, including the appropriate role of the precautionary principle in WTO law, 
as also the relevance of the doctrine of substantial equivalence in the trade regime (in 
other words whether GMOs and conventional products can be considered like products for 
the purposes of GATT).592 There are a number of pertinent issues in the decision that are 
relevant for an examination of the room WTO rules leave for public contestations and 
participation during regulation of GMOs. First among these is the Panel’s definition of a 
risk assessment, and how such a definition affects the understanding of scientific 






                                                
591 See for a useful treatment of this point, as also for a very good commentary on the panel’s decision: 
Denise Prevost, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: The panel’s findings in the EC- Biotech Products Dispute’ (2007) 
34 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 67. The complainants in any case shied away from substantially 
challenging the EC GMO regulatory regime per se, but concentrated on the delays which the regime 
generated. Canada even argued that the EC would not have erred in any manner if it had adhered to its own 
assessment and approval procedure.  
592 Under Article III GATT and Article 2.1 TBT. Ilona Cheyne, ‘Life after the Biotech Products Dispute’ 
(2008) 10 Environmental Law Review 52, 64. 
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5.3.1 What is a risk assessment? 
The Panel in EC Biotech sought to employ a set of criteria previously set by the AB in 
Australia- Salmon593 to identify the necessary elements of what could be considered a risk 
assessment.594 This identification was necessary for the argument that the impugned 
measures fall within the ambit of SPS measures.595 By setting a high definitional threshold 
to employ this definition, the Panel refused to hold various scientific studies as risk 
assessments. These cited studies could have cast important doubts about the sufficiency of 
scientific knowledge for regulation, and could even negate the assumption of the previous 
risk assessments.  
For instance, it rejected several studies on lacewing larvae which confirmed the 
harmfulness of Bt. toxin residues in GM maize for lacewings (predatory insects that do 
not feed on maize), as they were undertaken under laboratory conditions. The logic of the 
Panel was that in non-laboratory conditions the lacewings would have had a choice 
between Bt-corn fed prey, and prey not raised on genetically modified corn, and if larvae 
chose the latter, the Bt toxin residue would not have shown in the studies.596 This 
reasoning is an extension of the differentiation between laboratory conditions and ‘real-
world’ conditions earlier made by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones I. The Appellate 
Body in this case held that ‘not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating 
under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they usually exist’ 
must be taken into account.597 The use of this distinction between laboratory conditions 
and ‘real world’ conditions by the panel in EC-Biotech is contrary to the legal form and 
intent of its original employment in EC-Hormones I. This was recognizing the possibility 
of risks existing in non-laboratory conditions that might not be visible in laboratory 
conditions. However, such an observation cannot be used to negate the consideration of 
hazards that were identified in laboratory studies, by a counter-claim that hazards 
                                                
593 The three elements considered essential by the Appellate Body in Australia-Salmon were ‘1) identify  the 
diseases [or pests] whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to prevent on its territory, as well 
as the potential biological and economic consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases; 2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases [or pests], as 
well as the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and 3) evaluate the likelihood of 
entry, establishment or spread of these diseases [or pests] according to the SPS measures which might be 
applied’, Australia - Salmon (n 585) para 121. 
594 A combination of Article 2.2 and Annex A (4) of the SPS Agreement expects these measures to be based 
on risk assessments, text to nn 564- 570. 
595 EC - Biotech (n 582) para 7.3040. 
596 EC - Biotech, (ibid) para 7.3098. 
597 EC- Hormones I (n 445) para 187. 
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identified in laboratory conditions cannot be accepted, as they were not tested in ‘real-
world’ conditions.598  
Herwig characterized the rejection of a lacewing study by EC-Biotech Panel as 
counterfactual, since the study could be easily accepted as a risk assessment because it is a 
direct, dose-dependent risk assessment for the specific risk that is likely to be encountered 
under ‘real-world’ circumstances.599 The restrictive manner in which the Panel had gone 
about rejecting laboratory based scientific studies as not being a risk assessment is 
criticized as unrealistic and unnecessarily harsh:  
 
A study that called for further evaluation did not constitute a risk assessment, and neither did a study 
which was designed to help set targets for future studies. A study which made reference to the 
possibility of a risk but made no evaluation of it likewise did not constitute a risk assessment. A 
laboratory based study which suggested possible effect was not sufficient; nor was a study which 
claimed to evaluate the likelihood of spread without differentiating between GM and conventional 
crops. A document which referred to studies and their conclusions but did not actually contain those 
studies did not constitute a risk assessment. Nor was a study which dealt with Bt proteins but was not 
specific to Bt. 176 maize sufficient…However in situations of real uncertainty and where scientific 
studies raise doubts about the validity of assumptions made in previous studies, requiring detailed 
evaluation of likely risks may be overly strict.600  
 
This negation of specific scientific studies was crucial to the whole scheme of the Panel’s 
legal reasoning. Not only did such a rejection remove the scientific basis from the 
impugned measures, a central requirement of legality under the SPS Agreement,601 it also 
negated an assertion that these studies point towards a situation of insufficiency of 
scientific evidence.  
 
                                                
598 However, it is pertinent that the Appellate Body in its final analysis still insisted on a high degree of 
specificity in the scientific studies examining consumption of meat from cattle treated with artificial 
hormones, seeking to establish a general risk of cancer from such consumption, EC-Hormones I (n 445) para 
198. Lee cited Sykes’ reminder of this insistence by the Appellate Body places an insurmountable hurdle to 
regulate risks of this nature, one which cannot be demonstrable through particularized scientific studies. 
This effectively stipulates which risks the members must tolerate and which they may select to avoid. Lee 
opined that notwithstanding the lack of clarity, it is implausible that the Appellate Body wishes to deny even 
the possibility of such Member regulation, (n 28) 216. Notwithstanding the plausible intentions of the 
Appellate Body, Sykes’ characterization of effect of such insistence being not much more than window 
dressing appears apt, given difficulties of inherent scientific incertitudes in such situations. See further: Alan 
Sykes, ‘Domestic regulation, sovereignty and scientific evidence requirements: A pessimistic view’ (2004) 3 
Chicago Journal of International Law 353, 364. 
599 Alexia Herwig, ‘Whither Science in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 823, 837. 
600 Cheyne (n 592) 57. Emphasis added. 
601 SPS Agreement (n. 541). 
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5.3.2 Treatment of ‘insufficiency’ of scientific evidence 
Importantly, the legality of the impugned EU Member State safeguard measures hinged 
upon an evaluation of the sufficiency of scientific evidence that is closely connected to the 
judicial determination of the existence of prior risk assessments. The panel held that the 
mere existence of previous EFSA assessments, and subsequent re-assessments by Member 
States, demonstrated that scientific evidence was no longer insufficient, thus impugning 
the legality of the safeguard measures under Article 5 (7) SPS. 602 Here, the Panel 
employed the logic that an assertion of insufficiency in scientific evidence to make a risk 
assessment cannot be invoked in situations where risk assessments are already carried 
out.603 Such a position is quite oblivious to the fact that insufficient evidence is a 
subjective concept, relative to the Members’ level of protection. New scientific evidence 
or information could sufficiently question central assumptions of prior risk assessments, 
but nevertheless be insufficient to carry out of a new risk assessment, based on the 
Members different level of protection. Further, it is not realistic to expect that an existing 
risk assessment, even for the same level of protection, can only be trumped by definite, 
falsifying evidence and not by preliminary evidence of lesser corroboration.604  
Such an interpretation of insufficiency borders on incomprehension of the inherent 
ambiguities with which scientific enquiries of this nature have to work, particularly during 
the development of radical technologies. Related to the discussions about the treatment of 
scientific uncertainty within expert systems in Chapter 4, is the Panel’s approach of 
categorizing situations of sufficiency and insufficiency as mutually exclusive, as soon as a 
risk assessment exists.  
 
The distinction between the two hinges primarily on whether data allows for applying risk assessment 
methods to determine the risk and not on whether there are scientific doubts regarding the validity of 
the risk assessment method or its underlying theories or on whether preliminary scientific evidence 
suggest a potential hazard. Once a framing of risk is used, in other words, the rationality of decisions 
about hazards is determined by that frame and no longer by any persisting uncertainties.605  
 
                                                
602 EC – Biotech (n 582) paras 7.3260, 7.3273, 7.3286, 7.3300, 7.3314, 7.3327, 7.3341, 7.3356, 7.3369. 
603 ibid. 
604 This position, deducible from a reading of the decision, is further elaborated by the Panel in its 
subsequent letter to the parties explaining the concept of insufficiency: ‘scientific evidence which is at one 
point sufficient for a risk assessment can later become insufficient if new scientific evidence becomes 
available that negates the validity of the existing risk assessment but is itself insufficient to perform a risk 
assessment’. EC-Biotech (n 582) Annex K. 
605 Herwig (n 599) 834. 
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Here the Panel emphasized that a Member can take into account factors which affect 
scientists’ level of confidence in a risk assessment they have already carried out, only in 
determining the measures to be applied for achieving its appropriate level of protection.606 
Herwig correctly identifies the implication of this:  
 
[O]nce scientists consider evidence before them to be a risk assessment, they may absorb uncertainty 
into risk through levels of confidence. But would they also accept that there can be uncertainty which 
cannot be absorbed into a framing of risk? Hardly, because this would call into question their 
conclusion that the evidence before them is a risk assessment – that is, an assessment that really does 
tell us something about the probability of a hazard. 607  
 
She concluded that the dialectical nature of risk as interwoven with uncertainty was 
neglected, thereby over-emphasizing the role of science in risk regulation at the expense 
of normative or ethical elements.608  
Further, the Members’ right to set its own appropriate level of protection 
(recognized in Article 5.5 SPS) comes to the fore. The need to recognize that different 
levels of protection may correspond to different levels of determinacy of insufficiency is 
crucial here. This aspect of difference in level of protection affecting the determination of 
insufficiency was later recognized by the Appellate Body in EC- Hormones II.609 Here it 
was held that scientific evidence which is used to conduct an existing risk assessment may 
be found as insufficient by another Member who sets a higher level of protection. This is 
since the higher level of protection may require analysis of different parameters of hazard, 
affecting the scope and method of the risk assessment.610 However Members’ right to fix 
                                                
606 EC-Biotech (n 582) paras 7.3234–7.3246. 
607 Herwig (n 599) 834. 
608 ibid. ‘To the extent that uncertainty remains intertwined with risk and cannot always be resolved by 
scientific methods, decisions about appropriate regulation of risk must also involve normative or ethical 
judgment’. The panel ‘neglected this by holding that the protection purposes of the regulator were not 
relevant for determining the insufficiency of scientific evidence within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the 
SPS Agreement’.   
609 EC-Hormones II (n 585). 
610 We avoid a detailed discussion regarding the EC-Hormones II judgment, though pertinent findings that 
are relevant for us are referred to at appropriate places. The dispute was brought to DSB by the EC seeking 
suspension of counter measures by U.S. and Canada, originally instituted in retaliation to the continuation of 
SPS measures that were invalidated in EC-Hormones I. In EC-Hormones II, EC unsuccessfully argued 
before the Panel, that the countermeasures were now unauthorized restrictive measures, citing 17 scientific 
studies commissioned by it as the basis of the current continuation of the ban against beef hormones. Upon 
cross appeals, the AB found that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before it, in 
its consultations with scientific experts, misinterpreted Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of SPS, mis-allocated the 
burden, and applied an incorrect standard of review. Given such a Panel report, the AB found it difficult to 
complete the review, and returned the matter to the panel for further consideration. See further, Koops (n 
586); Hoekman & Trachtman (n 558).  
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higher levels of protection is subject to further discipline in the trade regime; where, if in 
one product the level of acceptable risk is kept high, while in another product of similar 
situation, it is kept low, such a situation may be found to be disguised discrimination.611 
The Panel in EC-Biotech identified four requirements which are to be met for a 
Member to use provisional measures under Article 5.7 SPS. These are: 612  
 
a) a demonstration that the relevant scientific information is insufficient, 
b) the provisional measure is based on pertinent available information, 
c) the Member should seek additional information necessary for a more objective risk 
assessment, and  
d) the Member should review the assessment within a reasonable period of time.  
 
Thus, the implication here is that a condition of insufficiency of scientific information is 
not enough for the employment and continuation of such provisional measures. Rather, 
according to the Panel’s interpretation, subsequent research and review within a 
reasonable time-frame has a gate-keeping function for the invocation of these provisions. 
Some commentators have criticized this clubbing of the obligation for further research to 
the right itself as erroneous.613 They point out that tying the right to use measures under 
situations of insufficiency of scientific information to subsequent research and review is 
not textually permitted in the SPS Agreement. Thus they argue that the right to take 
provisional measures is recognized under the Agreement for all cases where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient, and the obligation for further research and review are 
supplementary obligations, whose breach invites the usual sanctioning mechanisms, 
without the denial of the exercise of the original right.614 
                                                
611 This scenario is amply visible in the context of Australia-Salmon decision (n 585). Atik concludes that 
readings of different situations under Article 5.5 SPS, which permit different levels of protection for 
different products, are similar in the way interpretations of like-products dominate the findings of 
discrimination under GATT Art. III, Atik, ‘Weakest link’ (n 567) 489.  Here however, the likeness of the 
situations or products only have to ‘present some common element or elements sufficient to render them 
comparable’, and is very broadly construed, as opposed to the restrictive nature of GATT which requires 
likeness or direct competitiveness or substitutability between products to be established, EC- Hormones II (n 
585). 
612 EC- Biotech (n 582) paras 7.3234-35. These criterion were originally set out by the Appellate Body in 
Japan Varietals (n 585) para 179. 
613 Andrew Lang, ‘Provisional measures under Article 5.7 of the WTO’s agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures: Some criticisms of the Jurisprudence so far’ (2008) 42 Journal of World Trade 
1085. 
614 ibid 1091-95. 
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Further, as mentioned earlier, unlike the AB’s rationale in EC-Hormones II, the 
Panel in EC-Biotech appears to have erred in denying the implicit connections between 
different levels of protection and insufficiency. The applicability of the precautionary 
principle in the SPS Agreement is related to this problematic treatment of insufficiency of 
scientific information, sometimes recognized as a watered-down version of the principle 
itself.615 
 
5.3.3 Applicability of precautionary principle 
There were two possible legal routes of engagement with the principle available to the 
Panel in EC-Biotech viz., first the principle as jus cogens, or an enquiry as to whether the 
principle is part of customary international law, and second the applicability of the 
principle as employed in the Cartagena Protocol. The Panel continued the trend among 
case law in the WTO framework of avoiding the question of the general applicability of 
the precautionary principle. 616 The Panel held that it was unnecessary to give a finding on 
the legal status of the principle as jus cogens, even while acknowledging that if the 
precautionary principle is part of customary international law it must be taken into account 
in the general interpretation of WTO law.617  
Further, the panel avoided the question of employing the precautionary principle as 
expressed in the Cartagena Protocol by holding the Protocol itself as inapplicable to the 
legal context of the dispute, since a number of complainants had not ratified the same.618 
The legal issue identified as key was whether the reference to ‘the parties’ in Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (internationally recognized as 
applicable law) applied only to the disputing parties or alternatively to the whole 
membership of a multilateral treaty. If ‘the parties’ referred to here were merely the 
disputing WTO Members, a second treaty concluded only between some of the disputing 
WTO Members but not the whole WTO membership could be considered in the 
interpretation of the SPS Agreement. Alternatively, while if ‘the parties’ referred to all 
Members of WTO, only treaties with an identity of membership with the WTO 
agreements could be referred as an outside interpretative source within the Convention.  
                                                
615 Applegate (n 384). 
616 EC-Biotech (n 582) para 7.89. This was in line with the Appellate Body’s finding in the EC Hormones II 
that the status of the precautionary principle is an ongoing debate, despite its incorporation in a number of 
international treaties, and it would be imprudent for the Appellate Body to take a position on the same, EC-
Hormones II (n 585) para 121. See for the general trend: Prevost (n 591). 
617 Qua Art. 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, (1969) 8 International Legal 
Materials 679.  
618 EC-Biotech (n 582) paras 7.71,7.72. 
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The Panel held that only treaties concluded between all WTO Members were an 
outside interpretative source and therefore declined to consider the Biosafety Protocol. 
After taking notice of the AB ruling in US- Shrimp that ‘WTO law cannot be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law’, it held that such a drawing from other 
rules of international law was not an obligation but merely a discretionary aid to inform 
and interpret SPS provisions.619 The reasoning used to exclude the Cartagena Protocol, 
including the specific expression of the precautionary principle in it - that such an 
agreement can only be considered as relevant if all the WTO Members have signed and 
ratified the specific environmental agreement, poses grave concerns regarding the 
applicability of multi-lateral environmental agreements.620  
This finding has been criticized also on textual grounds,621 raising difficult issues 
of fragmentation of international law.622 The UN International Law Commission 
expressedly criticized this stand of the Panel, and sought to address this important issue:  
 
Bearing in mind the unlikeliness of a precise congruence in the membership of most important 
multilateral conventions, it would become unlikely that any use of conventional international law could 
be made in the interpretation of such conventions. This would have the ironic effect that the more the 
membership of a multilateral treaty such as the WTO covered agreements expanded, the more those 
treaties would be cut off from the rest of international law. In practice, the result would be the isolation 
of multilateral agreements as ‘islands’ permitting no references inter se in their application.623  
 
For the reasons discussed above, it would appear that the science-based requirements that 
the SPS framework textually demands is sought to be judicially extended not only to other 
trade realms like the TBT Agreement, but also to the environmental realm. 
Notwithstanding the caution the Panel appears to employ by stressing that it has not 
                                                
619 EC-Biotech (ibid) para 7.94. 
620 See Prévost (n 591) 86-93. Further, Article 24 of the Cartagena Protocol stipulates the transboundary 
movements of LMOs between parties and non-parties to be in consistent with the objective of the protocol, 
where parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements with non-parties for this end, 
and also exhorts parties to encourage non-parties to adhere to the substance of the Protocol. 
621 Herwig (n 598) 837, noted the relevance of Article 2(1) (g) of the Vienna Convention, which maintains 
that ‘party’ means a State which has consented to be bound by the Treaty and for which the Treaty is in 
force. Since this ‘says nothing about disputing parties, some of or the whole membership of a multilateral 
treaty’, she asserts that Article 31(3) (c) read in conjunction with this definition merely tells us that the 
international treaty binding even only the disputing parties, but not the whole WTO membership would 
comply with the provisions of the Vienna Convention. 
622 See for instance: Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2003) ch 3-5; Matthew Craven, ‘Unity, diversity and fragmentation of international law’ (2003) 14 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 3. 
623 International Law Commission, 58th Session, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006 para 471. 
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determined ‘whether biotech products in general are safe or not’, the framing of the ambit 
of SPS framework in an expansive way is found to have far reaching and potentially 
debilitating effects on the regulation of environmental risks.624 
As elaborated in the third Chapter, once we recognize the political nature of not 
only risk management but also the normativities employed in the stage of risk analysis, the 
multiple possibilities to characterize the contours of (in)sufficiencies of scientific 
evidence, and their connections to the levels of protection come to the fore. Here, the 
importance of participation to choose between these multiple possibilities is affected by 
the Panel’s interpretation of insufficiency. Further, many critics of the panel decision in 
EC-Biotech highlight the concerns of fragmentation of international law. Whether such a 
concern of fragmentation can be solved singularly through expert consensus is an issue 
that will be addressed in the end of the next section. 
 
5.4 SPS Committees, Codex standards and limits of co-operation 
Traditional foci on DSB interpretations about the legitimate ambit of national regulatory 
sovereignty, and on high profile international trade negotiations are said to hide 
considerable amounts of cooperative governance through the expert committees. Lang and 
Scott suggest a keener focus on (the more than thirty-five) Committees and the emergence 
of interpretive communities that serve to elaborate the (partly) open-ended norms laid 
down in the relevant agreements is necessary. 625 This, they contend, reveals a picture of 
WTO that is more dynamic, cooperative and reflexive than conventional understandings 
of the WTO regime. They emphasize that such a focus on this world of apparently 
mundane activities in the expert committees reveals an administrative infrastructure, 
which produces technocratic consensus towards supervision, monitoring and management 
of at least some important aspects of governance in the trading system.626 
The SPS Committee is intended to provide a regular forum for Members to raise 
related ‘specific trade concerns’ and to monitor harmonization of international standards 
                                                
624 Peele, ‘A GMO by any other name’ (n 583) above, identifies the logic used by the Panel to expand the 
ambit of SPS Agreement beyond the conventional understanding of the realm of the SPS agreements into 
the realm of not only the TBT Agreement, but also of multi-lateral environmental agreements. She 
convincingly argues how the textualist reading of the SPS provisions is not only patently incorrect, but also 
that it has undesirable implications for the development of national and international environmental 
regulatory regimes. For an argument regarding the lack of institutional capacity of WTO process to consider 
non-market values in general, and specifically how EC-Biotech fails to consider cultural factors, see: Layla 
Zurek, ‘The European Communities Biotech Dispute: How the WTO fails to consider cultural factors in the 
GM food debate’ (2006) 42 Texas International Law Journal 345.   
625 Lang and Scott (n 547).  
626 ibid 576. 
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by relevant organizations like Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex).627 Members are 
required to notify their SPS measures in the Committee so that others can raise concerns 
about them. This helps to detect disagreements at an early stage, and may resolve them 
through broader sharing of information, better understanding of each other’s positions and 
building of research capacities. Such a state of better mutual understanding could lead to 
possible withdrawals or adjustments of contentious measures. Decisions in this regard can 
only be taken if no Member formally objects, and commentators feel that the Committee 
has generated greater empathy between Members and a heightened awareness of the needs 
and difficulties of other states.628 Krisch noted the high degree of cooperation and policy 
convergence in SPS measures, whereby postnational rules have been concretized through 
the Committees, and normative expectations aligned towards earlier anticipation, 
avoidance or solution of potential problems.629 He approvingly cited the resolution 
(wholly or partially) of about one third of the 277 specific trade concerns raised from the 
7,500 SPS measures notified to the Committee between 1995 and 2008.630  
However, though committee procedures can possibly minimize conflict situations, 
in situations of apparent incommensurable differences the limits of such cooperation are 
stark. In cases like GMOs or regarding the ambit of the use of precautionary principle, 
these committee spaces are seen to have become sites where existing sharp differences are 
rehearsed, where competition to gain regulatory allies among Members rather than to 
bridge positions is the order of the day.631 Existing differences are seen to be rehearsed in 
some important areas during Codex proceedings (see the next subsection). This is visible 
in the experience of the TBT Committee as well, where EU insistence on labelling has 
been an issue of consistent controversy.632 Steinberg reminds us of the acute possibility of 
committee members strategically providing incomplete or incorrect information, which 
makes existing imbalances in information between Members particularly stark. 633 
                                                
627 See Articles 12, 3.3 and 5.5 of SPS Agreement.  
628 Lang and Scott (n 547) 594. 
629 Nico Krisch, ‘Pluralism in Postnational Risk Regulation: The dispute over GMOs and Trade’ (2010) 1 
Transnational Legal Theory 1, 26. 
630 Cited from Krisch (n 629) fn 139: ‘Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement (6 
Feb 2009) WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/887/Rev.1, paras 25, 66; Overview of all the Specific Trade Concerns (5 
February 2009) WTO Doc G/SPS/GEN/204//Rev.9, paras 8,10; Specific Trade Concerns (6 February 2009) 
G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.9/Add.3’. 
631 Richard H Steinberg, ‘The hidden world of WTO Governance: A reply to Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott 
(2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 1063, 1064. 
632 Krisch (n 629) 27. This Committee is established by Article 13 TBT. 
633 Steinberg (n 631). 
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The SPS Committee is also a site where open-ended norms laid down in the 
Agreement are elaborated; thus the nature of membership becomes important. All WTO 
Members have automatic membership, usually represented by trade diplomats or 
particular ministry specialists. While various intergovernmental bodies are granted 
different types of observer status, importantly non-governmental observers are simply not 
admitted.634 Lang and Scott suggest how these activities of the Committee contribute to 
the emergence of interpretive communities, and such trans-governmental networks need 
not necessarily amplify democratic norms, process or concerns. A further examination of 
the work of Codex Alimentarius Commission, throws better light on this aspect of the 
impediments for the expression of public contestations in and through the functioning of 
expert committees/epistemic communities. 
 
5.4.1 Codex Alimentarius Commission 
An important aspect of the health- environment- trade complex of rules is furthered 
through the functioning of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex).635 Earlier, 
charged with the formulation of international food codes as a voluntary standard setting 
process, in a joint endeavour of the Food Agriculture Organization and the World Health 
Organization, Codex pre-dates the WTO agreements by more than three decades.636 
However, the role and functions of the Commission have considerably transformed since 
the incorporation of its work within the ambit of the SPS, as one of the five international 
standards bodies whose standards could legitimate expectations of either compliance or 
exceptions to free trade rules under it.637  
There is a twofold quasi-delegation of the mandate of the SPS Agreement, first to 
harmonize and develop uniform standards, and second to monitor and discuss the 
deviations from these standards by Members, in a kind of a peer review process. Any 
                                                
634 Standard setting bodies like Codex and World organization for Animal Health, and a number of 
intergovernmental bodies like UNCTAD, WB, IMF and FAO are granted permanent observer status, while 
other bodies like EFTA, OECD and ACP have been granted ad-hoc status, Lang and Scott (n 547) fns 70, 
71. 
635 Article 1 (a) Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Commission Procedural Manual 3 (14th 
edn, Codex Alimentarius Commission 2004) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/ProcManuals/Manual14e.pdf> last 
accessed 21 November 2011. Article 1 states the purpose of the constitution of the Joint FAO/WHO Joint 
Food Standards Program.  
636 The scientific assessment and consensus building of this commission consists of various horizontal 
practice specific standards including ones on hygiene and manufacturing, limits on pesticide residues in 
food, as well as commodity specific standards, like in packaging and processing. See for more on the 
Commission: WHO/FAO, Understanding the Codex Alimentarius (FAO 2005) 
<www.fao.org/docrep/008/y7867e/y7867e/y7867e00.htm> last accessed 21 November 2011. 
637 Article 3 read with Annex A. 3 (a) SPS. The other bodies include the World Organization for Animal 
Health, and the International Plant protection Convention. 
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deviation from the recommendations of Codex requires a justification by Members 
through a risk assessment involving ‘sufficient scientific evidence’.638 The DSB has also 
used Codex standards in disputes relating to TBT, for instance the compatibility of an EC 
measure with Article 2.4 of TBT was evaluated by reference to a 1978 Codex standard in 
EC Sardines.639  
This reliance on an international body, which was till then relatively obscure, 
provided the WTO architecture with a universalizing normative authority of scientific 
expertise in its goal of rationalizing food safety regulation throughout the globe; 
notwithstanding possibilities of significantly divergent risk constructions among 
Members. The inclusion of Codex within SPS facilitated a scientific universalism through 
risk analysis for the WTO regime, since there is a default obligation that Members will 
rely on the standards set by Codex in their SPS measures. Though deviations from Codex 
standards are textually permitted as long as they are intended to achieve a higher level of 
protection, the Panel’s decision in EC-Biotech reminds us of the considerable difficulties 
in employing them. Commentators have identified fundamental ways in which this 
recognition by the WTO regime has changed Codex, as if there is a new body that is doing 
its work.640 Recent guidelines show an inclination to issue meta-guidelines, while prior to 
the mid nineties its standards were relatively narrow in scope, dealing with one procedure 
or even one product at a time. Publication of a set of procedures and principles related to 
risk analysis of goods in general, and risk analysis of foods derived from modern 
biotechnology would have been considered too far-fetched before the Authority was 
placed within the network of free trade policy actors.641  
The standards formulated within Codex were entirely voluntary before the grant of 
coercive authority to these standards by giving incentives in the WTO trading regime for 
Members to base their regulations on them. The shift from a strictly voluntary 
organization to a global agency with quasi-legal authority is said to have transformed the 
body in important ways. As mentioned earlier, recognition of Codex within the WTO 
regime has coincided with the movement from a voluntary scientific standard setting 
agency to a particular emphasis on probabilistic processes based on risk analysis. Codex 
                                                
638 Articles 3.2 and 5 of SPS. 
639 WTO Panel Report European Communities– Trade description of Sardines WT/DS231/Panel/R adopted 
29 May 2002 and WTO Appellate Body Report WT/DS231/AB/R adopted 26 Sep. 2002.  
640 Sarah Poli, ‘The European Community and the adoption of International Food Standards within the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 613. She termed Codex ‘as a satellite 
organization of the WTO’, 615. 
641 ibid. 
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itself recognized that this new status required several important changes in its own 
practices to foster a harmonized approach through making it ‘consistent with science-
based risk assessment’.642 Winnickoff and Bushey recall how employment of risk analysis 
in Codex, from a probabilistic analytical technique that was not very frequently used, 
transformed itself to the very grammar of decision-making of Codex.643 The point they 
make is one of co-production of normativity, where the trading regime by claiming to 
adopt pre-existing science-based standards at the international level, was in fact lending its 
legal and executive power in the WTO legal regime to transform the Codex into a global 
agency, and necessitating it to generate such standards. The mandate for, and the self-
imagination of risk analysis, transformed the agency in its development of new norms and 
practices for management of knowledge, expertise and evidence in regulatory decision 
making, and in turn gave the trading regime a claim to technical neutrality, universal 
normativity and legitimacy.644  
The large scale employment of risk analysis is said to have supplanted other 
potential frameworks of mediating environmental, economic, and other potential factors in 
food safety regulation, for instance the virtual obliteration of any mention of the 
precautionary principle in both SPS and Codex frameworks.645 Another instance of this 
marginalization regards the use of ‘other legitimate factors’ in the Codex framework. A 
general decision of Codex in 1995 had recognized that the Commission ought to regard 
‘other legitimate factors’ relevant for the protection of consumers’ health and fair 
practices in food trade, in appropriate circumstances.646 Winnickoff and Bushey describe 
the gradual obliteration of ‘other legitimate factors’ through the relentless and singular 
focus on standardization of risk analysis measures.647  
Codex proceedings are said to rehearse and play out pre-existing sharp policy 
differences, in a manner similar to the experience in SPS and TBT Committees mentioned 
in the previous subsection. Livermore discusses several characteristics that make robust 
                                                
642 David E Winickoff and Douglas M Bushey, ‘Science and Power in Global Food regulation: The rise of 
the Codex Alimentarius’ (2010) 35 Science, Technology &Human Values 356, 364. 
643 ibid. 
644 ibid 360. 
645 The terminological use of precaution was a major bone of contention for a decade during the formulation 
of the Principles and Guidelines for Microbiological Risk Management, resulting in a complete absence of 
the term in the final adoption. See: Report of the 38th Session of the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme ALINORM 07/30/13; Report of the 30th Session of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission. Rome: Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program ALINORM 
07/30/REP. 
646 See further, Codex Alimentarius Commission Procedural Manual (16th edn, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 2006).  
647 Winnickoff and Bushey (n 642) 361. 
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deliberation difficult within Codex, including large inequalities among participants, few 
procedural protections for minority positions, and over-representation of industry and state 
interests. The shift from the prior voluntary phase has aggravated the effects of these 
inequalities due to the significantly higher stakes in the WTO regime, including legal and 
economic (dis)incentives for non-compliance.648 Poli describes how the differences 
between the EU and the US in three issues are played out in Codex, viz., the role of the 
precautionary principle in risk management decisions, the role of factors other than 
science in Codex decision making, as well as the need to label and impose traceability 
requirements for food derived from biotechnology.649  
Commentators note an increased emphasis on constructing scientific consensus 
through a conscious avoidance of any public acknowledgement of expert disagreement in 
the Codex, including an active mobilization of efforts by Codex to prevent votes in such 
cases.650 Furthermore, voting has been reportedly avoided to such an extent that 
controversial issues have been left at the draft stage for considerable number of years to 
avoid bringing it before a regulatory committee where it would inevitably result in a vote. 
651 A publicized deliberation of differences in technical findings in the committee have 
been frowned upon, where the secretariat is reported to have insisted that ‘you cannot vote 
in science; you can only disagree’.652 The change in emphasis, here, is from recognition of 
disagreement in science and its reporting, to contriving to resolve such disagreement 
through institutionalized negotiation, which will strive to reach middle grounds, without 
an explicit recognition of the controversies inherent in reaching a traditional 
understanding of scientific consensus.653  
The ‘behind the scenes’ generation of an expert consensus on standards by both 
Codex and the SPS Committee (described in the previous section) without necessarily 
                                                
648 Michael A Livermore, ‘Authority and legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional 
differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 766, 769-771. 
However, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones I had underlined the need to be prudent about the mandatory 
effect of such international expert standards, and to take a flexible approach of ‘based on’ these standards as 
opposed to ‘confirm with’ these standards, (n 445) para 165. Further, the Appellate Body in US- Sardines 
suggested these standards as a ‘basis’ or starting point rather than being the substantive end point, (n. 639) 
para 275. However, there is no reversal of burden of proof in such cases of failure to comply. See further: 
Lee, ‘Ambiguity and Hierarchy’ (n 167) 233.  
649 Poli (n 640) 616-629. 
650 Lang and Scott (n 547). 
651 ibid. 
652 Winnickof and Bushey (n 642) 370. They substantiated this concern with another illustration of voting. 
In the case of Emmental Cheese label in 2007, a decision was apparently ‘all but sealed’, apart from a single 
dissent. However, when it was put through voting, it had a quarter of members voting against the decision. 
This, the authors underlined, shows that in many cases of apparent consensus in technical decisions, 
considerable number of experts might vote against it, if a counter proposal is seconded.  
653 ibid 371. 
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resolving outstanding public issues is significant here; it becomes extremely crucial with 
the enforceability of these standards by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.654 Lang and 
Scott question the legitimacy of the managerialism of transnational experts, seen in the 
activities of these Committees, dominating Members’ regulation of health and 
environment.655 They discuss the implications of Weiler’s work regarding the creation of a 
relatively close-knit community of trade negotiators and governmental officials within 
GATT/WTO system, who share a defined ‘ethos’, a sense of common purpose, normative 
commitments and common ways of defining and analyzing problems.656 In this context 
they recall the concerns expressed about the side-lining of existing international 
institutions and states in such kind of technocratic governance by trans-governmental 
expert networks.657 Domination of such expert networks is criticised to be often ‘not 
accountable to governments or parliaments back home’.658 The concern of the democratic 
deficit, also seen in EU institutions, is amplified in expert networks that seek to position 
their mode of governance as a functional, problem-oriented process of deformalization, 
whereby the traditional political processes are hollowed out. In such circumstances, overt 
political contestations become subsumed in the discourse of expert cooperation, where 
‘struggles over global governance are to a certain extent …fought through the debates 
waged within and between various scientific and professional disciplines and their 
universalizing discourses’.659 It is conceivable that concerns of fragmentation can be 
resolved in a way that the transnational expert consensus can be arrived at, without 
attempting to address the concerns behind the divergent normative approaches to 
development and use of technologies that might fuel public contestations about specific 
technologies. Thus, even when systems of standards are in harmony with each other, if 
they are discordant with widespread citizen opposition in Member States, expert 
harmonization can only work up to a certain point in practice, and means very little in 
principle. The International Law Commission acknowledged this as such, when it 
recognized that fragmentation can often be caused by normative conflicts, expressions of 
                                                
654 Text to nn 638- 639. 
655 Lang and Scott (n 547) 601- 605, fns 128, 138. 
656 Cited from Joseph Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the internal 
and external legitimacy of WTO dispute settlement’ in Roger Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subramanian, 
and Merico Beriglia Zampetti (eds), Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The multilateral trading system at the 
millennium (Brookings 2001) 334. 
657 Lang and Scott, (n 547) 604. 
658 ibid. They cited the influential article of Julia Black, ‘Constructing and contesting legitimacy and 
accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 137. 
659 Sol Picciotto, ‘Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of 
Neo-liberalism’ (1997) 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1014. 
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diverging preferences, and values rather than merely technical mistakes and ‘require a 
legislative, not a legal technical response’.660  
Taking stock, global rules that define the permissible ambit of EU rulemaking 
appear to be dominated by a certain claim to scientific normativity. We have seen the 
supersession of the WTO regime over all others, and SPS over other Agreements within 
the trade regime, partly caused by the judgment of the panel in EC Biotech. Such a 
preference for the SPS Agreement (that emphasizes science as its yardstick) is contributed 
by the lack of an international tribunal within postnational environmental regimes, since it 
could have given rise to the possibility that such tribunals would attempt to ‘insist on 
determining its relationship with the outside’.661 Further, it was also suggested that even 
within the environmental regime, a technocratic understanding and implementation of the 
precautionary principle under the Cartagena protocol, in any case, would have only made 
an incremental difference. Following the discussion in Chapter 4, if the trigger for the 
principle is held by techno-scientific communities, then public contestations about 
technological trajectories might not be effectively incorporated into public decision-
making.662  
An insistence in the SPS regime on classical risk parameters, the problems of 
which were discussed in Chapter 3, is an inappropriate employment of scientific discourse 
since it is unrealistic in a context of emerging scientific knowledge and systemic 
incertitudes. Given the fact that in such situations, preliminary scientific studies that raise 
fundamental concerns about the assumptions of an existing scientific assessment cannot 
provide definite falsifying evidence, these closures through classical risk parameters are 
neither a reassurance that is respectful of public concerns, nor do they have a handle on 
how scientific discourses, enquiries and advances operate. Surveying the use of science 
during WTO dispute settlement, Herwig concluded that law can enhance its authority and 
epistemic validity through scientific evidence, but only if it recognizes limitations of 
science’s epistemic and normative authority.663 She emphasizes that law has to approach 
science as contested knowledge and risk regulation as political decision-making, leading 
inevitably to more indeterminate solutions to transnational legal conflicts. Connected to 
the discussion in Chapter 3, she observed: 
 
                                                
660 International Law Commission (n 623) para 484. 
661 Krisch, ‘Pluralism in Postnational Risk Regulation’ (n 629) 12. 
662 Text to nn 477- 485 (Chapter 4). 
663 Herwig (n 599). 
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[I]n risk as a decision-making resource that enables decisions in the face of uncertainty, through a 
certain kind of probabilistic framing of hazards… framing something as risk implies dealing with these 
uncertainties by either integrating them into the risk assessment where the sources of uncertainty are in 
principle known (e.g. through stating the confidence level or error rate of a study) or blending them out 
of the assessment as too speculative and hypothetical pending the generation of further knowledge 
about these uncertainties’.664 
 
According to her, when the notion of risk is primarily understood as a construction, based 
on certain social and scientific conventions and not as a fact, ‘framing an issue as one of 
risk may sometimes coincide with there actually being a risk in the sense of a calculable 
probability of hazard. At other times, it may not.’665 She continued, ‘however, for all its 
emphasis on probability and the possibilities of taking decisions, a contrapuntal 
undercurrent of uncertainty remains when frames of risk are used.’666 
Textual and interpretative readings of SPS provisions, including a strict reading of 
(in)sufficiency of scientific evidence, as well as the determination of the studies which can 
constitute a risk assessment and SPS measure, provide limited room for such a nuanced 
understanding of scientific uncertainty. As discussed in the previous Chapter scientific 
uncertainty is not necessarily exposed through expert disagreements, but rather public 
contestations about existing scientific certainty informed by their everyday experiences 
can lead to gradual recognition of those concerns by some experts, which may later lead to 
minority opinions and disagreements between experts.667  
 
5.5 Windows for engagement with public contestations in the SPS 
Agreement 
In a strictly formal sense, there is a window of opportunity to bring public opinion to the 
fore in the WTO legal process through submission of amicus briefs that may be put on 
record at the DSB, subject to judicial discretion.668 Here, there is a limited amount of 
accommodation within WTO law in terms of Members’ ability to be responsive to public 
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667 Text to n 418. 
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opinion,669 albeit one which is severely limited by the lack of clear procedures, as well as 
by the difficulties faced by non-parties in acquiring relevant information about the case.670 
The DSB, in disputes involving the provisions of SPS, has only recognized the 
importance of considering public opinions and concerns at the stage of risk management, 
but not regarding how risk assessment is framed. Foster notes how the DSB has 
consistently interpreted that public appreciation of the magnitude of risk could be 
recognized in risk management, through a combination of Articles 3.3, 5.5 and 5.6 SPS (to 
set appropriate levels of protection in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor a disguised 
restriction on international trade).671 However important elements of risk assessment, viz., 
determining the sufficiency of available scientific evidence, the scientific principles 
appropriate in a technical enquiry, how to base measures on these principles, and how risk 
assessments and provisional measures are to be framed, are held as processes in which 
public opinion is of no relevance. She argues that in cases of serious scientific uncertainty, 
a Member should be able to defend an SPS measures on the basis that its population 
simply does not want to undertake a particular risk. She emphasizes that though it may 
only be on the rarest of occasions where SPS measures are adopted with entirely pure 
motives, but in those exceptional cases it is necessary to interpret the SPS Agreement in a 
way that will accommodate public concerns about an uncertain risk as a legitimate 
factor.672 Given the technocratic understanding of the constitution of risk, as a product of 
magnitude and probability, she argues that there is a role for subjective assessment of 
magnitude through incorporation of public opinion, making public opinion an inherent 
part of risk assessment.673 Thus public fears, if demonstrated to exist, can be a reason for 
not only the maintenance of higher levels of protection, but also inconsistencies in levels 
of protection between goods that are considered similar, apropos the WTO disciplines of 
                                                
669 See Joanne Scott, ‘European regulation of GMOs: Thinking about Judicial Review in the WTO’ (2004) 
57 Current Legal Problems 140; she terms Members’ ability to be responsive as considerable, perhaps in 
reflection of the history of the lack of inclusion of non-state actors in transnational tribunals.  
670 See, Amicus Brief in EC–Biotech jointly filed by the Center for International Environmental Law, 
Friends of the Earth – United States, Defenders of Wildlife, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy and 
Organic Consumers Association – United States,  (1 June 2004) <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ 
WTOBiotech_AmicusCuriaeBrief_June04.pdf> last accessed 12 Jan. 2012, fn 3. 
671 Caroline E Foster, ‘Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the WTO agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 427, 431. cf, Tracey Epps, 
‘Reconciling Public Opinion and WTO rules under the SPS Agreement’ (2008) 7 World Trade Review 359, 
383-385. 
672 Foster (671) 432. 
673 This is in line with the submissions of five renowned social scientists in the second amicus brief to the 
WTO Panel in EC Biotech: Amicus Curiae Brief, submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel of the World 
Trade Organization in the case of EC: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(Lawrence Busch and others 30 April 2004).  
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rationality and proportionality. The acceptability of inconsistency in levels of protection 
between like-goods is suggested by the Appellate Body in EC Hormones I, when it held 
that it would be absurd to accept an insistence on similar levels of protection for beef 
developed with natural and synthetic hormones.674  
The tension between international expert standards and appropriate levels of 
protection of a Member was identified in the previous section as opening legal spaces that 
could accommodate public contestations about technology. Public demands for higher 
levels of protection could pave the way for deviation from international expert standards, 
when these demands trigger further expert investigations and inquiry in risk analysis. The 
Appellate Body in EC-Hormones I appears to entertain possibilities of legality of concerns 
that are outside the strict sense of expert considerations in risk assessment. It exhorted the 
Panel ‘to bear in mind that responsible, representative governments commonly act from 
perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks are irreversible, e.g., life terminating, 
damage to human health are concerned’.675 Though these remarks are contrary to the 
reality of the final findings of the Appellate Body,676 it opens a window of opportunity for 
public estimations of risk that are different from that of techno-scientific communities to 
be taken into consideration during adjudication of the legality of Members’ measures. 
This opportunity for wider publics to participate can include public perceptions regarding 
the magnitude of hazard, its linkages to public preferences for certain risk frames over 
others. Such a possibility, thus, connects Members’ textual right to choose their own level 
of protection to public opinion and political pressure. Thus one can identify a possibility, 
at least theoretical, of construing an opportunity to bring considerations of public concerns 
and opinion in risk inquisitions (at least in categories publicly considered to be serious and 
irreversible) even if an existing international expert consensus may have suggested 
otherwise. Pursuit of higher levels of protection can thus require scientific studies, and 
even identification of scientific ambiguity and ignorance.  
Though textually all that is required by the trade regime is a rational relationship 
between findings of the risk analysis and the ultimate measure, the restricted ambit of 
which studies can constitute a risk analysis in the EC-Biotech decision, provides 
considerable challenges to the realization of this window for Members’ regulation to 
                                                
674 EC Hormones I (n 445) para 187. 
675 ibid para 187.  
676 ibid para 253. It found fault with the specific minority opinion for a perceived lack of specificity, a mere 
suggestivity, and the lack of direct relationship to the identified risk.  Joanne Scott’s comment that the AB’s 
bite was more muted than its bark is apposite, especially since there was a finding that the specific measure 
could not have been based on a risk assessment, Scott, ‘European Regulation of GMOs’ (n 669) 139. 
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incorporate public contestations about expert characterizations. Related to this is the EC-
Biotech Panel’s problematic treatment of the term ‘insufficiency of scientific evidence’, 
that appears oblivious of differing conditions of insufficiency that correspond to different 
levels of protection (mentioned in an earlier section). This finding is however 
contradictory to the relevant interpretations of the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones II, 
which recognizes the necessity to conceptually link ‘insufficiency of evidence’ to ‘levels 
of protection’. Coupled with the insistence that qualitative analysis would suffice as risk 
assessment in EC-Hormones I (mentioned in the previous two paragraphs), there is a slim 
chance for a meaningful window for public opinion, in SPS frameworks, through 
recognizing public contestations about existing expert ascertainment, influencing 
identification of an appropriate level of protection.677 However, for the realization of such 
a possibility, explicit, meaningful and institutionalized deliberative exercises during the 
framing of risk assessment are necessary. Through such exercises Members may be able 
to attempt regulatory innovations to find different means to coalesce expert and lay 
concerns in the characterization of an appropriate level of protection.  
 
5.6 Room for protection of public morality in the WTO regime  
Conceptually separable, though intricately connected, is the avenue for protection of 
public morals during the regulation of GMOs within WTO rules on global trade. More 
than a decade ago, Pauwelyn identified a pertinent question about overlapping objectives 
of a Member’s measures that is still relevant to us here:  
 
In all the three cases involving SPS (before EC-Biotech) the parties agreed it was a health measure, but 
what happens if the contention is that, say, the measure is only ten percent health, and the rest is 
consumer anxiety or protection of moral?...or the same is not about protection of health at all? (sic) 678  
 
Deviations from the principles of non-discrimination for protection of public morals, 
provided in GATT XX (a), are part of general exceptions that allow Members to use 
measures that violate GATT obligations in order to pursue certain national policy 
objectives.679 Marwell identified a number of reasons for a heightened attention to the 
trade-morality interphase in recent years, including an increased cultural heterogeneity in 
                                                
677 Such a hope is also noticed in Emily Reid and Jenny Steele, ‘Free trade: What is it good for? 
Globalization, Deregulation, and Public Opinion’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 11. 
678 Pauwelyn (n 585) 644. Italicized words are added as a clarification for the reader. 
679 Text to nn 549- 562. 
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the membership of the WTO and the heightened ‘disciplining’ of environmental, health 
and other related regulation by the AB.680 He identified an absence of judicial elaboration 
as a contributing factor for Members to recast regulations that might fall foul of the SPS 
Agreement under the public morals exception. The trade-morality interphase was 
examined by a trade tribunal only in two cases (US- Gambling and China-Audiovisuals) in 
the last fifty years.681 The Panel in EC-Biotech recognized that a single measure can be 
considered and justified under different Agreements so that despite violations of the SPS 
Agreement as a health measure, it could still be justified under GATT Article XX (a) as a 
measure to protect public morals.682 Such a position is again recognized by the Panel and 
AB in China-Audiovisuals, where the public morals exception was found to be a possible 
defence against violations to China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO.683 
The WTO legality of measures that is claimed to fall under the exceptions in 
Article XX is generally evaluated through a two-tier test, and the Member issuing the 
specific measure must demonstrate that it is necessary. Important elements of this judicial 
evaluation were identified in second section of this Chapter. It included a demonstration 
of how the impugned measure was designed to pursue a policy objective within the 
‘defined scope’ of the relevant exception and a ‘necessity test’ to prove the required 
degree of connection between the measure and its objective. Subsequently a good faith 
requirement in the chapeau ought to be met by demonstrating that the measure neither 
arbitrarily discriminates between like conditions/products, nor is a disguised restriction on 
international trade.684 Diebold suggests that each of the below mentioned elements are to 
be met separately for the judicial validation of a measure under these general exceptions:  
 
(i) Is the measure aimed at a policy objective other than a trade restriction? 
                                                
680 Jeremy C Marwell, ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals exception after Gambling’ (2006) 81 
New York University Law Review 802, 808-811. Appendices in the end of this article, list examples of 
regional and bilateral free trade agreements that incorporate public morals clause, as well as countries that 
maintain morals-related trade-restrictive measures. 
681 WTO Panel Report United States- Measures affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (US-Gambling) WT/DS285/R, adopted 10 Nov. 2004, and WTO Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 Apr. 2005; WTO Panel Report China- Measures Affecting Trade Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China- Audio 
Visuals) WT/DS363/R, adopted 20 Mar. 2009, and WTO Appellate Body Report WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 
19 Jan. 2010. 
682 EC-Biotech (n 582) Add.1 to Add. 9, and Corr.1, DSR 2006: III-VIII, 847. 
683 Panel Report, China- Audiovisual (n 681) para 4.112 and Appellate Body Report China- Audiovisual (n 
681) para 23.  
684 See Christoph T. Feddersen, ‘Focusing on substantive law in International Economic relations: The 
Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX (a) and ‘conventional’ rules of interpretation’ (1998) 7 Minnesota 
Journal of Global Trade 75. 
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(ii) Does the objective of the policy at issue fall within the scope of one of the exhaustively listed 
public interests (protection of public morals in this case)?  
(iii) Does trade in the good or service at issue actually pose a risk to or impairment of the 
achievement of the public interest or moral sought?  
(iv) Does the connection between the measure and the policy objective meet the required level? and  
(v) Whether the measure either arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between countries where 
like conditions prevail or constitutes a disguised restriction on trade (good faith requirements of 
the chapeau)? 685 
 
The definition of public morals is a threshold enquiry for the applicability of this defence 
since Members need to demonstrate that specific measures fall within this definition of 
public morals. The Panel in US-Gambling employed an ordinary meaning of public 
morals as denoting ‘standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a 
community or nation’.686 This dispute arose out of a complaint from Antigua regarding 
US measures to curb Antigua-based online gambling services. The respondent invoked the 
defence of protection of public morals, by asserting that organized crime, money 
laundering and underage gambling necessitated restrictions on internet gambling to 
protect public morality. The Panel recognized that Members had some scope to define and 
apply the concept of public moral in their territories, in accordance with their own systems 
and scales of values, given that the content of public morals ‘can vary in time and space 
for members depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, 
ethical, and religious values’.687 Given the scenario that an internationally uniform 
definition of morals may not correspond to local values, protection of national morals 
needs to be delinked from any attempt to find an internationally uniform definition of 
morals. Such an approach is also palpable in the morality exception under Article 27 (2) 
                                                
685 See for more: Nicolas F Diebold, ‘The Morals and Order exceptions in WTO law: Balancing the 
toothless tiger and the undermining mole’ (2007) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 43, 47- 48. 
686 Panel Report US-Gambling (n 681) para 6.465. Though this was in the context of GATS Article XIV (a) 
exception it is similar in scope regarding textual treatment of public morals. Charnovitz, concluded that the 
method of ordinary meaning employed to interpret public moral exception under GATT by the tribunals, in 
light of the measure’s object and purpose, only leads to ambiguous results: Steve Charnovitz, ‘The moral 
exception in trade policy’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law  689, 701, 716. Diebold, in his 
review of authorities on the subject, found that the employment of Article 31, Vienna Convention in terms 
of its ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose, was quickly found to be dismissible, since it 
provides no useful results in the interpretation of public morals. He emphasized it to be ‘at best difficult, but 
likely impossible’. Diebold (n 685) fn 17. 
687 US-Gambling (n 681) para 6.461. However, the Panel found that US measures were not necessary to 
vindicate public morality, which was subsequently overturned by the Appellate Body. Further, the Appellate 
Body found that despite establishment of necessity, the US failed to show that its laws did not discriminate 
against foreign gambling services. See for a succinct account of the facts of the dispute, including the lack of 
compliance by the respondent: Sayera J. Iqbal Qasim, ‘Collective action in the WTO: A “developing 
movement” toward free trade’ (2008) 39 The University of Memphis Law Review 153, 159-167. 
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TRIPS, public morals exception to the protection of freedom of speech under Article 10 
(2) of the ECHR, and the position of UNCTAD and ICTSD that members have 
considerable flexibility to define the situations where morality exceptions can be covered, 
depending upon their conception of public values.688 Both the Panel and the AB in China 
Audiovisuals (the other case in which public morals was used in a WTO tribunal) 
‘assumed’ that all the asserted measures were driven by the need to protect public morals, 
given the absence of any protest from the complainant on this count.689  
The Appellate Body in US-Gambling upheld the Panels employment of the 
definition of public morals, and noted that depending on the facts and circumstances of the 
case the evidence of existence of public morals may be derived from international 
practice, national ordre public and public policy and national legislative history.690 Given 
the dynamic interpretation of the notion of public morals in US-Gambling,691 Marwell 
persuasively argued that Members should be able to define public morals based solely on 
their internal circumstances, pursuant to certain evidentiary requirements, since public 
morals are ‘highly subjective, geographically localized, and diverse across political 
boundaries’.692 The legality of specific regulatory measures in EU GMO regulation, 
through the exception for protection of public values, depends upon the nature of public 
morals that is invoked in the DSB, as well as its purpose and connection to the impugned 
measure. Lee reflected on whether concerns about animal welfare, interfering with nature, 
consumers’ right to know and the distributional impacts of regulation could fall within the 
ambit of public morals here.693 She opined that while it is unlikely that the AB will allow 
the provision to turn into a ‘catch-all’ provision (given the available defences under 
Article XX (b) and (g) GATT), it is not totally inconceivable that ‘a combination of 
                                                
688 UNCTAD/ICTSD, Resource book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005) 379, 
cited from, Diebold (n 685) fn 58. He also discusses the experience of the public policy and ordre public 
exceptions in private international law, 56-57.  cf Mark Wu, ‘Free trade and the Protection of Public Morals: 
An analysis of the newly emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine’, (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International 
Law 215. He opined that various issues need further clarity, including whether the measure asserted as a 
measure of public morals requires universal backing through reference to international state practice or 
endorsement by relevant international organizations, and whether the defence would be judicially viewed 
differently between inward and outward directed measures (231-236).  
689 Further, the Appellate Body in China- Audio Visuals observed that (in the context of another assumption 
of the panel that it deemed unacceptable), assumptions may not always provide a solid foundation upon 
which to rest legal conclusion, detract from a clear enunciation of the relevant WTO law and create 
difficulties for implementation, (n 681) para 213. 
690 Appellate Body Report US-Gambling (n 681) paras 296, 299. 
691 Panel Report US-Gambling (n 681) para 6.461. 
692 Marwell (n 680) 824- 826, 836. 
693 Lee, ‘EU Regulation’ (n 28) 195. 
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argument, information on context, and evidence of public views could be used to 
demonstrate that specific measures aim at protection of public morals’.694  
Significantly, whether the regulatory objective of safety is pursued within the 
ambit of public values of a Member is an important facet of this general exception. 
Reactions of regulators to systemic incertitudes and scientific ignorance can differ 
between Members in accordance with their respective public morals and values. These 
values include the manner in which regulators treat the instability of underlying 
knowledge in the regulation of GMOs and the institutional ethics of risk regulation.695 
Davis succinctly argues that public values that influence these factors of regulation are 
within the subject matter of the general exception of protection of public morals under 
GATT.696 As many sections of this thesis have suggested, there appears to be general 
disaffection in the EU towards the sole reliance on expert constructions of safety through 
classical risk parameters, hinting at a particular moral position regarding the collective 
manner in which society reacts to systemic incertitudes.697  
Given a wide and permissive definition of public morals in US-Gambling, the 
centrality of the WTO tribunal’s role through evaluations of necessity and ‘weighing and 
balancing’ becomes stark. Standards and means of evidence become important to 
ascertain questions like whether trade in a specific good actually impinges protection of 
the relevant public morals and if the impugned measure is the least trade disrupting policy 
alternative available to ensure the specific protection. Any judicial scrutiny as to whether 
an outright ban of a specific transgenic plant is necessary to protect public morals depends 
on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is discernable that questions about the least 
restrictive measure and non-discrimination between like-goods would be intricately 
connected to not only the application of a measure that is purported to protect public 
morals, but even to the nature of the morals that are invoked. Lest excessive application 
and abuse should transform it to a Trojan horse to the WTO system, the means of 
                                                
694 ibid. 
695 Text to nn 801- 821 (Chapter 6). 
696 Gareth Davies, ‘Morality clauses and decision making in situations of scientific uncertainty: The case of 
GMOs’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 249. cf Brownsword (n 15) 204: ‘where there is a level of scientific 
uncertainty that leaves room for legitimate disagreement, those states that prefer to take a risk-averse 
approach are allowed, at least provisionally to do so; on the other hand, where there is little room for 
scientific doubt, members are not to be encouraged to dress up their moral objections as if they are concerns 
about safety. Objecting that one does not want to gamble on GM crop safety is one thing; objecting against 
GM crops…on moral grounds is something else.’ 
697 In conventional terms the range of these options are characterized as permissive, prudential, 
precautionary or restrictive. See further, Adam D. Sheingate, ‘Promotion versus Precaution: The evaluation 
of Biotechnology Policy in the United States’ (2006) 36 British Journal of Political Science 243. 
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evidence to determine the objective and application of any policy measure as a moral 
exception becomes important.698 Though in US-Gambling morality is broadly viewed 
according to a Member’s own systems and scales of value, it is conceivable that 
eventually Members will have to provide concrete evidence that the specific measure 
pursues the objective of protecting domestic public morals. Further, it may need 
demonstration that the specific regulatory measure is in good faith in terms of the 
graveness of the effect, or significant number of people affected; as also regarding the 
necessity of the impugned measure, as opposed to a less trade restrictive measure or 
narrower application.699 Diebold argues that a majority of a Member’s population must 
endorse a particular value for this provision to be applicable.700 He compared his position 
to the proposal of Pascal Lamy (as Commissioner of DG Trade) for a safeguard clause 
related to the clash between trade and collective preferences.701 Lamy advocated a 
position where ‘certain collective choices are binding on a society as a whole and 
transcend individual preference’ and are undertaken through an internal review (through 
widespread consultations) of the collective preference regarding the measure adopted, in 
order to establish whether it was well founded.702 As suggested in the first Chapter, it is 
arguable with statistics, surveys and various heuristic devices that a significant number of 
people in the EU are skeptical of the large scale use of GMOs in agriculture. Though 
numbers could become crucial in a judicial examination, the means of ascertaining any 
view as majoritarian can be challenging in cases where there are deep divisions through 
multiple axes of moral preferences.  
The earlier sections noted a narrow window of possibility in the SPS regime to 
accommodate public participation in risk assessment and management; a regime that 
currently dominates the other Agreements in the risk regulation of GMOs through judicial 
construction. The current section noted the right of WTO Members to initiate regulatory 
measures that seek to protect public morality. How the regulation of research, 
development and use of GMOs falls within the ambit of such protection is subject to 
context and argument. We also noted that this context can include contrasting public 
                                                
698 ‘Effective ex ante mechanisms for controlling moral hazard often entail effective means of monitoring 
the behavior of contracting parties ex post’: Robert Howse, ‘China- Measures affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights’ (2011) 10 World Trade Review 87. 
699 Appellate Body Report US-Gambling (n 681) paras 300-302, 300-311, 317.  
700 Diebold (n 685) 66-67. 
701 ibid. 
702 Pascal Lamy, ‘The emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: Implications for 
Regulating Globalisation’ (15 September 2004) <http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy 
/speeches_ articles/spla242_en.htm> last accessed 12 Jan 2012. 
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values regarding how regulators treat systemic incertitudes and scientific ignorance in the 
regulation of new technology. Since such values could be subjective, it becomes important 
to understand how the public is allowed to participate in the ascertainment of public 
values about GMOs in the EU. A referendum to gauge public opinion for collective 
choices could be part of ascertaining a claim on public values. However, establishing the 
existence of public opinion simpliciter, for or against a policy measure, may not be 
conceptually sufficient to establish public values. How public values about GMOs are 
currently mediated in EU regulation, and whether it includes legal measures to ensure 
participation of publics wider than techno-scientific communities, need further 
elaboration. This is attempted in the following Chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Public Contestations and Pursuit of Public Values 
 
Bioethical debate will have to become more political, and take fuller cognizance of the realities of 
the contemporary world, its technologies and its institutional possibilities in order to deal with the ethical 
fragility of individualist conceptions of informed consent. 703 
 
This Chapter investigates the room for wider public participation in the pursuit of 
public values during EU regulation of the development and use of GMOs. An explicit 
pursuit of public values about both development and use of technology is significant, 
since competing and conflicting values exist not only about consumption but also about 
the development of technologies like GMOs. Hence, it is important that law facilitates the 
characterization and representation of these values during its regulation. The description 
here continues from the discussion in the previous Chapter, where the need for elaboration 
of the manner in which public values are pursued in the EU GMO regulation was noted.  
There are two strategies apparent in the EU regulation of GMOs in its engagement 
with protection of public values. The Irish Council for Bioethics succinctly identified the 
first, viz., protection of the public from harm by progressing in a cautious and stepwise 
manner (through risk regulation), and protecting the ethical autonomy of the consumer to 
choose through adequate labeling and coexistence strategies.704 Labelling laws help 
pursue personal ethical choices of consumers inclined to consume GM products, while 
others averse to them can avoid it. The implications of this labelling framework that seeks 
an ethically neutral structure in law’s engagement with public values about research, 
development and use of GMOs will be examined and elaborated in the next section. It 
recalls the discussion about the general requirement to label GMOs in Chapter 2, and 
further describes requirements for supplementary ethics labeling in situations where 
ethical or religious concerns about specific GMOs are identified. The section notes the 
contradictory and multi-interpretable nature of consumer concerns, and underlines the 
need for further clarity as to which substantive ethical concerns of a consumer can 
conceivably be included under the provision for supplementary ethics labels. It further 
                                                
703 Onora O’Neill, ‘Informed Consent and Genetic Information’ (2001) 32 Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 689,702. 
704 Irish Council of Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops and Food: Threat or Opportunity for Ireland? 
Opinion (Irish Council of Bioethics 2005) 36 <http://www.bioethics.ie/uploads/docs/GM%20Report1.pdf> 
last accessed 21 Dec. 2011. 
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emphasizes the inappropriateness of a technical Authority like EFSA to make judgments 
about these normative aspects.  
Subsequently, the section examines the vision of coexistence measures, for 
creating an ethically neutral platform of segregation through which all forms of 
agriculture can flourish, as an integral part of consumer and producer choice. It identifies 
the conceptual and practical controversies in the coexistence framework that are 
incompatible with this vision of ethical plurality. These controversies include the 
Commission’s insistence on coexistence as a purely economic issue, the difficulties in 
ascertaining and apportioning the burden of putting in place a segregation structure, and 
doubts about the technical (im)possibilities of a fool proof segregation mechanism. They 
raise fear in some quarters that coexistence facilitates large scale GM cultivation, and 
creates a fait accompli of large scale inadvertent mixing of crops. The section further 
emphasizes and elaborates the limitations of the vision of an ethically neutral framework 
through which ethical plurality can flourish. 
Apart from the attempt at creating a neutral framework that respects the ethical 
plurality of consumers, the regulatory regime also uses advice from public bioethics 
committees to identify and reflect on issues of public values related to the regulation of 
science and technology.705 The Deliberate Release Directive underlines the importance of 
respect for ethical principles recognized in Member States, and in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, emphasizes the right of Member States to consider ethical 
aspects during the deliberate release of GMOs.706 The Directive envisages consultations 
with the Commission’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
(EGE), for obtaining advice on ethical issues of a general nature regarding the deliberate 
release or placing on the market of GMOs, either suo motu by the Commission, or at the 
request of the European Parliament, Council, or a Member State.707 It is emphasized that 
such consultations with this expert group on ethics should be without prejudice to the 
competence of Member States regarding ethical issues.708 Provision for consultation of the 
EGE, or any other appropriate body, to obtain advice on ethical issues regarding placing 
GM food or feed on the market is also mandated by the Food and Feed Regulation.709 The 
                                                
705 Prominent advisory bodies on ethical questions relating to science and new technologies include GAEIB 
(Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology), its successor EGE (European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies) as well as various National Bioethics Committees (NBCs). 
706 Recital 8 of the Deliberate Release Dir.  
707 Recital 57 ibid. 
708 Article 29.1 ibid. 
709 Recital 42 of the Food and Feed Reg. 
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remainder of the Chapter identifies the room for public participation in the pursuit of 
related public values opened up by public bioethics committees during the current EU 
regulatory regime of GMOs.  
Towards a sufficient understanding of this second strategy a subsequent section 
highlights the supposed ethical turn in regulation; a turn which seeks to move beyond the 
reliance on ethical assumptions of the techno-scientific community about its own research. 
It further elaborates the conceptual employment of public bioethics in technology 
regulation, and regards the generation of public bioethics advice as part of the public 
sphere. Thus, it underlines the public purpose of public bioethics to identify, characterize 
and represent the full range of values and conflicts regarding regulation of technology. It 
further identifies concerns about the impediment of such public functions during the 
working of expert dominated committees, when they emphasize promotion of technology 
as an imperative starting point of ethical investigation, whereby an important opportunity 
for a public scrutiny of trajectories of technological development is lost.  
A small number of reports from the EGE and Member State Committees have 
examined ethical issues arising from GMOs in agriculture under the current regulatory 
regime. The Chapter then proceeds to examine the advice of three public GMO ethics 
committees published during the current EU regulatory regime in two subsequent 
sections. The attempt here is to analyze their respective approaches regarding the 
characterization of public contestations about technology, identify the important 
recommendations in these three reports, and the openings these might provide for wider 
public participation in EU regulation of GMOs. The advice of the Irish Council for 
Bioethics, the first of the three reports, is found to be indicative of the criticisms of a 
conventional approach to GMO-ethics visible in earlier public bioethics committees. The 
approach of the report is examined in the light of these criticisms, and focuses on the little 
room it leaves for any other ethical concerns outside the heuristic of techno-scientific risk. 
In the subsequent section, the reports of the EGE and the Danish Council of Ethics are 
examined, underlining the positive manner in which earlier criticisms about GMO-ethics 
are taken on board. It identifies the implications of these reports for an appropriate 
characterization and a full blown civic deliberation of public contestations and concerns. 
A specific species of recommendations in the EGE and Danish Council reports, viz., 
environmental impact assessment, utility assessment and technology assessment, are 
highlighted for its potential for facilitating wider deliberation of regulatory values about 
GMOs in the final section. This focus on impact assessment in the section is not intended 
 169  
as a suggested policy solution to implement public participation. It is merely to highlight 
the possibilities of wider participation in regulation that technology assessment exercises 
can potentially offer, as opposed to a strict techno-scientific conceptualization of risk 
regulation. On the whole, the evaluation of the second strategy of public bioethics 
committees in EU regulation of GMOs has two elements. First, whether the generation of 
such advice includes a process of lay participation. Second, irrespective of the 
composition of public bioethics committees, whether the ethical scrutiny and 
recommendations in these reports provide room for participation wider than expert 
communities. Altogether, the Chapter seeks to identify the normative assumptions behind 
reliance on these two aforementioned strategies, and how public participation and public 
contestations about technology are accommodated within them. 
 
 6.1 Pursuit of ethical plurality through labeling and coexistence 
mechanisms 
A prominent strategy for the pursuit of public values in EU regulation of GMOs is 
through the recognition of ethical pluralism, facilitated by labelling laws and coexistence 
strategies to ensure segregation between GM crops and other crops. The legislative 
objective of labelling as a measure to inform and communicate with consumers is 
understood by ethics committees as an integral part of the citizen’s right to know and to 
make informed choices.710 Since consumers may have competing and conflicting ethical 
positions about consuming GMOs, this strategy assumes that the appropriate way forward 
would be to create an effective labelling and segregation mechanism through which a 
plurality of values of consumers and social groups can coexist in a market. This is seen as 
an important strategy within a classical liberal model to ensure individual autonomy, since 
the state is expected not to force particular perceptions of the good life on individuals, 
allowing them to determine their own conceptualizations about such values in situations 
of disagreements.711 Pursuit of consumer autonomy within EU regulation of GMOs is 
                                                
710 Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology, Opinion 5 on Ethical aspects of the 
labelling of foods derived from modern biotechnology (GAEIB 1995) <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-
group-ethics/docs/opinion5_en.pdf> last accessed 21 Dec. 2011.  
711 See for an elaboration of this liberal model of autonomy and ethical plurality: Danish Council of Ethics, 
Utility,Ethics and Belief in connection with the release of Genetically Modified Plants (The Danish Council 
of Ethics 2007) 98-99. Further, three important conditions for a consumer’s choice to be autonomous are 
identified viz., competence (psychological and physical capacities to make autonomous choices), 
authenticity in desires and beliefs (freedom from coercion and constraint), and power to implement these 
beliefs/desires to choices. The existence of alternative choices are found to be necessary for the exercise of 
individual’s power to implement their beliefs, i.e. a choice refusing to buy a particular kind of food cannot 
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facilitated through a general obligation to label GMOs (elaborated in Chapter 2), and 
through supplementary labelling mechanisms mandated for specific cases where ethical or 
religious concerns are conceivable (elaborated later in this section).  
 
With respect to labelling, the preamble to the Food and Feed Regulation provides:  
 
Labelling should include objective information to the effect that a food or feed consists of, contains or 
is produced from GMOs. Clear labelling, irrespective of the detectability of DNA or protein resulting 
from the genetic modification in the final product, meets the demands expressed in numerous surveys by 
a large majority of consumers, facilitates informed choice and precludes potential misleading of 
consumers as regards methods of manufacture or production. In addition, the labelling should give 
information about any characteristic or property which renders a food or feed different from its 
conventional counterpart with respect to composition, nutritional value or nutritional effects, intended 
use of the food or feed and health implications for certain sections of the population, as well as any 
characteristic or property which gives rise to ethical or religious concerns.712 
 
These objectives of the Regulation give fuller expression to the more general statements 
of intent found in the objectives of the Deliberate Release Directive that labelling ought to 
ensure appropriate identification.713 These statements are substantiated through the 
general requirements to label GM products in the Directive and the Regulation.714  
 
6.1.1 Supplementary labels stipulated for ethical concerns 
The Food and Feed Regulation also stipulates an additional label in situations where any 
characteristic or property of a GMO gives rise to ethical or religious concerns. The trigger 
for these supplementary ethics labels is tied to an earlier stage of the regulatory procedure 
viz, the application for authorization to place any GM food or feed on the market. Under 
the Regulation, applications for authorization are expected to be accompanied by a 
reasoned statement that the specific product does not give rise to ethical or religious 
concerns; alternatively the application should be accompanied by plans for supplementary 
                                                                                                                                                   
be meaningful if the only alternate choice to avoidance is having to grow the food. Helen Siipi and Susanne 
Uusitalo, ‘Consumer Autonomy and Availability of Genetically Modified Food’ (2011) 24 Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 147. 
712 Recitals 21, 22 of the Food and Feed Reg. Emphasis added. 
713 Recital 40 of the Deliberate Release Dir.  
714 Article 26 and Annex IV of the Deliberate Release Dir. sets a framework for implementation of labelling 
requirements through Committee mechanisms. Articles 12, 24, 13(1) and 25 (1) of the Food and Feed Reg. 
substantiates them. See for a more detailed description, text to nn 148, 221- 227 (Chapter 2). 
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labels in accordance with the provisions in the Regulation.715  
Supplementary ethics labelling procedures can be initiated in a straightforward 
manner if applicants propose a specialized labelling scheme on their own accord. 
However, it is unclear how the regulatory system can ascertain the veracity of a ‘reasoned 
statement’, in instances where an application avers that a specific ethics label is not 
required due to the absence of any ethical or religious concerns. From the discussion in 
Chapter 2, the reader may remember that the application for authorization is to be assessed 
by EFSA, including the requirements for supplementary labels.716 Here, the technical 
safety Authority is left with little guidance (not to mention legitimacy or competence) to 
decide on the particulars of a reasoned statement of the applicant that a specific transgenic 
product does not give rise to ethical or religious concerns. This factor brings out an 
element of uncertainty to the institution of mandatory labeling that provides 
supplementary information for variegated ethical concerns. The impact of this lacuna on 
how public participation is furthered during the protection of public values depends on the 
nature of values that consumers can legitimately expect these ethics labels to cater to. It is 
therefore necessary to elaborate further on the range of concerns that consumers may 
pursue through a label. 
 The importance of not conflating consumer concerns and citizen values (amply 
emphasized in the work of Mark Sagoff)717 is relevant here, since it might be 
inappropriate and unwise to consider the market, and consumer ethics, as a more secure 
route to efficacious expression of public values than other public channels. However, if it 
is to be used as one of the prominent routes, it is important that consumers receive 
meaningful and accurate information that is reliable and verifiable; although what 
information is meaningful in this context needs further elaboration.718 In a number of 
studies, consumer demands for mandatory labeling were found to be not merely 
expressions of lack of trust in safety evaluations of environment and health characteristics 
                                                
715 Articles 5 (3) (g) and 17 (3) (g) Food and Feed Reg. 
716 Though ‘with assistance from an appropriate food assessment body for safety assessment, or an 
appropriate competent authority for environmental risk assessment, or a community reference laboratory for 
methods of detection and identification’ under Article 6 (3) of the Food and Feed Reg.  
717 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge University Press 1988) 7-10. 
718 See for a technical proposal for rewarding food suppliers for seriously taking ethical concerns of 
consumers into account: Tassos Michalopoulos, Michiel Korthals and Henk Hogeveen, ‘Trading “ethical 
preferences” in the Market: Outline of a politically liberal framework for the ethical characterization of 
food’ (2008) 21 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 3. The proposal pertains to the 
development of the ethical dimension of food production through a labeling mechanism, and focuses on 
ethical characterization of what information is meaningful and most important for this endeavour. 
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of a product.719 These were also found to include an opportunity to register their view 
about the wisdom of food biotechnology - ‘i.e. to support or not support the dissemination 
of food biotechnology, apart from their views about the characteristics of the individual 
product’.720 A general label that informs the process of genetic modification within a 
product might be able to cater to this kind of straightforward concern.  
However, Korthals pointed out that several types of consumer concerns about 
agriculture and food are contradictory and multi-interpretable.721 This underlines the 
dynamic nature of pluralistic consumer concerns, since they are responding to complex 
socio-technological situations and developments. He described how ethical concerns of 
food consumers in Europe often concern substantive issues, as well as issues relating to 
transparency and alienation. First, structural traits of the food chain have become 
important substantive ethical concerns of food consumers.722 For GMOs, these include 
concerns regarding the acceptable level of intervention in nature,723 accentuation of 
distributional issues and increased corporate control of food chains through GM seeds,724 
and the increase in intensive and commercialized agriculture at the expense of de-
intensified and re-localized models associated with peasant or family farming.725 Second, 
ethical concerns related to transparency pertain to the reliability of information related to 
food choices, ‘e.g., that consumers with a preference for organic meat products look for 
different information about the food chain and want different advice than consumers with 
other preferences’.726 Third, ethical concerns of alienation pertain to the widespread 
consumer feeling of disconnection and lack of control in the way food is produced in food 
chains.727  
                                                
719 US FDA Center for Food safety and Applied nutrition, Report on Consumer Focus Groups on 
Biotechnology (Alan S. Levy and Brenda M. Derby ed, Office of Scientific Analysis and Support 2000) 
cited from Douglas Kysar, ‘Preferences for Processes: The process/product distinction and the Regulation of 
consumer choice’ (2004) 118 Harvard Law Review 526, fn 361. Further, Recital 2 of the Food and Feed 
Reg. cites a similar sentiment among ‘numerous surveys by a large majority of consumers’. 
720 ibid (US FDA). 
721 Michiel Korthals, ‘Ethical rooms for maneuver and their prospects vis-à-vis the current ethical food 
policies in Europe’ (2008) 21 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 249. 
722 ibid 258. 
723 The level of intervention in GMOs is seen as qualitatively higher than the conventional breeding 
mechanisms due to the far higher degree of control of agro-ecological conditions in GM agriculture, ibid. 
724 Sometimes, this accentuation is through the technological possibilities offered by GM technology, which 
aids stricter control for implementation of patent provisions. See for an elaboration Danish Council (n 711) 
146- 147. 
725 Rosa Binimelis, ‘Coexistence of plants and Coexistence of framers: Is an individual choice possible?’ 
(2008) 21 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 437, 439. 
726 Korthals (n 721) 258. 
727 ibid: Some consumers simply take this gap for granted, while others may find it troubling and try finding 
out where their food comes from, ‘very often with disappointing results, because they do not get a satisfying 
answer to their query or cannot get any information at all.’ He emphasizes the fundamental connections 
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Over and above a general GM label, it is unclear whether the aforementioned 
range of contradictory and multi-interpretable ethical concerns legally requires 
supplementary labels for each specific ethical concern. However if consumers have to 
meaningfully participate in decisions of public values during their consumption, then this 
range of information needs to be provided on the label. If public contestations about GM 
technology are indeed arising from different intellectual, political and ethical concerns, 
then the earlier identified lacuna regarding the stipulation of supplementary ethics labels 
through EFSA becomes significant. This is since a supplementary ethics label can 
mandate the inclusion of information regarding the technological impact of the product on 
different ethical concerns, for instance about distributional issues or accentuation of 
corporate control that might have different implications in different GM products. Though 
there is no clarity on the substantive contents and limits of ethics in this supplementary 
labelling provision, nor any sociological investigation available, the competence of EFSA 
to make such judgments is suspect.  
 
6.1.2 Coexistence measures 
Stringent upstream segregation of seeds and crops becomes crucial for an effective 
labeling system in agricultural products so as to communicate accurate, verifiable and 
reliable information. Thus, coexistence measures that ensure effective segregation 
(elaborated in Chapter 2) are instrumental for realizing consumer autonomy and 
facilitating a plurality of ethical choices. This subsection examines the difficulties 
regarding realization of the regulatory strategy of protecting public values by pursuing 
ethical pluralism and consumer autonomy, which are sharply visible in the controversies 
around coexistence measures. 
 In an area that is traditionally understood to be largely a matter of Member State 
authority, the Commission’s beginning point for implementing coexistence is found in its 
recommendation that ‘no form of agriculture, be it conventional, organic, or agriculture 
using GMOs, should be excluded in the EU’.728 The vision of coexistence as an important 
platform for ensuring ethical plurality is, however, at sharp variance with the strictly 
                                                                                                                                                   
between the ethical concerns of involvement and participation with the earlier-mentioned substantive 
concerns. 
728 Commission Recommendations 2003 (n 232) Recital 1. Article 26a of the Deliberate Release Dir. 
mentions coexistence as a matter of Member State responsibility, but see text to nn 232-234 (Chapter 2) 
regarding how this subsidiarity authority is sought to be hemmed in by the ‘non-binding recommendations’ 
of the Commission. Further, for the constraints on Member State flexibility through functioning of COEX-
NET, see Lee, ‘Governance of Coexistence’ (n 229) 196-198. 
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economic approach emphasized by the Commission in its first set of recommendations.729 
Lee criticizes the singular emphasis in the Commission’s guidelines on coexistence as an 
economic problem, which negates its importance for the effectuation of ethical 
pluralism.730 Since ‘the narrow economic understanding of coexistence …implies that to 
the extent that presence of GM material’ has marginal market impact, the labeling 
provision will then ‘raise no coexistence issues’.731 The Commission’s insistence that 
coexistence measures are purely economic is inconsistent with an aspiration for ethical 
plurality through labeling and consumer choice. This is because ‘meaningful coexistence 
is absolutely central to the consumer choice rhetoric…since in the absence of 
distinctiveness between the three forms of farming, consumers cannot choose between 
them’.732 In contrast, the Committee of Regions stressed the intrinsic rather than economic 
value of different forms of agriculture, which is far more consonant to an approach based 
on ethical plurality.733 Representations of such intrinsic essence can be found, for instance, 
in the Regulation on Organic production, which recognizes the role of organic agriculture 
not only to cater to consumer demand, but also to deliver an important public good 
beyond the market, like, ‘contributing to protection of the environment and animal 
welfare, as well as to rural development.’734  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the current set of Commission recommendations has 
continued to emphasize that an economic approach is central to EU coexistence 
measures.735 Limitations arising from the Commission’s insistence on a strictly economic 
approach to coexistence make aspirations of an ethically neutral framework less coherent. 
The Commission’s insistence impacts the contours of a ‘neutral framework’, which is 
especially visible with regard to the question of the type of agriculture (conventional, 
organic or GM) that bears the cost of segregation.736 The Commission guidelines required 
farmers introducing a new production type to bear the responsibility for implementation of 
                                                
729 Recital 4, 5 of the Commission Recommendation 2003 (n 232). 
730 Lee, ‘Governance of Coexistence’ (n 229). 
731 ibid 199. 
732 ibid. 
733 Committee of Regions, ‘Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament report on the implementation of national measures 
on the coexistence of Genetically Modified crops with conventional and organic farming’ (2007) OJ C 
57/11. 
734 Organic Reg. (n 229) Recital 1. 
735 See n 236. 
736 Commission recommendations 2003 (n 232) para 2.1.7. With respect to a preference by Member States 
to impose costs on GM farmers, whether or not they were first to farm an area, see: Commission Staff 
Working Document, ‘Annex to the Report on the implementation of national measures on the Coexistence 
of GM crops with conventional and organic farming’ SEC (2006) 313, 16, cited from Lee, ‘Governance of 
Coexistence’ (n 229) fn 68. 
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segregation strategies.737 However, Lee reminds us that the daily grind of ensuring 
coexistence falls on those parties (organic or conventional farmers) that have an interest or 
compulsion to avoid GM material, and not vice versa.738 Such efforts include institution of 
controlling weeds, changing planting regimes, and isolating equipment to ensure effective 
segregation of their crop and produce. In contrast, GM produce is not economically 
affected by the presence of organic or conventional produce.739 Apart from the risk of loss 
of market value for organic or conventional produce, non-GM farmers may have to label 
their produce as containing GMOs in case of contamination; they also have to anticipate 
the burden of avoiding ‘innocent infringement’ of patent rules, in situations of inadvertent 
mixing with a neighbour’s GM crop.740  
 Ethnographic studies among rural farmers in Catalonia highlight local tensions in 
farming communities (between farmers who do not want to plant GM crops, and those 
who do) due to the individualization of ethical and other responsibilities through 
coexistence measures.741 This tension is visible in case of the creation of GM-crop free 
zones in various parts of the EU, and a network of GMO-free regions, whereby various 
local farmer groups and communities (as well as some regional and local governments) 
seek the effectuation of particular ethical world views. They perceive GM crops as a threat 
to other crop productions and ecological sensitivities that are rooted in an ethical model of 
post-productivism or alternative agro-developmental model.742 The Commission 
recommendations recognize that there may be economic and natural conditions, where 
Member States could consider the possibility to exclude GMO cultivation. It insists that 
such exclusion should rest on the demonstration that other measures are not enough to 
achieve sufficient levels of purity.743 
Further, the very idea of a legitimate and economically viable coexistence framework 
is found doubtful by many groups. These doubts relate to differences in the normative 
emphasis and basis of coexistence measures i.e. if they ought to be restricted to an 
                                                
737 ibid (Commission Communication) para 2.1.7.  
738 Lee, ‘Governance of Coexistence’ (n 229) 209. 
739 Article 9 Organic Reg. (n 229), which stipulates that any farm produce that has to be labelled as 
containing GMOs cannot be labelled as organic. 
740 Text to nn 248- 250. See also: Karl Heinz Bablok (n 153) where the Court reaffirmed that honey 
containing traces of pollen from GM plants must be labelled according to the general procedure prescribed 
in the Food and Feed Regulation. 
741 Binimelis (n 725). See also, the examination of the assertions of impossibility of coexistence by the Irish 
Council for Bioethics (n 704) 44-45. 
742 Yann Devos and others, ‘Ethics in the societal debate on Genetically Modified Organisms: A (re)quest 
for sense and sensibility’ (2008) 21 Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29, 42-43. 
743 Commission Coexistence Recommendations 2010 (n 235) Annex 2.4. 
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economic choice model, or they should explicitly recognize other ethical concerns as well. 
Doubts persist about ecological and technical (im)possibilities of crop segregation. This 
includes the identification of appropriate refuge between GM and other crops and realistic 
thresholds to ensure effective prevention of gene flow from one type of agriculture to 
another. The European Environmental Agency conducted a study that showed the 
incidence of pollen mediated gene flow in all the major relevant crops (maize, rape, sugar 
beet) to be very high for spatial isolation, through barrier crops, isolation distances and 
information systems, to work.744 In contrast, another study by the EC-Joint Research 
Centre in the same year concluded that coexistence was feasible with adjustments in the 
current farm practices.745 Binimelis reviewed a series of authors who have highlighted the 
impossibility of coexistence between organic and GM-based agriculture, due to the 
incommensurability of rationale at the technical and conceptual level.746 The difficulties in 
ensuring fool-proof segregation, as also to live with a certain amount of mixing between 
the three forms of agriculture, have brought to focus the controversies of the GM 
thresholds in organic and conventional products. The recent Commission 
Recommendations reveal that zero level of mixing is not even a goal for regulators, 
implicitly accepting that a certain amount of admixture will be a reality, and thus 
assuming that regulating levels of mixing is only important if there is an economic 
impact.747 
The controversies surrounding the acceptable levels of adventitious admixture are 
also related to fears that these would serve as a back-door push for large scale introduction 
of GM crops.748 Thus the notion of coexistence measures in support of consumer 
autonomy and ethical pluralism is fraught with a number of conceptual and practical 
inadequacies. These inadequacies make a vision of public participation in pursuit of public 
values during use of GMOs through consumer choice hollow. In fact, attempts to 
                                                
744 Katie Eastham and Jeremy Sweet, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms: The significance of gene flow 
through pollen transfer’ (Environmental issue report No 28, European Environment Agency 2002) 
<http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2002_28> accessed 14 Oct. 2011. 
745 European Commission, Scenario for co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic 
crops in European agriculture: A synthesis report (Joint Research Centre 2002). 
746 Binimelis (n 725) 259. See further: Laura Ponti, ‘Transgenic crops and sustainable agriculture in the 
European context’ (2005) 25 Bulletin of Science Technology Society 289; Levidow and Boschert, 
‘Coexistence or contradiction?’ (n 240); Kathleen McAfee, ‘Beyond techno-science: Transgenic maize in 
the fight over Mexico’s future’ (2008) 39 Geoforum 148.  
747 Commission Coexistence Recommendations 2010 (n 235) Annex 2.3.2: ‘Member States should consider 
that there may be no need to pursue specific levels of admixture where labelling a crop as GM has no 
economic implications.’ 
748 See for concerns about how large scale cultivation of canola and rape in Canada, soy and maize in the 
US, and soy in Argentina, ended up with difficulties in producing non-GM crops of the same species, n 72. 
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elaborate coexistence measures have brought back unresolved conflicts about values and 
ideals regarding GM crops, rather than effectuate ethical plurality through institutional 
neutrality. They demonstrate the inherent limitations of a strategy to pursue ethical 
pluralism and consumer autonomy to resolve the clash of public values in GMO 
regulation.  
 
6.1.3 Other conceptual limitations of a strategic reliance on consumer autonomy 
The strategy of pursuing consumer autonomy and ethical pluralism by making available 
all types of products may not be able to trump ethical concerns like the protection of 
producer autonomy or the autonomy of suppliers/ processors/ wholesalers/ retailers. 
However, some of these concerns are in conflict with each other. For instance, farmers 
cannot be forced to produce a kind of product for the purpose of making available those 
kinds of products in pursuit of consumer autonomy.  
Indeed, even assuming full realization of autonomy for consumers and producers, 
there may be other overriding public values in the regulation of technology that could take 
precedence. Such concerns, including environmental values, other people’s well being, 
beneficence and social justice, may trump an approach of individualized ethics and 
consumer autonomy. Therefore, this necessitates institutional interventions beyond 
facilitation of consumption choices.749 Ethical issues about wealth can be relevant to 
techno-scientific research. For instance, ethical considerations regarding the collection, 
research and use of plant biodiversity that culminates in GM crops include ensuring 
adequate recognition of the contributions of indigenous communities and traditional 
farmers to that process.750 It is doubtful if citizens, who consider these ethical concerns as 
values of general importance, will be satisfied with merely avoiding the consumption of 
these GM products, as opposed to influencing the ethics of the development of such 
technologies itself. If that is the case, then a vision of an ethically neutral framework 
through which ethical plurality flourishes is an inadequate strategy to mediate 
contestations about public values.  
                                                
749 See further, Siipi and Uusitalo (n 711). 
750 Gripping points in existing codes of conduct for such property issues about agro-biodiversity research in 
general, or of a particular company in particular, could be ethical principles like equity, the inalienability of 
rights of local communities and farmers towards active participation in the research, full disclosure 
regarding the extent and ultimate purpose of the research to these communities, their prior informed consent, 
ensuring integrity of the morality and spirituality of the culture, traditions and relationships of indigenous 
peoples, appropriate restitution of indigenous peoples should any adverse consequences occur from research 
activities, and active support of indigenous research: Johannes M.M. Engels, Hannes Dempewolf and 
Victoria Henson-Appollonio, ‘Ethical considerations in agro-biodiversity research, collecting, and use’ 
(2011) 24 Journal of Agricultural Environmental Ethics 107. 
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The construction of a labeling and coexistence mechanism aimed at ensuring 
ethical plurality through the facilitation of consumer choice to prefer or to avoid 
transgenic products can have some degree of virtue in law’s engagement with public 
contestations about technology, since it provides the consuming publics arenas to 
participate in the regulatory process. However, the aforementioned inherent limitations of 
this approach accentuate the importance of pursuing more participative routes of engaging 
with public values in the regulation of research, development and use of technologies like 
GMOs. 
 
6.2 Pursuit of public values and public bioethics 
The second prominent EU strategy identified in the regulation of GMOs is the use of 
bioethics for deliberating whether the regulation of research, development and use of 
GMOs fall within acceptable markers of public values. Callahan identifies the endeavour 
of bioethics as catering to a need for a more open dialogue between science and society 
towards ascertaining, ‘so far as that is possible, of what is right and wrong, good and bad, 
about the scientific developments and technological deployments’.751  
Use of ethics as a separate component of regulatory decision-making in science 
and technology anticipates the inadequacies in unduly relying on the techno-scientific 
community in the pursuit to make research, development and use of technology 
compatible with corresponding public values. Some commentators link the growing trend 
of constitution of ‘a wide range of commission-like advisory bodies to assure legitimacy 
of political action in ethical questions’, to law’s need to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
regulatory actions, despite intense political divisions and destabilization of the instrument 
of classical risk.752 Here, ethics is seen as an important and decisive semantic form in 
                                                
751 Daniel Callahan, ‘Why America accepted Bioethics’ (1993) 23 Hastings Centre Report 8-9.  
752 Alexander Bogner and Wolfgang Menz, ‘How Politics deals with Expert Dissent: The case of Ethics 
Councils’ (2010) 35 Science, Technology & Human values 888, 894. A standard text traces the emergence 
of bioethics as a ‘term with social currency’ to the early 1970s, when academics predominantly in the field 
of medical ethics, philosophy and law became engaged in the study of ‘the moral dimension- including 
moral vision, decisions, conduct and polities - of the lifesciences and the health care, employing a variety of 
ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting: Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (Oxford 
University Press 1998) 3. Salter and Jones emphasized the growing importance of the field of bioethics by 
using crude quantitative indices like the number of courses, conferences, websites and committees, and 
discussed its growing political utility due to the growth in its advisory role in regulatory frameworks: Brian 
Salter and Mavis Jones, ‘Biobanks and Bioethics: The Politics of Legitimation’ (2005) 12 Journal of 
European Public Policy 710. Dodds and Thomson cite the institution of over ninety National Bioethics 
Committees around the globe as a marker of the public importance attached to bioethical issues: Susan 
Dodds and Colin Thomson, ‘Bioethics and Democracy: Competing roles of National Bioethics 
Organisations’ (2006) 20 Bioethics 326. 
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which governance discourses are conducted in situations where political opposition is not 
framed in terms of left/right but in terms of right/wrong.753 The relevance of public 
bioethics in this context is the moving away from an assumption of a monopolistic 
reliance on the ethical viewpoints generated in the techno-scientific community, and the 
creation of spaces and processes to speak about the development and use of new 
technologies in a structured and democratic way.754 
The Warnock Committee process in the UK is an early marker of law’s need to 
address the dilemmas of conflicting public values brought forth during research, 
development and use of new technologies, like GMOs. It examined the controversies 
about the use of in-vitro fertilization (IVF) in the UK. The Warnock Report recognized 
this fundamental dilemma of liberalism viz., of securing freedom (of science and 
individual) without endangering the foundations of social order, or ‘how to protect the 
foundations of social order without illegitimately curtailing the freedom of the 
individual’.755 In relation to the need to elicit ethical advice, Warnock observed that a 
society without ‘inhibiting limits, especially in the areas with which we have been 
concerned (IVF), would be a society without moral scruple...what is common is that 
people generally want some principles or other to govern the development and use of the 
new techniques’.756  
Biotechnology was the area in which ethics as a component in EU decision-
making in science and technology was first envisaged through the formation of GAEIB 
(Group of Advisers on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology); all the other areas of 
science and technology were later brought within the ambit of GAEIB.757 GAEIB’s 
successor, the EGE, recognized the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
emphasizes that the Union is founded on the indivisible and universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity as well as the principles of democracy and the 
                                                
753 See further, Mouffe (n 318). 
754 Alfred Moore, ‘Public Bioethics and Public Engagement: The Politics of Proper Talk’ (2010) 19 Public 
understanding of science 197, 202. 
755 ibid. See further: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology (UK 
HMSO 1984) <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Warnock_Report_of_theCommittee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_ 
Fertilisation _and_Embryology_1984.pdf> accessed 14 Sep. 2011. 
756 Mary Warnock, A Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilization and Embryology 
(Blackwell 1985) 2. 
757 European Commission, ‘Commission Decision on the renewal of the mandate of the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ (11 May 2005) 2005/383/EC.  
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rule of law, as part of the broad ethical framework in EU for the research, development 
and use of science and technology.758  
As mentioned earlier in the Chapter, the Deliberate Release Directive empowers 
the Commission to consult any committee (such as the EGE) to obtain advice on the 
ethical implications of biotechnology, either suo motu or at the request of the European 
Parliament, Council, or a Member State.759 The Food and Feed Regulation also provides 
for the Commission to consult the EGE, or any other appropriate body established by the 
Commission, for an opinion on ethical issues on its own initiative or at the request of a 
Member State.760 Given the advisory nature of these Committees, how their 
recommendations may be implemented in the decision-making structure is opaque and 
indeterminate. However the Directive emphasizes that consultation with any such 
Committee ought to be conducted under ‘clear rules of openness, transparency and public 
accessibility’, and the outcome of such consultation be made accessible to the public.761 
Since ethical issues are largely a matter for Member States, ethics committees of a number 
of Member States have given advice on various aspects of regulation of GMOs, including 
the UK Nuffield Commission, and the National Councils of Ireland and Denmark. 
 
6.2.1 Conceptual employment of public bioethics in regulation 
Before we examine the room made available for public participation through such advice, 
it is necessary to examine how public bioethics is conceptually employed in regulation. 
This is a difficult task in view of the ‘absence of empirical work on its institutions, 
ideologies, knowledges and notions of ethical expertise as part of the difficulty of gauging 
the precise nature of the identity of bioethics as moral philosophy’.762 Moore describes 
public bioethics as a complex of institutions, practices and discourses connecting policy 
making with ethical considerations and ethical deliberation, for improving political 
                                                
758 EGE Opinion (n 125) 35-36. See further: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, 
2000/C 364/01 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/ text_en.pdf> accessed 24 Nov. 2011. The EGE 
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Regulation are significant, including a) the Parliament and Council are not capable of directly requesting the 
EGE etc. for an opinion under the Regulation, and (b) there is no explicit requirement in the Regulation that 
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761 Article 29.2 Deliberate Release Dir. 
762 Salter and Jones (n 752). They noted the difficulty of gauging the precise nature of the identity of 
bioethics as moral philosophy, or as driven by utilitarian service of interests rather than a search for truth. 
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decision-making.763 He points out how public bioethics is only one element of the broader 
regulatory ethics (differentiating it from academic bioethics, corporate bioethics or 
bioethics in corporate institutional locations, as well as the work of clinical and research 
ethics committees), and that public bioethics committees have a ‘direct or indirect 
connection to the state, that is, in one way or another initiated, supported, controlled or 
commissioned by state actors’. 764  
When an academic endeavour conducted by experts to describe what is right and 
wrong, or good or bad becomes involved in formation of public policy, ‘moral thought has 
to be radically reinvented and reframed’ for its use as a regulatory tool to characterize 
public values.765 Such reframing includes emphasizing the inevitable connection of public 
bioethics to the public sphere, and less to methodological justifications of analytical moral 
philosophy. This is important because public bioethics needs further legitimation than a 
claim of competence in analytical philosophy and ethical reasoning. 766 It seeks to 
influence setting of policies that will be generally applied to all people in a polity, in the 
name of values of all.767 Dodds and Thomson identify various responsibilities of National 
Bioethics Organizations (NBOs), including ‘contributing to and stimulating public debate, 
providing expert opinion in identifying relevant issues that need to be addressed in policy 
deliberation, and/or developing public policy’.768 In contentious ethical debates where 
there is a need to reflect diversity of opinion and ethical frameworks, they argue for NBOs 
opening up public debate by a well-informed response and amplification of both expert 
and lay public views. The appropriate identification and an amplified description of all 
positions and interests are important during disagreements on public values about the 
development and use of technology. Without wide public participation towards this end, 
the danger is that ethics would become a direct expression of political views of the State, 
                                                
763 Moore (n 754) 198. 
764 ibid. 
765 Mariachiara Tellichini, ‘Governing by Values. EU Ethics: Soft Tools, Hard Effects’ (2009) 47 Minerva 
281, 282.  
766 John H Evans, ‘Between Technocracy and Democratic Legitimation: A proposed compromise position 
for Common Morality Public Ethics’ (2006) 31 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 213, 214. He follows 
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767 Mairi Levitt, ‘Public Consultation in Bioethics. What’s the point of asking the Public when they have 
neither Scientific Nor Ethical Expertise?’ (2003) 11 Health Care Analysis 15. 
768 Dodds and Thomson (n 752) 327. The authors moot a basic framework to develop public policy 
involving NBOs which seek to promote well-informed and diverse expression of opinion in society. Here 
they identify building internal capacities to meet the democratic ideal of effective participation of citizens as 
key. 
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and an illegitimate and undemocratic regulatory tool for dominant regulatory groups 
‘heavily reducing ethical enquiries and discussion to an expression of the intellectual 
establishment’.769 
 
6.2.2 Conceptual errors of expert domination in public bioethics 
The call for wider public participation, arising from the concern that values of dominant 
regulatory groups may pass off as public bioethics, is usually accompanied by the problem 
of the domination of experts in the composition of public bioethics committees. This is 
since their composition can substantially influence proceedings and outcomes of public 
bioethics committees.770 A study found that professionals from medical genetics and law 
constituted sixty two percent of the members of public ethics committees on bio-banks 
across the world, hinting at the elevation of expertise in law and biological sciences as the 
most appropriate qualification to make ethical judgments about the interests and values of 
citizens in another important emerging area of bioethics.771  
Such expert centered generation of bioethics advice is in stark opposition to a 
vision of public bioethics committees that are composed from a wide range of publics, 
articulated in the UK Warnock Report. Following six years of intense public debate on 
IVF (both inside and outside the Parliament), the Committee recommended permission for 
research on human embryos with explicit restrictions through licensing and other 
regulation; obliquely leading to the provisions in the UK Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, 1990. Warnock criticized Devlin’s influential conceptualization of a 
societal consensus on public morality in his Enforcement of Morals, where Devlin had 
famously argued that if there is a consensus of public opinion against a certain practice, 
                                                
769 Tellichini (n 765) 282. 
770 Bogner and Menz, discussed different models of composition of public bioethics committees, the 
implications of those which does not include explicitly identified stakeholders and different sections of the 
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771 Salter and Jones (n 752) 728. Another study showed a similar finding regarding the predominance of 
medical science and law in ethical committees: Jean-Christophe Galloux, Arne Thing Mortensen, Suzanne 
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patients’ organizations and disabled groups, ibid. 
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only then the law must intervene to prevent that conduct.772 Warnock criticized this 
assumption of common morality, and argued that the idea of a consensus in public opinion 
about such a morality is a myth:  
 
[T]here is no agreed set of principles which everyone, or the majority, or any representative person, 
believes to be absolutely binding, and this is especially so in areas of moral concern which are radically 
and genuinely new. The question must be recast: in situations where people disagree with each other as 
to the rights and wrongs of a specific form of behavior, how do we decide whether or not the law is to 
intervene?773 
 
Importantly, Warnock argued that the primary role of such committees was not to provide 
correct answers to the question ‘what should we do?’, and instead was to concern itself 
with framing a process in which decisions could be made despite profound disagreements. 
The Committee recommended the constitution of a model of bioethics committees with 
significant non-scientific lay representation (greater than 50%), for counterbalancing the 
professional interests of the scientific and medical community, and underlined the danger 
of possible exploitation by enthusiastic scientists if they are left with a dominant voice.774 
It is significant that the EGE and most Member State Bioethics committees have no such 
specific provisions to ensure lay membership. Warnock is raising fundamental questions 
here about both the rationality and general functioning of public bioethics committees, as 
to whether members of the public are not capable of establishing their own frames of 
meaning. Such frames might differ from analytical reasoning of technical and scientific 
experts, including lawyers, theologians and moral philosophers. If that is the case, the 
difficulties of representing moral concerns of at least some lay publics by expert 
committees are significant. This aspect is elaborated in the subsequent subsection.  
The Commission’s Expert Group on Science and Governance raised fundamental 
questions about how ethics can be appropriately viewed as just a matter of expertise, and 
still convincingly represent ‘the values of all Europeans’ when it is institutionalized 
through the creation of expert committees.775 Such use of ethics is found by the report to 
‘largely reduce to the bureaucratic mechanism of expert ethical advice, deriving from 
                                                
772 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals: Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the British 
Academy (Oxford University Press 1959). 
773 Warnock (n 756) xiv.  
774 Warnock Report (n 755). 
775 Expert Group on Science and Governance, ‘Taking Knowledge Society Seriously’ (n 60) 52.  
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procedures which are identical to those for scientific advisory committees’.776 It is found 
to move away from ‘an emergent pluralist, inclusive and inter-disciplinary dialogue’ as 
potentially a new way of shaping public policy around science and new technological 
endeavours.777 The report asserts that if ‘the need to establish a more intense and open 
dialogue between science and society’ requires to ‘ground the normally self-referential 
ethics of science in a democratically legitimated framework of values and socio-technical 
choices’, then this reduction to bureaucratic mechanism of expert ethical advice is 
inappropriate.778 This is since ‘ethics is represented as if it is naturally only a matter of 
expert judgment, though this very framing has markedly shaped, and continues to shape, 
which ethics and whose values count in European politics’.779 Here the slippery slope in 
normative language from ‘European legislation on ethics’ to ‘Ethical legislation’, is seen 
to facilitate an undeliberated state production and imposition of (state values as) collective 
values.780 The criticism here is that ethics through expert committees is in practice 
institutionalized as soft law without collective debate.781 It thus neutralizes political issues, 
introduces norms outside traditional process of law-making by evoking society without 
involving it, and pays lip-service to democratic concerns while only expert processes take 
place.782 
 
6.2.3 An imperative for promotion of technology through consensus 
Earlier in the section it was posited that the public function of public bioethics is 
intricately connected to the public sphere, where public debate is stimulated by the 
identification of the full range of values concerning contestations about the development 
of technology by a public body. Characterization of a range of values and their respective 
rationalities to the fullest possible extent is in contrast to an emphasis on promotion of 
specific technologies seen among many public bioethics committees. Such an emphasis on 
promotion can be seen in the title of the Communication from the Commission to the 
Parliament and Council, which advocated accommodating ethics within EU decision-
making on biotechnology, viz., Promoting the Competitive Environment for the Industrial 
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782 See further, European Parliament resolution on institutional and legal implications of the use of ‘soft 
law’ instruments, 4 September 2007. 2007/2028(INI), P6TA (2007)0366. 
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Activities based on Biotechnology within the Community.783 The emphasis on promotion 
(as opposed to a more neutral investigation on various public values about biotech 
research, development and use) is visible in the Commission’s association of ethics with 
avoidance of an uncertain and confused debate, as ‘such confusion can adversely 
influence the whole climate for industrial development of biotechnology’.784 Significantly, 
the Commission ruled out proposals for a broad social assessment of new biotechnology 
through public discussion, on the basis of the ‘imperative to avoid a situation creating 
uncertainty (which) could result in a diversion of investment and could act as a 
disincentive for innovation and technological development by industry’.785  
It is significant that although the European Parliament initially supported the 
institution of GAEIB, it subsequently passed a resolution noting the exclusion of 
Parliamentary involvement (including in GAEIB’s composition), and criticized for paying 
too much attention ‘to the interests of research and not enough to the possible effects on 
society’.786 In this context, Salter and Jones found: 
 
[I]t is generally the case that while institutionalized ethics of this nature may include public concerns 
within the policy process, they subordinate those concerns to the dominant political 
culture…governmental ethics regimes are found to work as a form of reflexive government in which 
inclusion, involvement, and mobilization of extra-scientific actors, and perspectives are built into a 
discursive and institutional framework that stabilizes rather than destabilizes the commitment to techno-
scientific progress and economic competitiveness.787 
 
The Commission’s Life Sciences strategy emphasized how public sensitivities require a 
change in the form of regulation of biotechnology to strengthen its legitimacy, through a 
stated policy of enhanced public consultation and transparency in the functioning of 
regulatory committees; including a broadened definition of the expertise required for 
membership in regulatory committees.788 Salter and Jones identified this stated shift within 
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the context of a basic regulatory dilemma of attempting to tap the scientific and industrial 
potential to be a global leader in new biotechnologies on the one hand, and the 
acknowledgment within regulators that public support for such a project is essential, but 
presently scarce.789  
If ethical scrutiny through public bioethics committees is to form an important 
form of governance of techno-science to elicit public opinion and possible validation 
through public participation, then an a priori position of promotion cannot be consistent 
with democratic principles. This is since the regulator’s normative acceptance of the 
development and promotion of particular technological trajectories itself is a subject of 
public concerns, requiring further public scrutiny in ethics committees. A general 
aspiration for consensus towards promoting a particular technology in a public bioethics 
committee can be inconsistent with democratic principles in situations where public 
contestations about choosing such technological trajectories are strong, and where no 
shared conviction of an a priori acceptance of promotion is reasonably conceivable within 
society. As an analogy, a consensus recorded in any ethics committee report on the 
production of stem cell lines stating a shared conviction that such production is legitimate 
for reasons of contributions to scientific progress and therapeutic uses, would be 
impossible ‘if not for the fact that representatives of the churches, or from philosophical 
positions beyond the utilitarian mainstream’ do not find a voice in the Committees. Thus 
Committees ought to be required to ethically scrutinize a priori positions of promotion 
itself, to facilitate a public deliberation about values regarding the development of GMOs.  
Bogner and Menz argue that expert dissent ought to be seen as a normal feature of 
committee process that can conceptually enhance the salience and legitimacy of politics, 
since decisions on ethical issues cannot be taken on the basis of expert knowledge alone in 
any case.790 Given the inevitability of serious divergence within public bioethics 
committees (if they are representative of a range of moral worldviews), it requires 
bioethics committees to record dissent and disagreement within the society. This requires 
both the record of dissent within its members and the seeking out of disagreement within 
society which provide full expression and rationality to all conflicting points of view. 
Wider public participation, here, would be key to amplify law’s ability to democratically 
and effectively engage with public contestations about technology. Though lay 
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participation cannot be seen as a panacea that will automatically ensure a range of views 
and the protection of minority opinions, a full characterization of public consultations and 
votes on divergent recommendations are necessary complements to ensure an appropriate 
representation of a range of public values. Such practices can be seen in the functioning of 
the Danish Council of Ethics, examined in a later section of this Chapter. 
 Having placed public bioethics advice as part of the public sphere, and emphasized its 
public function to identify, characterize and represent the full range of values and conflicts 
concerned with the regulation of technology, the next two sections examine the advice of 
three public GMO-ethics committees published during the current EU regulatory regime. 
The attempt here is to identify the recommendations in these three reports, analyze their 
respective approaches regarding characterization of public contestations about technology, 
and how their ethical scrutiny amplifies room for public participation in the EU regulation 
of GMOs. The next section examines the advice of the Irish Council for Bioethics, and 
identifies criticisms against a conventional approach to GMO ethics visible in earlier 
public bioethics committees. The section finds the Irish advice as symptomatic of these 
criticisms, which is related to the seamless interpretation of public concerns as private 
feelings, having profound implications in terms of a narrower scope for ethical scrutiny. 
Following this, the subsequent section examines the relevant reports of the EGE and the 
Danish Council of Ethics, and underlines the positive manner in which previous criticisms 
about GMO-ethics are taken on board. It identifies the implications of these reports for an 
appropriate characterization and a full blown civic deliberation of public contestations and 
concerns about GMOs. 
 
6.3 Irish Council advice: Typical limitations of traditional GMO-ethics 
The Irish Council for Bioethics established a working group on GMOs in response to a 
request from the Irish Food Safety Authority in 2002, and considered the ethical issues 
raised by adopting GM crop and food technology in general, as also the context of Ireland 
in particular. This process culminated in a final report in 2005, and importantly included 
public consultations through prepared questionnaires.791 The report held that genetic 
modification of crops is not morally objectionable by itself, since on balance the 
technology held a great deal of promise despite introducing new risks for consumers, 
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farmers and the environment.792 It held that an appropriate ethical approach to regulation 
would be to protect the public from harm by progressing in a cautious and stepwise 
manner (through risk regulation), and in the meantime protect the autonomy of the 
consumer to choose through adequate labeling and coexistence strategies. In other words, 
when there is a choice for all parties, the potential benefits of GM crops can be made 
accessible to those who wish to avail of them.793 This prescription of an appropriate 
framework on ethics of GMO regulation in the report is fairly similar to the regulatory 
approach that is apparent in the current EU release framework. The report substantially 
relied on the statement that:  
 
[T]he scientific community has widely agreed that the risks for human health associated with GM crop 
consumption are very low given the thorough safety assessments required for market approval. The 
magnitude of the environmental risks is more difficult to estimate, however, these risks appear to be 
manageable through careful implementation strategies, and therefore the introduction of GM crops into 
Irish farming would not necessarily be irreversible.794 
 
It also noted that:  
 
[A] scientific risk assessment involves predicting possible harmful consequences and estimating their 
likelihood, and such successful prediction of the consequences of any new technology is extremely 
difficult, and unanticipated side effects commonly emerge from the introduction of new technologies. 
The risk reviewed above should not cause panic; they reflect the inherent nature of scientific progress, 
which will always involve some side effects.795 
 
The unequivocal belief in the scientific community and epistemology of science without 
ethical scrutiny and elaboration, based on a normative aspiration of progress is 
noteworthy. This is notable due to the fact that significant public contestations arise from 
doubts about this unequivocal reliance on scientific risk as the strategy for regulation of 
release of GMOs. 
  Opinions of the majority of respondents to the questionnaire prepared by the 
working group of the report contradicted this position, requiring some reflection and 
elaboration from the Council about this position. An overwhelming majority stated that 
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they do not trust scientists or governmental organizations to provide all the relevant and 
available facts.796 For this reason, they stated that they are not convinced of the safety of 
GM foods that were authorized for sale. They expressed their concerns about possible 
adverse impacts on future generations, and were not confident that GM food/crops are 
carefully regulated, including the effectiveness of coexistence mechanisms to segregate 
GM agriculture from organic agriculture. A large majority of respondents, thus, did not 
support controlled cultivation of GM crops in Ireland.797 While the report appreciated ‘the 
vigour and sincerity’ with which the opinions were recorded making for ‘a most 
informative and positive contribution to the consultation’, it took no apparent effort to 
identify, understand or articulate the ethical implications of the lack of public trust in risk 
mechanisms, or in the quasi-exclusive reliance in the scientific community for 
regulation.798 It is significant that the Irish Council undertook a public consultation 
through questionnaires and other methods, and recorded that ‘the great majority of those 
responded clearly displayed a strongly negative attitude towards GM’.799 However, an 
avoidance of discussing the ethical implications for GMO regulation of the lack of public 
trust in these approaches is inadequate. The Council could have ethically reflected and 
justified these approaches, since otherwise it is merely restating current regulatory 
approaches without any additional reflection on the very elements that the public are 
skeptical of. It required a systematic reflection and reasoning about the ethics of 
predominantly relying upon the scientific community itself. This would include the 
scrutiny of regulatory approaches regarding issues that the scientific community 
characterizes as side-effects. This is because other social groups that are marginal in 
regulatory deliberation might not agree, given that its impact on them might be grave.800  
  Three important omissions in the general approach of various GMO-ethics 
committees in the 1990s are also identifiable in the Irish Council report. These points 
pertain to:  
a) a lack of attention to the instability of underlying scientific knowledge that is used in 
regulation of technology,  
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b) the need for a deontological ethical scrutiny of risk regulation, and  
c) the necessity to focus on the ethics of research and development of specific 
technologies.  
 
These points are elaborated below through review of literature that examines important 
public GMO ethics reports that predated the current regime. 
 
6.3.1 Instability of underlying knowledge 
Despite systemic issues of scientific ambiguity and ignorance visible in high profile 
failures like BSE, public concerns about the limits in reliability of scientific knowledge 
used in regulation is generally left out of ethical scrutiny by most committees. These 
Committees are criticized for their specific approach in disregarding scientific ignorance 
as an issue of ethical scrutiny. Under this approach, scientific ignorance needs no further 
ethical elaboration if the scientific community is examining the accompanying hazards 
during risk assessment. Such an approach is visible in the ideal-typical understanding of 
public concerns in the advice of the Irish council. It is also identifiable in the UK BBSRC 
report, the UK Nuffield Council advices and the GAEIB report, which are discussed later 
in this subsection. 
Based on the findings of a number of qualitative research projects regarding public 
perceptions on GMOs,801 Wynne asserted that the public is concerned about a range of 
moral concerns beyond the consequences of the use of GMOs.802 He focused on specific 
moral concerns like playing God and disrespect of nature, and asserted that the public 
concerns signified a ‘relational dimension’ regarding the response of regulators and 
scientists to the inadequacy of current scientific understandings. In other words, public 
concerns are also about the lack of acknowledgement of the limits of scientific knowledge 
used for the characterization of adverse consequences by the scientific community, in 
view of prior regulatory failures in grave and unforeseen consequences. Through the 
aforementioned qualitative studies on public perception, he elaborated that while the 
public is concerned about the quality and lack of stability of the underlying scientific 
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knowledge for GMO regulation, the public is not demanding or expecting a situation free 
of uncertainty or a freeze on innovation till that moment of clarity. However, it is 
concerned about the lack of reflection about the quality of knowledge at issue, and 
importantly, a failure to relate instability of this knowledge to the purpose of innovation. 
He stressed that these qualitative studies demonstrate a public expectation that regulators 
go beyond claims of promoters and check whether the purpose of innovation is 
sufficiently important to accept inevitable scientific ignorance. That is to say, citizens 
expect regulators to be permissive during stages of scientific ignorance only if the answer 
to this question is sound and commensurate to recognized public values and interests 
through a comparison with alternatively available technologies.803 
Given this public expectation, he found that the resultant public concerns about the 
ethics of the instability of underlying knowledge cannot be left only to scientific 
communities, but should also be scrutinized by ethical bodies.804 For this reason, he 
emphasized that ethics about technologies like GMOs is not just about consumer concerns 
that could be solved through individual choice and labelling, but involve wider public 
concerns whose scrutiny cannot be avoided by invoking individual choice as a framework 
for solution. Such concerns of citizens about regulators playing God, disrespecting nature 
or ignoring instability of scientific knowledge are largely understood by earlier GMO-
ethics committees as private concerns. In contrast, critics argue that they are publicly 
articulated assertions and concerns regarding the ethics of ignoring the instability of 
underlying scientific knowledge by regulators.  
While substantiating this point, Wynne is critical of the discussion of disrespect 
for nature in the UK BBSRC report,805 ‘as one of asking solely about the ethical status of 
the manipulation’, ignoring the ‘institutional denial of lack of control, and of dismissing 
unpredictability’. 806 Since the institutional denial and dismissal of unpredictability itself 
might be fuelling concerns of disrespect of nature, it needs further ethical scrutiny and 
elaboration from public ethics committees. He pointed out how such a treatment in the 
BBSRC report is possible only because ethical concerns of citizens are deemed to be 
shorn of intellectual judgment, and by the seamless disregard of the intellectual issue of 
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limits of knowledge.807 Wynne identified a similar deletion also in the UK Nuffield 
Council report,808 which he strongly criticized: 
 
[I]t ignores the very issue raised by typical public concerns - whether we should assume that science 
indeed reliably identify future consequences, or whether to the contrary, there are going to be 
consequences of which current knowledge is ignorant, or which are contingent on so many independent 
conditions that we can only say they are conceivable but with unknown likelihood.809 
 
From Wynne’s elaborations it is clear that the regulatory treatment itself is understood as 
the object of public concerns in playing God and disrespect for nature. Then, the object of 
public scrutiny is a question of institutional ethics about the relational aspect between the 
public purpose of innovation and the instability of scientific knowledge. Understanding 
them as private concerns, is denying a profound public influence on shaping public values 
in regulation of GMOs. 
This pattern of ignoring ethical concerns about scientific incertitudes through 
reframing them as only risk assessment, and referring them back to the scientific 
community, recurs among earlier GMO-ethics committees. It is also discernable in the 
advice of GAEIB to the Commission in 1995, which identified the primary ethical 
imperative applying to all foodstuffs as being related to their safety. 810 It stated that ‘when 
such products are authorized to be placed on the market they will have already met the 
required safety standards both for human health and for the environment; these standards, 
which are also subject to ethical considerations, do not fall within the scope of this 
opinion’.811 It is through this deletion of important question of institutional ethics that the 
report focuses on the benefits of biotechnological progress as ‘a new element that can 
contribute towards meeting food requirements in Europe and throughout the world’.812 
In these illustrations, the seamless writing out of public concerns about the lack of 
reflection regarding intricate connections between limits of underlying scientific 
knowledge and judgments regarding social value and utility in permitting new innovations 
is apparent. It is through such deletion that ethical issues about playing God and tampering 
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with nature are reduced as emaciated personal concerns of consumption, which can then 
be resolved through labelling measures under the logic of consumer choice. 
 
6.3.2 Ethical scrutiny of risk regulation 
Quite apart from the reliability of the data in risk analysis, there is a lacuna in the 
approach of various public bioethics committees in ignoring to scrutinize the ethical 
aspects behind the framing of the regulatory tool of risk. Various bioethics committees 
have taken the normative assumptions implicit in technical risk analysis as natural, and 
not in need of ethical scrutiny. This failure by public bioethics committees like the Irish 
Council to scrutinize the normative assumptions in risk analysis ignores societal 
disagreements about them.  
The need for public bioethics committees to scrutinize and discuss the normative 
assumption in risk analysis is emphasized by Levidow and Carr. They demonstrate the 
incompatibility of the various accounts of the risk problem in the GM debate, where each 
set links risk and opportunity to its own account of benefit, an account that necessitates 
further ethical scrutiny:  
 
[F]or some critics, the risk problem goes beyond physical measurable effects (consequences/cost), to 
encompass features that some proponents regard as benefits. Such features include the tendency to treat 
society’s problems as genetic deficiencies of organisms, and to treat nature as a commodity...for 
example, many people perceived biotechnology as a profit-driven force that threatens their ethical-
cultural values.813 
 
Through research interviews, the authors assert that when regulators set priorities for risk 
research, judge available evidence, and/or seek additional evidence for the treatment of 
some potential effects as plausible and unacceptable, it also involves considering the 
ultimate benefits of a particular release: ‘if doubtful about benefits, then they may set 
more stringent criteria’.814 ‘From one stance, society is at risk from failing to reap the 
indispensable benefits of biotechnology. From other stances, society is at risk from 
biotechnology, which precludes beneficial alternatives’.815 The authors elaborate how 
competing environmental values enter most aspects of risk assessment in the 1990s: while 
                                                
813 Les Levidow and Susan Carr, ‘How Biotechnology regulation sets a Risk/Ethics Boundary’ (1997) 14 
Agriculture and Human Values 29, 33. 
814 ibid 37. 
815 ibid 36. 
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in the UK, ‘harm was meant as that which infringes farmers’ property rights or impairs the 
agro-chemical control of weeds’, in some European countries there was a broader 
definition of environmental harm ‘as any effect that could preclude future options for 
sustainable agriculture, including …ecological uncertainty from unacceptable effects of 
large-scale commercial use’.816  
If the assumptions that go behind risk frames in risk analysis and risk management 
are implicitly value laden, then such assumptions need public scrutiny and ethical 
elaboration. The approach in advices like that offered by the Irish Council is 
conspicuously inadequate in this regard.  
 
6.3.3 Ethical scrutiny of technological trajectories 
The third major lacuna identified in the traditional scrutiny by public GMO ethics 
committees is their lack of attention to the ethics of research and development of GMOs. 
Public ethics may need to scrutinize not only the ethical concerns regarding the use of 
GMOs, but also the ethics of the directions of biotechnological research. This is because 
the public may be concerned about a range of moral concerns and not just the 
consequences of the consumption of GMOs, as evidenced in the studies mentioned in the 
previous sections.817  
An implicit acceptance of the ethical judgments of developers of controversial 
technologies is in opposition to the need for an open ended and explicit public discussion 
about the direction of such research and development, including through bioethical 
scrutiny of public bodies. This is since ‘in reality, the research itself is already shaped by 
values which link the production of scientific knowledge...to notions of progress and 
strategic interest’.818 Once these values are taken for granted and beyond the scrutiny of 
public bioethics, Carr and Levidow argue, expert committees merely mitigate the 
undesirable effects of the prior value-choices, which are already embedded in techno-
scientific research and development programs.819 In absence of this scrutiny, GMO-ethics 
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is seen to only conduct a risk-benefit analysis by restricting public concerns as individual 
moral feelings. This is in opposition of a public institutional ethics where the production 
and application of biotechnological knowledge, as well as the implicit ethics involved in 
the regulator’s judgments, are explicitly scrutinized by public bioethics committees.820 
In any case, an explicit recognition of normative and ethical commitments that 
shape the development of technologies is currently absent during risk regulation. This 
makes an examination by public bioethics committees of the ethics of the normative 
commitments that fuel specific trajectories of technological development even more 
imperative. This is connected to the demand for a public debate about the benefits from 
GMOs, which is part of the public contestations about the technology. In the absence of an 
explicit public scrutiny about benefits regulators may assume ‘that any product brought 
forward by any promoter for regulatory decisions, by definition equals prospective social 
benefit because that free entrepreneur has defined it as such’.821 
Taking stock, first, given the lack of trust in the scientific establishment there is a 
need to recognize the limitations in the assumption of singularly employing risk analysis 
as an answer to public concerns about the instability of underlying knowledge. This in 
turn calls for further ethical scrutiny and elaboration of how to deal with the instability of 
scientific knowledge during regulation. Second, symptomatic of the criticism about the 
advice of the Irish Council, the normative assumptions during the framing of risk needs to 
be publicly scrutinized by bioethics committees, rather than to assume those implicit 
normative judgments as natural, unproblematic and unnecessary of ethical elaboration. 
Devoid of these two factors, GMO-ethics could be imagined and employed in a way that 
effectively keeps risk and ethics as two separate domains. This could effectuate the 
avoidance of public scrutiny of the normative assumptions of risk regulators, as well as 
the instability of scientific knowledge used for risk regulation. Finally, implicit judgments 
during the development of specific trajectories of technologies, including GMOs, about 
                                                                                                                                                   
practice far-reaching effects mean lack of intellectual control by science over future consequences, it is 
inappropriate that the ethical consequences of such development of technologies is not publicly scrutinized 
by the bioethics committees. Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation’ (n 802) 462. 
820 Carr and Levidows highlighted a report commissioned by the European parliament that identified wide-
ranging value judgments as ethical issues that needs scrutiny, including instrumental transformation of 
nature, inequitable distribution of risks and benefits, the significance of ecological uncertainty, and the 
cognitive frameworks involved in risk assessment. Using the term bioethics to include the implicit policies 
of R&D and regulatory priorities, in evaluating the potential benefits, the report contrasted the commercial 
aims and practices with the humanitarian claims of the development of agri-biotechology, through which 
there was an attempt at a fundamental ethical scrutiny Levidow and Carr (n 813) 38. 
821  Brian Wynne, ‘Elephants in the room where Publics encounter “Science”?: A response to Darrin 
Durant’ (2008) 17 Public Understanding of Science 21, fn 16. 
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social benefits, progress through innovation and the conceptualizations of the good life 
need explicit scrutiny by public bioethics committees. These include a public scrutiny of 
the reasons through which specific techno-scientific developments are found as desirable, 
explicit scrutiny of the social values they pursue and the ways in which such 
developments serve the public good. Thus the suggested appraisal should be in 
comparison with alternative trajectories and relate judgments of social value with possible 
dangers, keeping in mind the fundamental instability of underlying scientific knowledge. 
With these criticisms in the foreground, the next section examines the advice of the EGE 
and the Danish Council, including the positive manner in which these criticisms appear to 
be taken on board.  
 
6.4 Ethical scrutiny of public concerns: Advice of the EGE & Danish 
Council 
Pursuant to a request by EU President Barroso, the EGE prepared an advice to address 
new challenges and opportunities for EU agriculture accompanying modern developments 
in agriculture technologies.822 The scope of the opinion was broader than GMOs and 
included ethical issues concerning food security, safety and sustainability regarding the 
primary production of food of plant origin. However EU agricultural policy areas like 
fisheries, livestock farming and green biotechnology for pharmaceutical use were 
explicitly excluded. The consultations that preceded the finalization of this opinion 
involved a range of actors including individual experts, representatives of European and 
international institutions as also representatives of civil society. It culminated in a round 
table comprising of invited speakers, EGE members and around hundred invited delegates 
from different interest groups including the agro-research industry, consumer 
organizations, religions, environment organizations, food and farm industries, and 
representatives of EU Member State ethics committees.823 
 
6.4.1 The need for technology impact assessments 
The EGE report recommended the pursuit of an integrated approach in agriculture 
involving a continuous assessment of the balance between expected outcomes and 
                                                
822 EGE, Opinion No. 24 on Ethics of modern developments in agricultural technologies (EGE 2008) 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/docs/opinion24_en.pdf> accessed 12 Nov. 2011. 
823 EGE, EGE Proceedings of the roundtable on Ethics of modern developments in agricultural 
technologies, 18 June 2008 (EGE 2008) <http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-
ethics/docs/publications/agriculture_ technologies_ethics.pdf> accessed 12 Nov. 2011. 
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required inputs (like resources and energy) at the technical level. It identified human 
dignity and justice as two fundamental ethical principles for the EU, and called for explicit 
embedding of them in EU agricultural policy, including in the production and distribution 
of food products.824 It found a scenario where members of society interact and act on the 
basis of commonly held values as desirable, and advocated a continuous assessment to 
adhere to its ethical goals.825 The approach recommended by the EGE included the 
recognition of the importance of principles of food safety, the right of access to food for 
all, as well as the need to implement a different model of agriculture that is sustainable 
and multi-functional. It argued for a model that includes the use of various principles like 
stewardship of the land, preservation of the resource base, the health of farm workers, 
preservation of small biota rich in biodiversity, as well as the values of rural communities 
and agricultural landscapes.826  
  Importantly, in addition to risk assessment, the report emphasized the need for 
impact assessment of technology, both at national and European levels.827 They 
recommended that the effects of a technology should be carefully studied and evaluated 
by means of an impact assessment that involves a comparison of existing and new 
technologies, before it is considered for use in agriculture.828 This important 
recommendation about impact assessment, which has a significant bearing on the 
regulation of GMOs, needs to be read along with the Committee’s recommendation on 
public participation. The report recognized that agriculture as a policy domain ought to be 
inordinately consistent with societal needs, goods and expectations, given its significant 
role in terms of economics, labour and social goods.829 Therefore the advice emphasized 
the imperative role of public participation and effective involvement of all stakeholders.830 
Further, it sought an integrative action plan that emphasizes the importance for 
agricultural regulation to address the needs of local and regional markets. They 
recommended that the plan should include local and regional transport systems, health and 
education infrastructure, and systems of accountability of political institutions and big 
corporations.  
  Within this broad framework, the report made specific recommendations about 
                                                
824 ibid 48. 
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826 ibid 63. 
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828 ibid 62. 
829 ibid 66. 
830 ibid 67. 
 198  
a number of issues, including the use of GM crops, agricultural biodiversity, sustainability 
of agricultural technologies and technology impact assessment of agricultural 
technologies.831 Significantly, the report understood the relevant ethical concerns as ones 
that cannot be confined only to policy design, but also deeply concerning the 
technological dimension of modern agriculture. This included unexpected consequences 
that may arise out of the use of new technologies in agriculture due to the rapid and 
fundamental impacts of these technologies.  
  Underlining the need to strike a balance that ensures food security, decent and 
dignified employment, as well as health and respect for the environment as key,832 the 
report linked the question of promotion of new technologies in agriculture not only to its 
outcomes, but also to the modes of ascertaining those outcomes, including questions of 
‘for whom, and for how long’.833 The report outlined the various axes of intense 
polarization around the cultivation of GMOs, including the differences in regulatory 
approaches in GMOs between the EU and the US or Argentina, as well as the sharp 
divisions within the EU, say, between industrial stakeholders and consumer organizations 
or environmental protection organizations. Within this rubric, it emphasized the demand 
from many quarters for an environmental impact assessment of new technologies, and a 
technology impact assessment regarding the dangers of implementing them, compared to 
persisting with existing agricultural technologies.834 After recognizing the existing 
obligations for a scientific risk assessment, the report emphasized the importance of the 
precautionary principle and the investigations regarding unwanted pleiotropic effects 
(related to the effect of a single gene having multiple effects in different tissue 
formations).835 Importantly, it also recommended that risk management procedures should 
be revised to take full account of the need for an impact assessment of all new 
technologies.836 
 
6.4.2 Protection of farmers’ right to save seeds 
Recognizing principles of fairness, justice and solidarity as fundamental in the regulation 
of world trade, the EGE raised concerns about the accentuation of market dominance 
within a few companies over much of agricultural production, through the existing IPR 
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regime for plant varieties and GM crops. The report was concerned about the disregard in 
current IPR policies and cited the increasing monopolization of the food, seed and agro-
chemical market by a small number of companies. It called for a proper balance between 
WTO rules and the socio-economic aspects of different regions of the world, a balance 
which is guided by concerns of fair trade, justice and solidarity in global trade in 
agricultural products, including in seeds.837  
  Here, the report emphasized the need to maintain farmer’s rights to save seeds 
and use them in subsequent seasons. It drew attention to grave concerns arising from the 
current industry practice of standard licence agreements (especially) in the sale of GM 
seeds, through which seed companies controlled the use of saved seeds.838 Noting that 
concerns of economic monopoly and biosafety have been raised in the context of the use 
of GMOs, it underlined that only those agricultural technologies that are conducive to the 
goals of the advice, including the ethical criteria indicated in it, should be sustained in the 
EU.839 While recognizing the need to promote innovation in agriculture, it called for 
specific efforts to mainly support technologies that are conducive to food security, safety 
and sustainability. This was in order to ensure ecologically and socially sound agricultural 
production (techniques and methods) based on fair treatment both of the environment and 
of farmers.840 It further encouraged the EU to increase the budget for research in 
agricultural sciences, green biotechnologies and all other sustainability oriented 
agriculture research, to achieve the ethical goals articulated in the opinion.841 
 The EGE report is conspicuous by its broad focus of ethical scrutiny regarding the 
regulation of GMOs and other agricultural technologies. Such an emphasis is also 
manifested in the focus on the issue of growing corporate control over the farm sector, 
particularly through the employment of standard license clauses to stop the traditional 
practice of using saved seeds by farming communities. It thus moves away from relying 
on a narrow scientific frame of risk of earlier GMO-ethics, elaborated in the previous 
section. Even the emphasis on the precautionary principle and the stated need for 
investigating unwanted pleiotropic effects is within this broad approach, since it connects 
social value and impact of the technology to risk regulation. This broad ethical frame on 
GMO regulation takes public contestations seriously and provides space for wider public 
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participation. This is visible in its insistence on technology impact assessments, and the 
imperative role of public participation in it. Such a broad approach is also visible in the 
advice of Danish Council of Ethics, which is described next. 
 
6.4.3 Advice of the Danish Council 
The Danish Council of Ethics prepared a report in response to a request from the Danish 
Environment Minister to identify ‘the more intangible subjects that have a significant 
bearing on the public debate on the use of genetic engineering in the field of food, beyond 
risk evaluations.842 The report reviewed the debate about the spread of GM plants, the 
legislation linked to the regulation of GM crops, and the appropriate regulatory responses.  
 It underlined the importance of examining both direct and indirect impacts of GMOs, 
including implications to the environment and health of non-target organisms, and the 
farming structure and economy. The report recognized that an evaluation of the utility and 
hazard of a particular plant has to be preceded by identifying the values relevant for such 
examinations. It emphasized the difficulties in making such a regulatory call, while 
representing various points of view to the fullest possible extent.843 Further, it examined 
the possibilities of incorporating ethical considerations in public decision-making, through 
various vantage points of utility assessment, religious views, eco-centric views and 
‘decision theories’.844 Identifying utility as a central issue, it underlined the importance of 
conducting utility assessments though a number of considerations. These considerations 
included sustainability and consideration for posterity, distribution of goods, agricultural 
developments and risk evaluation. The report insisted that this assessment has to be 
coupled with answering the question as to who received the maximum benefit from such 
technological improvements.845  
  The report noted that scientific risk evaluation currently determined the 
decision to release, and emphasized the need to include utility in the evaluation during the 
decision to release. By citing various European studies about citizen’s attitudes to GMOs, 
it underlined that citizen’s perceptions that GMOs benefits them play an essential part in 
consumer approval. This is since skepticism is absent in areas like GM medicine, disaster 
management and decontamination, or famine reduction. It also underlined that citizens 
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object to large multinational corporations reaping inordinate benefits from large scale use 
of GM seeds, despite persisting uncertainties.846  
  The report examined the concept of utility, its incorporation in regulatory 
decisions and the problems that arise due to a wide spectrum of interpretations of 
utility.847 While it felt that utility assessment is desirable, it found the discussion tricky 
due to lack of agreement about objective standards regarding usefulness, as well as the 
uncertainty surrounding both beneficial and undesirable effects from the use of GM crops. 
The Council found that the difficulty in utility assessment is not merely about predicting 
the direct and indirect risks and the useful effects brought about by GM cultivation. But 
further, the consequences of the actual application depend upon a number of social and 
human factors that are difficult to be assimilated into the theoretical prediction for 
consideration of utility.848  
 
6.4.4 Characterization of dissent about utility 
The report emphasized the need for a holistic evaluation of GM crops, and approached its 
recommendations regarding considerations of utility in approval procedures for release in 
a salient manner. The advice characterized three different points of view among the 
committee members regarding a determinative linkage between permissions to release a 
GM crop and its utility assessment.849 A minority of members felt that considerations of 
utility should not be directly included in the regulator’s approval procedure. This was 
since the evaluation of any particular GM crop’s utility will invariably be so elastic and 
subjective by nature that it is best left to the market, and the demands of the consumer. In 
this viewpoint, the consumers’ view of utility ought to determine the production and 
distribution of particular GM plants, provided that it entails no risk to humans and the 
environment.  
  In contrast, a big majority argued to include considerations of utility in the 
approval procedure for release, although members within this group disagreed about the 
precise role of utility in the procedure. Bearing in mind the great effectiveness of GM 
methods, since it allows quick and highly extensive modifications, all members of this 
group were concerned about inadvertent negative consequences and shifts of ecological 
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balances. Some members within this group felt that GM crops can only be approved for 
release if it can be demonstrated with great probability that only minimal risk is associated 
with their use. Along with this criterion, these members also insisted that it must be shown 
with reasonable probability that their release may entail substantial benefit or essential 
utility, ‘i.e. must either be able to satisfy fundamental human needs, or remedy essential 
environmental problems, where this is not possible in any other way’.850 Citing secular 
and religious rationales, this group held that the integrity of nature should be respected as 
a basic premise. Consequently, one should be cautious about altering existing species or 
creating entirely new species regardless of justifications provided, such as in the interests 
of mankind. Others within the majority felt that it is possible to weigh up utility and risk, 
and that GM crops can be approved if the risk of using them is deemed to be entirely 
minimal, even when no additional utility is anticipated. They nevertheless felt that 
discretion should be exercised in modifying existing plants, given the limitations of 
foreseeing the consequences of using them.  
 
6.4.5 Restrictions on farmers’ right to save the seed 
A large majority of members, regardless of their views on how utility and risk assessments 
should be weighed, also wished to underline one important economic and social factor 
regarding farm-saved seed. This is because currently ‘once the farmer has bought a 
portion of GM sowing seed, according to customary practice he is not allowed to use his 
crop as farm-saved seed without paying a fresh fee to the patentee’.851 The report pointed 
out that this aspect makes a vital change in farming culture. The Council unanimously 
emphasized that this practice raises grave implications for small farmers and farming 
culture, and underlined the need to include this factor in the debate on GM crops.  
  It is significant that the disagreement about employment of utility within the 
members of the Council, a central aspect of public values about the use of GM 
technology, is scrupulously and remarkably recorded, along with all the salient view-
points and their respective rationales. There was an absence of ethical scrutiny regarding 
the development of food technologies itself in the report. Nevertheless, the 
characterization of conflicting rationales, regarding utility as a central value independent 
of scientific risk, is an appropriate exercise of the public function by the bioethics council. 
Through this, the advice has fostered public debate, identified rationales of ethical 
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convergence and divergences in society, and ethically scrutinized the regulatory positions 
regarding divergences.  
 Both the EGE and the Danish Council, acknowledged the grave concern about 
the control of the traditional practice of saved seed, through license agreements by GM 
seed companies, and sought further public debate about this in the GM debate. They also 
identified increasing concentration of control over agricultural production by a small 
group of for-profit corporate entities, and identified public concerns that connected 
appraisals of profits, benefits and utility to regulatory investigations in risk; thus seeking 
to include assessments of utility and impact of the technology in regulation of safety 
concerns. The EGE sought technology impact assessments, and environmental impact 
assessment, over and above the existing requirement for risk assessment prior to release of 
GMOs. It further put focus on ethical concerns regarding the development of new 
technologies in relation to the lack of stability of the underlying scientific knowledge. 
Both Committees recommended that risk management measures should take full account 
of the need for impact assessment. This holistic approach is in contrast to the restricted 
approach of the Irish Council, and earlier traditional GMO ethics. Though there was no 
lay representation granted by law in all the three Committees, they involved public 
consultations before the preparation of the advices. The Danish advice was conspicuous 
by its representation of a range of minority opinions. The identification of impact and 
utility assessment in the EGE and Danish reports also open avenues for bringing public 
concerns of social value, and contestable notions of justice and welfare to the centre of the 
regulatory debate, and further recognizes public debate and participation in its conceptual 
core. 
 
6.5 Towards public deliberation of public values in GMOs 
Before we proceed to conclude this Chapter, this section focuses on the possibilities 
opened up for public participation in EU regulation of GMOs through the 
recommendations for impact assessment in the EGE and Danish reports. These two 
reports provided broader range of scrutiny in comparison with the scrutiny by earlier 
public GMO-ethics committees, which restricted its gaze within a strict scientific 
conceptualization. This section highlights the recommendations for environmental impact 
assessment, utility assessment and technology impact assessment of the development and 
use of GMOs of these reports to see if they can provide for public participation in EU 
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GMO regulation. The intention in the section is not to offer them as policy 
recommendations to make EU regulation more participatory, but to merely evaluate the 
room for participation that such assessments offer if such impact assessments were 
implemented in the EU regime.  
Technology assessment is understood as an analysis of all significant primary, 
secondary, indirect and delayed consequences or impacts present and foreseen of a 
technological innovation on society, the environment or the economy.852 Within this 
definition, it is evident that risk assessments, environmental impact assessments and 
utility assessments fall well within the ambit of this exercise. There is a cognitive 
superiority in invoking technology assessment as a regulatory practice over an emphasis 
on safety through risk assessment. This is since it can be a more holistic tool to connect all 
potential scientific, social and environmental outcomes regarding the development and use 
of a new technology. However whether technology assessment can be a channel of 
representation of public values in which groups broader than expert communities can 
participate is unclear. This depends on the institutional and conceptual imaginations 
within which technology assessment is implemented as a regulatory tool.  
Currently there is no explicit requirement for technology assessment in the EU 
regulation of development and use of GMOs, let alone legal specifications for public 
participation in such exercises. Technology assessment first gained prominence in the 
1970s, through the creation of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) for providing 
objective analysis to the US Congress.853 The OTA was expected to ‘provide early 
indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the applications of 
technology’ to assist the US Congress.854 The experience of the OTA (until it was wound 
up in the mid-nineties)855 is traced by some commentators as a significant influence in 
many EU Member States. 856 There is a plethora of bodies that provide such advice for 
parliamentary bodies in Europe including the Rathenau Instituut in the Netherlands, the 
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Office of Technology Assessment at the German Parliament, the Catalan Foundation for 
Research and Innovation for the Parliament of Catalonia, the Danish Board of Technology 
and the Institute of Technology Assessment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The 
Scientific Technology Options Assessment panel has organized the process of technology 
assessment consultations in the European Parliament since late 1980s. This European 
Parliamentary panel is advised by the European Technology Assessment Group since 
2005, which is a network of earlier-mentioned institutions that provide technology 
assessment advice to Parliaments in the Member States. The Commission has funded 
various research projects in this area including FAST (Forecasting and Assessing for 
Science and Technology), Formakin (Foresight as a Tool for the Management of 
Knowledge Flows and Innovation), Europta (European Participatory Technology 
Assessment), ASTPP (Advanced Science and Technology Policy Planning), ITSAFE 
(Integrating Technological and Social Aspects of Foresight in Europe), and 
TAMI (Technology Assessment in Europe; Between Method and Impact).857 How these 
EU research projects may affect the regulatory reality on GMOs is currently 
indeterminable.  
There are calls for bringing explicit technology assessment into the centre stage of 
regulation of new technology with an explicit emphasis on public participation in such 
assessment of technology.858 The critique of expert dominated technology assessments run 
parallel to the calls for public participation in risk assessment, conceptually an integral 
part of assessing the impact of any new technology.859 This emphasis on public 
participation is explicit in the EGE recommendation for impact assessment of new 
agricultural technologies like GMOs. The role of Danish Board of Technology, an avid 
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advocate of pTA (participatory Technology Assessment)860 and the general culture of 
consensus seeking through citizen-based deliberative exercises in the Danish political system 
are significant in making sense of the recommendations for utility evaluation by the 
Danish Council.861 A question of how to involve the lay public in an institutional sense 
cannot be addressed here since matters of institutional design are outside the purview of 
the thesis. Having noted the promise of technology assessment, including environmental 
impact assessments and utility assessments, for its broader focus (in comparison to a 
techno-scientific conceptualization of risk assessment), this section reiterated that whether 
such assessments can be incorporated as regulatory tools in EU GMO regulation is 
currently indeterminable. This is since it depends on the legal and institutional context 
through which technology assessment as a regulatory tool will be implemented; a context 
which is currently speculative. 
Taking stock, the focus of this Chapter pertained to EU regulatory strategies 
regarding pursuit of public values during the regulation of the development and use of 
GMOs, and the role of public participation in them. The strategy of consumer autonomy 
and ethical pluralism employed through labelling and coexistence rules can sufficiently 
involve consuming publics only if the disagreements about values pertain exclusively to 
the employment of a technology, and not to its development. Further, an attempt at 
creating an ethically neutral framework to pursue ethical pluralism itself is beset with 
ethical controversies. These include the question as to which set of public values require 
statutory ethics labelling, as well as enumerated technical and conceptual controversies 
about coexistence strategies. Controversies about coexistence mechanisms include doubts 
about the possibilities of an effective segregation for different agricultural forms to 
coexist. This generates significant doubts among some sections that a stated attempt at 
creating a neutral framework is in fact the road toward fait accompli situations in which 
organic and conventional agriculture will have to live with the presence of a certain 
amount of GM. Such a framework will not be seen as ethically neutral by these groups, 
exposing serious limitations of labelling as a predominant strategy to address 
disagreements regarding public values about regulation of GMOs.  
After identifying the second regulatory strategy of advice from public bioethics 
committees, the Chapter emphasized the necessary connections of public bioethics to the 
                                                
860 See, ‘The Danish Board of Technology wins International award for Public Participation’ (15 March 
2011) <http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=1735&survey=15&language=uk> accessed 21 Jan. 2011. 
861 Horst and Irwin (n 485). 
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public sphere, as opposed to restricting itself to methodological justifications of analytical 
philosophy. It noted that the challenge for public bioethics committees is to identify and 
characterize the full range of public concerns about the ethics of regulation, including the 
use and development of GMOs as a technology trajectory. In the examination of relevant 
reports from three public bioethics committees, major criticisms about the focus and 
substance of various reports in the previous regime were found to be symptomatic in the 
Irish advice. These included a singular emphasis on the ethics of consumption of GMOs 
(as opposed to a scrutiny of the ethics of research and development), a lack of scrutiny of 
the instability of the underlying knowledge used in regulation, and the avoidance of a 
scrutiny of the normative questions implicit in risk analysis. Dissent and disagreement 
regarding public values about development and use of technology among various sections 
of society need to be made visible within public bioethics committees, particularly since 
Europe aspires to be a polity that ‘represents the values of all Europeans’.862 Tellichini 
identified the Commission’s public assertion of ethics as an official narrative that amounts 
to an essential frame for the idea of European citizenship - as a way to represent citizen’s 
values, and a glue to move from an economic union towards a political union. 863 She 
presented evidence from archives of Commission web-page regarding the role of GAEIB:  
 
in setting it up the European Commission has highlighted its desire to integrate Europe’s science and 
technology in a manner that serves the interests of European society and respects the fundamental rights 
of every European citizen…European integration must mean more than establishing a single market; 
progress in science and technology must be given a human, social and ethical dimension, otherwise 
European citizenship cannot be established.864 
 
For the effectuation of such a claim of European citizenship in science and technology, 
public consultation and participation have to dominate the expert committee enterprise. 
Otherwise it would be a process where ‘citizens enter this ethical domain more as 
intended objects than as subjects and actors of ethical decisions, notwithstanding the 
assumption that ethics represents citizens’.865  
Further, the supposed ethical turn in regulation seeks the legitimation of the 
resolution of techno-scientific conflicts increasingly in terms of ethical concepts and 
                                                
862 Expert Group on Science and Governance, ‘Taking Knowledge Society Seriously’, (n 60) 52. 
863 Tellichini (n 765) 295. 
864 ibid fns 7- 9. 
865 ibid 295. 
 208  
categories. While this use of bioethics in regulation is criticized for its continuities with 
the earlier expert-dominated governance despite its fundamental concern with democratic 
legitimation, Irwin identified a partial displacement of the technical with the emergence of 
the ethical.866 This is a movement from a technical frame developed by deliberation within 
the scientific community (where technical problems and dangers to health or safety could 
be discussed, but not questions of social order, power or notions of common good) to a 
potentially wider mechanism for social appraisal of science.867 A nuanced defence of the 
ethical turn itself is possible only within a conceptual framework of public deliberation, as 
opposed to an expert dominated committee procedure that, despite taking into account 
wider public concerns, may remain within a rubric of promotion of technological 
endeavours by market enterprises. This would suggest that only a full blown deliberation 
may be able to sufficiently legitimate techno-scientific regulation during public 
contestations about technology and its specific trajectories.  
However, effectuation of such deliberations and public participation within 
bioethics frameworks needs new kinds of regulatory innovations, including conceptual 
and institutional arenas where such public deliberations can occur. Significantly, advices 
of public bioethics committees under the current regime, viz., the EGE and the Danish 
Bioethics Council, have brought into focus these issues. Such focus, by itself, does not 
correspond to the fundamental problem posed by the expert dominated committees to a 
more participatory engagement of public values and contestations about GMOs. This is 
since use of ethics as a separate component in regulation of techno-science itself 
anticipates the inadequacies of a reliance on the values of techno-scientific communities 
to make their research and development compatible to a range of public values. The 
recommendations for technology assessment, environmental impact assessment and utility 
assessment by the EGE and the Danish Council, respectively, are important openings for a 
more open engagement with public values about research, development and use of new 
technologies like GMOs. This is since they do not restrict themselves to a regulatory 
emphasis on techno-scientific risk as the dominant voice for development and use of 
GMOs. However, whether such assessments will lead to deeper public participation in the 
EU regulation of the research, development and use of GMOs is currently speculative, as 
these recommendations are not implemented in EU law. 
                                                
866 Alan Irwin, ‘The Politics of Talk: Coming to terms with the New Scientific Governance’ (2006) 63 
Social Studies of Science 299. 
867 Moore (n 754) 201. 




…we are always in the position of beginning again 868 
 
This thesis sought to identify the space for public participation in the EU 
regulation of GMOs, given the problem of representation in liberal democracies regarding 
governance of emerging technologies. During the discussion in various chapters, the scope 
for public evaluations of social value and utility of new technologies emerged as an 
important theme in the regulation of new technologies. Social value was noted to be a 
crucial element in public appraisals of emerging technologies like GMOs, especially in the 
face of complex and unstable underlying scientific knowledge that informed risk 
regulation. Public bioethics committees like the EGE and the Danish Council have 
emphasized the important connections between the social purpose of a new technology 
and the public acceptance of basic scientific incertitudes about the development and 
employment of GMOs. These reports found questions like who would substantially 
benefit from the employment of such technologies, and whether there are equally viable 
alternative technologies that involve less scientific instability, as important considerations 
in the regulation of GMOs. This has important implications to the room for public 
participation in EU regulation of GMOs.  
Risk regulation was found to be the predominant route through which GMOs were 
regulated in the EU. Participatory discourse is often invoked to make the political 
management of risk more acceptable to the general public. In this thesis, risk is contended 
to include public trust and engagement in its conceptual core, in contrast to a bifurcated 
model of risk that conceptualizes techno-scientific communities as the sole custodian of 
risk assessment. It was noted that issues of public trust in the techno-scientific 
characterization of risk do not necessarily pertain to the normativity of science, but 
regards the norms that underlie the identification of the hazard, and the ethics of statistical 
projections through which the occurrence of hazards is probabilitized. Here 
scientific/technical processes are to be honed towards identifying and investigating all 
potential hazards that are conceivable, including some that are not considered plausible by 
                                                
868 Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment’ in James Faubion (ed) Essential Works of Foucault 1954-84 
(The New Press 1997) 303, 317. 
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techno-scientific communities but are found to be of concern within other publics. Such a 
participatory investigation of incertitudes may constitute an active pursuit of social trust in 
risk regulation.  
It was found that the implementation of the precautionary principle in the current 
EU framework for risk regulation of GMOs is bereft of the fundamental rationale behind 
the principle. With regard to this, the thesis argued that the regulation of safety concerns 
about GMOs in the EU continues to be well within the classical risk paradigm. The 
precautionary principle is most relevant at the limits of expert rationality, in situations 
where scientific understanding is beset with systemic ambiguities and scientific ignorance. 
Bearing this in mind, the regulatory determination of the applicability of the principle 
through expert recommendation in EU GMO regulation is a problematic proposition. In 
this regard, the Commission has insisted that precaution is to be triggered by a technical 
finding of uncertainty, and that the principle should be confined to the stage of risk 
assessment. This leads to a situation where the trigger of the principle is controlled by 
techno-scientific spaces, through an expressedly non-precautionary assessment. Over and 
above this, the chapter noted that bulk of the decisions to release GM crops in the EU is 
purely based on the assessment report of EFSA, given the deadlock in voting during 
committee procedures that constitute risk management. This has meant that the regulation 
of release of GMOs in the EU has been anything but precautionary, and has had extremely 
limited participation from groups outside of techno-scientific spaces.  
An appropriate normative perspective of the precautionary paradigm within which 
a policy framework can be developed, as suggested by WRR (the Dutch council for 
government policy), requires a proactive approach to uncertainty and vulnerability of 
people, society and the natural environment through public participation. Both the 
conceptual core of the regulatory tool of risk, and the normative emphasis on a proactive 
approach to incertitudes require participation of publics which are wider than techno-
scientific communities. This involves social inputs and political control that is wider than 
a pure reliance on techno-scientific reason, one where science is subsidiary to the debate 
about the reasons for developing the technology in question. This wider range of inputs 
include consideration of concerns about social value, a comparative appraisal of viable 
alternative technologies and a connection between the public purpose and the plausibility 
of dangers from the technology. The chapter on global rules regarding GMOs enquired 
whether possible institutional innovations that involve public participatory mechanisms in 
safety regimes within a precautionary paradigm are permissible within relevant global 
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rules. Despite classical risk dominating the SPS Agreement, a realm which currently 
dominates other global rules through judicial construction, it was found that there is a slim 
possibility of WTO legality for Members to introduce these regulatory innovations. 
On the whole the thesis contented that it is important that law maintains 
efficacious channels to identify and respond to public values about regulation of GMOs. 
This includes public values about safety concerns as well, given the normative nature of 
questions in risk regulation, and the basic incertitudes in basic scientific knowledge used 
for such regulation. With regard to the pursuit of public values, two significant routes that 
involved varied levels of public participation were identified in the EU regulation of 
GMOs. First is the strategy of consumer autonomy, effectuated through labeling and 
coexistence measures, where consumers can choose between different agricultural 
systems. This gives the consuming publics an opportunity to participate through 
consuming or avoiding consuming GM products. This strategy predicates on an 
assumption of ethical plurality that can be sustained through an ethically neutral 
framework, where the consuming publics can take the decision about appropriate 
consumption themselves. However, the strategy of consumer autonomy and sustaining 
ethical pluralism will be sufficiently participatory only if the disagreements about values 
pertain only to the consumption of technology, and not its development. The imagination 
of consumer autonomy is predicated on an ethically neutral framework through which 
divergent values can be furthered simultaneously by publics of different value disposition. 
However, controversies encountered during coexistence make the potential to create such 
an ethically neutral framework itself suspect. These factors include controversies 
regarding which stream of agriculture will bear the costs of segregation, the ethical 
implications of a strictly economic basis for coexistence measures and the technical 
(im)possibilities of segregation. These controversies are cited by some groups to call these 
measures as a back-door entry for situations of fait accompli of significant inadvertent 
presence of GM through large scale introductions.  
The second arena identified in the thesis where public values about regulation of 
GMOs are formally taken into account is the deliberation in public bioethics committees. 
Culminating in advisory reports, the deliberation here is an important regulatory strategy 
to identify and reflect on public values about GMOs. The thesis emphasized the necessary 
connections of public bioethics to the public sphere as opposed to restricting it to 
methodological justifications of analytical philosophy. Chapter 6 underlined the need to 
include a public scrutiny of not only the ethics of consumption of GMOs but also the 
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institutional ethics of development of technology through these committees. Further, a 
lack of ethical scrutiny of the instability of the underlying knowledge used in risk 
regulation, and regarding the normative assumptions during the framing of risk analysis 
would be an inadequate form of deliberation. Significantly, advice from the EGE and the 
Danish Bioethics Council has brought focus to these issues. Such focus, by itself, does not 
correspond to a fundamental problem posed by the expert dominated committees about 
the lack of lay participation in them. This problem relates to fundamental objective of use 
of bioethics advice, i.e. use of ethics as separate component in regulation of techno-
science itself anticipates the inadequacies of a reliance on the values of techno-scientific 
communities to make their research and development compatible to a range of public 
values. However, identification of technology assessment, environment impact assessment 
and utility assessment by the EGE and Danish Council are important openings for a more 
public engagement with public values about research, development and use of GMOs. 
During their scrutiny, these bioethics committees underlined the importance of public 
participation in the suggested impact assessment of GMOs. If and how these 
recommendations will be implemented in the future in the EU regulation of GMOs is 
speculative; and the nature of public participation in these implementations, currently 
indeterminable. 
While the thesis has in itself explored the space for public participation in EU 
regulation of GMOs, this is quite different from reflecting on whether public participation 
is practically possible. How to structure participatory regulation in the EU depends on a 
host of factors, including political will, and is not germane to the scope of this thesis. 
However, it is important to recall invocations of an important hurdle to public 
participation viz., ill informed and disengaged lay publics. In this context, perhaps it is 
also a valid question posed by many groups as to ‘why is it that citizens and the public are 
always asked to choose among alternatives which others have designed and presented to 
them? Why is it that citizens are not asked to specify the world they want and the 
alternative which they desire?’869 Whether lay publics are seen as citizens who are capable 
of finding their own meanings or seen as intellectually vacuous, would be key here. 
Various EU policy documents appear to answer this normative question in an affirmative 
and positive manner, while they commit themselves to public participation. If there is 
indeed such a policy commitment, then the description in this thesis points to a distinct 
                                                
869 John Dixon, ‘How can Public Participation become Real’ [1975] January/February Public Administration 
Review 69, 70. 
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disconnect between the commitment and implementation in the legal regime. The 
challenge then for policy makers is how to implement them through justiciable principles 
and procedures. It would be erroneous to assume that lay public influence in social 
choices for the development of technology is an attack on the scientist. Much to the 
contrary, it can pose added meaning to the technological enterprise through a responsible 
and democratic way of development of technology: ‘in recent focus groups and other 
public engagement exercises on nanotechnology, particularly in Britain, members of the 
public voiced their experience of not having any agency, and were then joined by nano-
scientists being involved but unable to make a difference either’.870 It is important that a 
wider debate influences the development and regulation of technologies like GMOs, and 
the challenges and opportunities such participation in regulatory deliberation offer to 
democratizing law could yet be crucial for our collective futures. 
                                                
870 Arie Rip and Tsjalling Swierstra, ‘Nano-ethics as NEST-ethics: Patterns of Moral Argument about New 
and Emerging Science and Technology’ (2007) 1 Nanoethics 3, fn 2. 
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